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FBIS-EEU-93-026 *10 February 1993*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

BULGARIA

FRY Envoy Regrets Problems Caused by Ships *[KONTINENT 6-7 Feb]* 1
Talks Held With Romania on Danube Embargo *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Cooperation on Embargo Reaffirmed *[BTA]* 1
Ministry Reports Serbian Planes Violate Airspace *[Sofia Radio]* 1
Kazakh Prime Minister Arrives for Visit *[Sofia Radio]* 2
Welcomed by Berov at Airport *[Sofia Radio]* 2
Holds Official Talks *[Sofia Radio]* 2
Berov Meets International Bankers *[BTA]* 3
Berov Cabinet Issues Detailed Government Program *[BTA]* 3
Foreign Policy Aspects Detailed *[BTA]* 4
New Police Director Discusses Threat of Crime *[BTA]* 5
Proposed Nuclear Waste Processing Plant Viewed *[KONTINENT 8 Feb]* 5
SDS Leaders Set Date for National Conference *[Sofia Radio]* 6
National-Radical Leader Explains Party's Goals *[OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK 4 Feb]* 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus Rejects Burden of FRG Asylum Seekers *[RUDE PRAVO 5 Feb]* 8
Final Stages of Federal Property Division Outlined *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 8 Feb]* 8
Klaus on Currency Switch, Broadcasting Issues *[Prague Radio]* 9
Citizens Optimistic About Economic Prospects *[CTK]* 10
Baudys Interviewed on Army's Current Problems *[TELEGRAF 2 Feb]* 10

SLOVAKIA

'Integration' Into European Structures Supported *[CTK]* 12
Slovakia Protests Czech Use of Former CSFR Flag *[CTK]* 12
Kovac Confirmed as Sole Presidential Candidate *[Bratislava TV]* 12
HZDS No Longer Insisting on Member Candidate *[CTK]* 12
Knazko Censured; Filkus Resigns *[CTK]* 13
Delayed Solution to HZDS Crisis Predicted *[NARODNA OBRODA 8 Feb]* 13
Data on 1992 Foreign Trade Statistics Relased *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 5 Feb]* 14
New Private Radios May Carry Ethnic Programming *[Budapest Radio]* 14

HUNGARY

Foreign Minister Views Relations With Neighbors *[MAGYAR NEMZET 6 Feb]* 15
Goncz Airs Views on Role of Visegrad Group *[Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES 3 Feb]* 18
Kazakh Prime Minister Concludes Official Visit *[MTI]* 18
Embargo on FRY Costs 'Hundreds of Millions' *[MTI]* 18
Socialist Politician Views Change of Regime *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 6 Feb]* 18
Trade Union Alliance Head on Forming New Party *[PESTI HIRLAP 3 Feb]* 19

POLAND

Walesa To Dissolve Sejm If Budget Not Approved *[Warsaw Radio]* 21
Culture Council Reminded of Dignity of Presidency *[PAP]* 21
Conflict Over Walesa Called 'Destructive for All' *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 4 Feb]* 21
Walesa Appoints New Culture, Arts Minister *[PAP]* 23
Privatization Minister Views Progress *[NOWA EUROPA 29-31 Jan]* 23

Sejm Passes Law on Privatization of State Firms *[PAP]* 25
State 'Sabotage' of Family Farms Denied *[TRYBUNA SLASKA 3 Feb]* 25
Rightist Leader on Market Economy, Regionalization *[TRYBUNA SLASKA 30-31 Jan]* 26
Solidarity Dissidents To Form Separate Team *[PAP]* 27
More on Solidarity 'Rift' *[NOWA EUROPA 8 Feb]* 27
Walesa Asks Sejm Speaker To Discipline Deputies *[PAP]* 27
Union, Government Disagree Over Arms Industry *[PAP]* 28
UP Objects To 'Brutalization of Political Life' *[PAP]* 28
Ex-Interior Minister Kiszczak To Face Trial *[PAP]* 28
KGB General Says No Plan To Intervene Existed *[PAP]* 29

ROMANIA

Assembly Agrees To Inspection of Bugged Phones *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 4 Feb]* 30
Melescanu Praises EEC Association Accord *[ADEVARUL 4 Feb]* 30
Secretary Ene Discusses Purpose of Sofia Talks *[ROMPRES]* 32
Communique Issued Answering Trade Union Requests *[ROMPRES]* 32
Trade Unions Call Off Threatened Strike *[ROMPRES]* 32
Committee Expels Dissident PRM Parliamentarian *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 6 Feb]* 32
PSM Considers Communist Restoration 'Impossible' *[ROMPRES]* 33
FSN, Opposition Parties Believed To Join Government *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 4 Feb]* 33
Dragomir Comments on Party, Political Issues *[ROMPRES]* 33
FDSN Concerned About Moldovan Situation *[ROMPRES]* 34
Docked Ships Negative Impact on Economy Alleged *[Bucharest Radio]* 34
Justice Minister Ninosu Defends Doina Cornea *[ROMPRES]* 34

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

Sarajevo Airlift Resumes After Three-Day Hiatus *[AFP]* 35
Convoys Leave To Supply Usora, Gradacac *[Zagreb TV]* 35
Sarajevo Mayor Meets With Vance-Owen Envoy *[Sarajevo Radio]* 35
Presidency Adviser Rejects Sarajevo Partition *[Sarajevo Radio]* 36
Commentary Calls Partition Proposal 'Sadistic' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 36
Refugees in Tuzla 'In Extremely Bad Shape' *[AFP]* 37
Izetbegovic Discusses War, Peace Efforts *[Sarajevo Radio]* 37
Cease-Fire Reportedly Broken by Serb Attack *[Zagreb Radio]* 39
U.S. Plan To End Fighting Reported *[Belgrade Radio]* 39
Trebinje Official Denies 'Ethnic Cleansing' *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 1 Feb]* 40
Army Using Chlorine Tankers as Defense in Brcko *[Sarajevo Radio]* 40
Small Percent of Needed Medicine Reaches Sarajevo *[Sarajevo Radio]* 40
Mazowiecki Says Human Rights Must Be UN Priority *[AFP]* 40

CROATIA

HDZ Big Winner in Chamber of Counties Election *[Zagreb Radio]* 42
Opposition Said Defeating HDZ in Larger Towns *[TANJUG]* 42
Serbs Arrest Belgian Soldiers for 'Spying' *[TANJUG]* 42
Talks Held With Bosnian Croats on Cooperation *[Zagreb TV]* 42
Government Rejects Negotiation With Krajina Serbs *[TANJUG]* 43
Croatian Serbs Call for 'Joint Serbian State' *[TANJUG]* 43
Lukic, Zecevic Hold Talks on Croat 'Aggression' *[TANJUG]* 43
Serbs Claim Victory Over Croat Forces *[TANJUG]* 44
Croats Launch 'Offensive' on Krajina Villages *[TANJUG]* 44
Krajina Front 'Enormous'; Volunteers Arriving *[Belgrade Radio]* 44
Army Denies Serb Recapture of Villages *[Zagreb Radio]* 45
Elite Units Called on To Defeat Serbs *[DANAS 15 Jan]* 45
Serbs Mobilizing RSK Refugees in Yugoslavia *[TANJUG]* 46
Krajina Serbs in FRY Drafted for Defense *[TANJUG]* 47
Krajina Government in 'Permanent Session' *[TANJUG]* 47
Succession Coordinator Assesses Present Situation *[VECERNJI LIST 6 Feb]* 47
Transformation of Croatian Enterprises *[DANAS 22 Jan]* 48
Situation of Muslims in Croatia Viewed *[DANAS 15 Jan]* 50
Islamic Community President Supports Croatia *[DANAS 15 Jan]* 51

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Kontic Accepts Premiership Without 'Elation' *[TANJUG]* 53
Fertilizer Shortage Threatens Food Production *[TANJUG]* 53
U.S. Intervention in Bosnia Likened to Vietnam *[POLITIKA 5 Feb]* 53

Serbia

Prime Minister-Designate Addresses Assembly *[Belgrade Radio]* 54
Radio Announces Coverage of Assembly Session *[Belgrade Radio]* 58

Kosovo

Albanians Claim 'Forces' To 'Destroy' Serb Plans *[ATA]* 59
FRY Army Chief Visits Troops in Province *[TANJUG]* 59
Serbs Seize Land, Property From Local Companies *[ATA]* 59

Vojvodina

Vojvodina Assembly Elects New Government *[TANJUG]* 60
Hungarians Object to Appointment of New Minister *[Budapest Radio]* 60

FRY Envoy Regrets Problems Caused by Ships

AU0902153093 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 6-7 Feb 93 p 2

[Report by Nikolay Golemanov: "I Regret the Difficulties for Bulgaria Caused by the Incident With the Danube Ships"]

[Text] Sofia, 5 February—"I realize that the recent passage of Serbian vessels on the Danube caused a lot of difficulties for Bulgaria, which I sincerely regret," FRY ambassador Milenko Stefanovic said in a three-hour interview for KONTINENT.

"I think the Bulgarian Government's stand was sensible. Your country was naturally obliged strictly to observe Resolution No. 787 of the UN Security Council, which it did, and I fully understand Bulgaria's position," he said.

"Nevertheless, as far as I know, the resolution does not provide for the use of force against vessels, and there is also a Danube Convention guaranteeing freedom of navigation," Mr. Stefanovic added.

"The Yugoslav Government has nothing to do with the barges in question. They belong to a private enterprise, a company, and the crew members embarked on the voyage at their own risk. In addition, they were detained for almost two months and remained without food and water," the ambassador explained.

The 60-year old Milenko Stefanovic, former Montenegrin foreign minister, is currently the only member of the FRY's Sofia embassy with diplomatic status. He has served in Bulgaria before, among other things, even as SFRY ambassador.

"I am not pleased to hear my country being called Serbian-Montenegrin Yugoslavia. It has its own constitution and its official name is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Mr. Stefanovic said.

The ambassador does not think the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia-Hercegovina has failed. It is the only possible solution for a peaceful settlement of the Yugo-conflict, according to him. New Yugoslavia supports this plan, he declared.

KONTINENT plans to publish an extensive interview with Milenko Stefanovic in the coming days.

Talks Held With Romania on Danube Embargo

AU0902191393 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] In Sofia today consultations were held between the foreign ministries of Bulgaria and Romania, as states bordering on the Danube River, on applying the UN Security Council sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. The meeting also discussed the coordinated cooperation of the two states in applying joint measures to monitor the observance of the sanctions.

At a news conference, the leaders of the Bulgarian and Romanian delegations to the talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Valentin Dobrev and Constantin Ene, secretary of state at the Romanian Foreign Ministry, stated that Bulgaria and Romania will strictly observe the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. They said that the two countries would press for the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution.

Romania and Bulgaria will jointly inform the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council on the losses they have incurred from observing the embargo. The two countries voiced their readiness to hold a trilateral meeting with Ukraine regarding the violations of the sanctions committed by vessels sailing along the Danube under the Serbia and Montenegro flag.

During the consultations it was agreed that Bulgaria and Romania should make a joint demarche to the United Nations asking for the deployment of a UN mission on the lower reaches of the Danube River.

Cooperation on Embargo Reaffirmed

AU0902195893 Sofia BTA in English 1941 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Excerpt] Sofia, February 9 (BTA)—Bulgaria and Romania will strictly observe the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro as required by the resolutions of the UN Security Council. The two sides will deepen their cooperation and will coordinate their activities in exercising control over oil tankers on the Danube. This was announced at a press conference held here today following the consultations between a Bulgarian delegation, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Valentin Dobrev, and a Romanian delegation headed by the Mr. Constantin Ene, minister of state at the Romanian Foreign Ministry. The consultations discussed and coordinated bilateral cooperation in the enforcement of the sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) against Serbia and Montenegro.

At the press conference the leaders of the delegations excluded the possibility of unilateral use of force against sanction busters. According to Mr. Dobrev, this can take place solely on the basis of a resolution of the UN Security Council sanctioning joint use of force. Any use of force may have unpredictable consequences in this region, Mr. Dobrev said. [passage omitted]

Ministry Reports Serbian Planes Violate Airspace

AU0902205693 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 2030 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] The Defense Ministry Press Center has issued the following announcement:

At 1628 hours today two low-flying Serbian military aircraft violated Bulgarian airspace by entering about two kilometers into our territory in the area defined by border markers Nos. 177, 185, and 195.

Bearing in mind the bend in the line of the border in the above-mentioned region and the nature of the terrain, it is assumed that the incursion was not deliberate, but rather due to an error. Notwithstanding this, the Bulgarian Government will take the necessary measures to clarify the incident with the Serbian authorities.

Kazakh Prime Minister Arrives for Visit

AU0902194393 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] This evening Sergey Tereshchenko, prime minister of Kazakhstan, arrived in Bulgaria on a two-day visit at the invitation of Bulgarian Prime Minister Lyuben Berov.

Welcomed by Berov at Airport

AU0902213993 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2100 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] A short while ago, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov held a meeting with Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Sergey Tereshchenko at Sofia Airport.

In a brief statement for the Khorizont Program, Mr. Tereshchenko said:

[Tereshchenko in Russian, fading to Bulgarian translation by announcer] The goal of our visit is to establish economic relations with Bulgaria. As a sovereign state, Kazakhstan is now arranging its own mutually beneficial relations with all states that previously maintained cooperation with the former Soviet Union, Mr. Tereshchenko said.

The leader of the Kazakhstan delegation referred to the recent very beneficial visit by Bulgarian Industry Minister Rumen Bikov and to the meeting that the two countries' presidents, Zhelev and Nazarbayev, held in Davos, where agreement was reached on the present brief visit to Bulgaria.

Tomorrow official intergovernmental talks will be held.

Bulgarian Prime Minister Berov added that certain documents may be signed even now. He said that a considerable number of spheres for economic cooperation have been marked out, and the possibilities in these spheres now have to be further specified.

It was announced that the Kazakhstan prime minister's visit will last for two days, but in fact Sergey Tereshchenko will stay in Bulgaria for less than 24 hours.

Holds Official Talks

AU1002115093 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] On 10 February at the Boyana Residence official governmental talks took place with the Kazakh delegation on the establishment of new economic relations between Bulgaria and the sovereign Republic of Kazakhstan. Kalina Stancheva reports:

The Kazakh prime minister is accompanied by almost one half of his cabinet. Leaders of the ministries of economy, industry, agriculture, foreign affairs, and foreign economic relations, and of the central state bank and the committee on security are members of the delegation. The membership of the Bulgarian delegation has a similar character.

The talks started with statements from the two prime ministers. They outlined the positions of their governments.

Mr. Berov said that his government will adhere in every way to the process of democratization. He confirmed that in its foreign policy Bulgaria will continue to strive toward a rapid integration in the European structures.

As far as the Balkans are concerned, our prime minister said that Bulgaria supports refraining from the use of force in settling the conflicts and rendering active assistance in establishing good-neighborly relations among all states in the region.

As far as the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Baltic states, Georgia, and Armenia are concerned, Bulgaria is interested in maintaining relations with those sovereign states and restoring friendly relations recognizing the mutual benefit.

Regarding future contacts with Kazakhstan, Mr. Berov presented in detail the view of the Bulgarian side. Those relations must be based on the prompt signing of the treaty on friendship and cooperation, accelerating contacts at the level of embassies, and working out a modern legal-contractual basis between the two states. He meant the signing of an agreement on economic (trade) and cultural cooperation, legal assistance, avoiding double taxation, and mutually protecting investments. According to Mr. Raykov, spokesman for the government, Bulgaria has the firm intention to maintain active and priority trade relations with Kazakhstan in the spheres of the electric industry, mining, specific foodstuffs projects, and tourism. We expect Kazakhstan to supply us with oil. This country's annual production is 26 million tonnes. It can only process 16 million tonnes—the same quantity that our Neftokhim oil processing plant can process. We also expect significant supplies of iron, cotton, coal, coke, and fruits.

The Bulgarian proposal to establish joint enterprises with a system of alleviated payments in the spheres of light industry and the construction industry and the mining of gold in Kazakhstan, was positively accepted.

The leader of the Kazakh Government agreed to other proposals that were voiced by the Bulgarian side. In his statement he described Kazakhstan's wealth, which presupposes a mutually beneficial cooperation.

The Bulgarian side understands all this. I talked to Mr. Berov, who pointed out that Kazakhstan is an especially

appealing partner, because this is a calm country and knows how to avoid ethnic and other disturbances.

[Begin Berov recording] This is a peaceful and very big republic, very rich in natural resources, from which our two states could benefit. [end recording]

Sergey Tereshchenko, Kazakh prime minister, also pointed out the mutual benefit of economic relations. We all have difficulties, he said, but if we face them together we will be more successful.

Berov Meets International Bankers

AU0902155193 Sofia BTA in English 1532 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Sofia, February 9 (BTA)—Prime Minister Lyuben Berov today met with Christopher Nowles of the European Investment Bank, Bruce Smith of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Raguveer Sharma of the World Bank, and Vam Maele of Operation PHARE. They discussed the financing of telecommunications networks projects in this country. The guests informed Mr. Berov of the progress in this area—contracts have been signed with two banks and negotiations are under way with a third bank—and said they were pleased with the leadership of the Posts and Telecommunications Committee.

The representatives of the financial institutions posed two major questions—about legislation, and the need for higher charges and higher quality of services.

Prof. Berov assured the guests that the inevitable changes in Bulgaria's administration will not lead to changes in legislation, instability and failure to meet commitments. Prime Minister Berov said a telecommunications bill has been submitted to parliament in August but he could not specify when it will pass because many important bills have to be debated first. Prof. Berov expressed the government's view that the increase in charges is inevitable but it remains to be decided when and how much they will be raised.

The guests reminded Prof. Berov that Bulgaria would receive 200 million dollars in credits upon the passage of a Telecommunications Act.

Berov Cabinet Issues Detailed Government Program

AU1002083093 Sofia BTA in English 2143 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Sofia, February 9 (BTA)—The cabinet of Prof. Lyuben Berov, elected on December 30 last year under the mandate of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) and with the support of the majority of the Socialist MP's [members of parliament], circulated its detailed programme in parliament today. It specifies the intentions of the cabinet outlined in the programme declaration of the government made public upon the election of the cabinet. Already then Prime Minister Berov declared that he will present parliament with a detailed programme within one month.

In the preamble to the programme the government points out that in 1993 the macroeconomic situation will be determined by the three-year drop in the gross domestic product and by the operative internal and foreign economic factors in the transition to a market economy. The preamble also points out that in 1993 the drop in the gross domestic product may reach about 4 percent and that the cabinet will direct its efforts towards curbing this drop.

In its programme the cabinet provides for a 1993 budget deficit between 6 and 8 percent of the gross domestic product and for an annual inflation not exceeding the 1992 one (80 percent). The government will seek to restrict the inflation rate to its possible minimum and at the same time it will pursue a policy aimed at a further liberalization of the prices of fuels, electricity and central heating, it is pointed out in the programme.

The government projects a one-percent drop in employment as a result of structural changes in the economic branches and declares that it will seek to encourage the opening of new jobs in the development of the private sector.

In its part titled "Economic Aims and Actions," the programme of the Bulgarian Government points to the restriction of the drop in production as the principal aim of the government. To this end the government envisages concrete steps for a quick start of privatization. By March 31, 1993, it will submit to parliament "expedient addenda and specifications" to the Privatization Act aimed at "broadening social support for privatization and preventing covert privatization."

By March 31 the cabinet will also prepare and move in parliament a 1993 budget formation and implementation bill. In financing the budget deficit the government will propose to give priority to the issuing of state securities and to decreasing direct credits from the central bank.

In settling the problems concerning Bulgaria's foreign debt the cabinet will pursue a policy which would relieve budget expenditures and contribute to the achievement of the macroeconomic aims.

Prof. Lyuben Berov's cabinet intends to draft and adopt a special long-term programme for the development of the priority economic branches—agriculture, tourism, light industry, and subbranches of mechanical engineering and the chemical industry. The cabinet intends to step up the process of land restitution and plans to restore ownership over 50 percent of the arable land by the end of the year. It will assist the formation of "new democratic cooperatives and other forms of cooperation between private farmers in the villages" and will facilitate the access of private agricultural producers to credits by increasing the resources of the agricultural credit fund.

The programme also provides for measures aimed at encouraging private entrepreneurship in the manufacturing sector, at the stabilization of the management of commercial partnerships with state property, observing at the same time the principle of their autonomy from the state and encouraging their privatization. By May 1993 the government intends to adopt rules regulating the exercising of the state's rights of ownership in the enterprises.

The government declares that it will continue the process of this country's integration in the European economic structures and will seek to "reorientate Bulgarian trade to the Western markets," though in the next few years Bulgaria will continue to be dependent primarily on its relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union and the former socialist countries. The export regulations will develop towards narrowing export bans, the operation of such bans being restricted to a limited group of goods in view of preventing possible shortages.

In the field of social security the government intends to "defend the real size of the minimum working wage, of social relief and of the base income for receiving social relief."

The programme is 80 pages long and is divided into two main parts titled: "Actions of the Government in the Realization of its Principal Goals" and "Actions of the Ministries and Committees in Implementation of the Government's Programme in 1993."

Foreign Policy Aspects Detailed

AU1002082793 Sofia BTA in English 2027 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Sofia, February 9 (BTA)—The government headed by Prof. Lyuben Berov, an independent, elected in December, declares in a detailed programme submitted to parliament that it will pursue a pragmatic, balanced foreign policy, in compliance with the generally recognized international law principles and standards, the UN Charter, the Charter of Paris, and the UN documents. The government stresses the supremacy of international treaty obligations over the national legislation, as well as its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague in disputes on conventions to which Bulgaria is a party, and of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.

The government headed by Prof. Berov declares that it will continue the policy of Bulgaria's integration into the European structures, the world financial and banking institutions. The programme says an association agreement will be signed with the European Community by the end of March 1993 and a speedy procedure for bringing Bulgarian statutory legislation in line with EC standards will be initiated by year's end. The programme says negotiations with EFTA [European Free Trade Association] for the setting up of a free trade zone should be completed in the first half of 1993. Early next year Bulgaria should start negotiating with the OECD for an agreement granting it observer status. The programme says association negotiations with GATT should start early next year.

The CSCE will remain a priority in Bulgarian foreign policy. The government declares that Bulgaria will continue its active work at the Council of Europe. "In the next six months we will accelerate Bulgaria's association with the European Social Fund and its accession to the major European conventions in the area of private, criminal and administrative law," says the programme.

The cabinet of Professor Berov declares that it will seek to promote Bulgaria's cooperation with NATO and the Western European Union and to contribute to enhancing the role of these two organizations in guaranteeing security in the Balkans.

The programme sets forth the intentions of the government to continue to promote with equal intensity Bulgaria's relations with the West European states, the United States, and Canada.

The programme gives prominence to Bulgaria's relations with the Balkan countries. "The efforts for enhancing confidence and security in the region, for the establishment of European standards in inter-Balkan relations and for settling the disputes between them through the European institutions will continue." "Special attention will be paid to preventing the spread of the Yugoslav conflict and the resurgence of historical enmities between the Balkan states and of nationalist ambitions," it is pointed out in the programme. The government intends to pursue a policy of regional responsibility and declares in its programme that it will oppose the resurgence of political axes and alliances in the Balkans and the establishment of new axes. The Bulgarian Government also intends to promote its relations with the former Yugoslav republics, paying special attention to supporting their efforts to establish themselves as equal subjects of international law and international relations. "As regards the Republic of Macedonia, the application of this principle will take into account the international and internal political aspects of Bulgaria's relations with that country," the programme reads. Bulgaria will develop its relations with Romania, Turkey and Greece with equal intensity. The programme expresses the striving of the government to give priority to the settlement of some outstanding problems related to the demilitarization of sea territories, environmental protection, humanitarian, financial and property issues, visa regulations and transportation fees.

Bulgaria will continue its political activity for the holding of a summit-level Balkan conference immediately after the Yugo-crisis is settled and the signing of a declaration on giving any territorial claims and recognizing the existing borders. Bulgaria has the intention to coordinate regional projects in the field of transport, communications and environmental protection within the framework of Balkan, Black Sea and Danubian cooperation, the programme says.

Bulgaria will restore and activate those elements in its bilateral relations with the East European countries and the Commonwealth of Independent States which are to the interest of the parties concerned in all fields. The programme stresses the need of speeding up the work on the new legal framework of these relations. Bulgaria intends to continue the effort for its inclusion in the so-called triangular operations for helping the CIS through the conclusion of bilateral agreements with its members.

A special part of the programme's foreign policy section is devoted to Bulgaria's relations with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Prof. Berov's government intends to restore the Bulgarian positions in the countries in those regions where Bulgaria has considerable economic interests, especially in the Middle East, it is said in the programme. It is envisaged to consolidate the legal framework of the relations with Japan, China, Israel and South Africa and to expand them. It is planned to intensify the relations with the so-called new industrial states in Asia and Latin America. The programme explicitly states that it is the government's goal to guarantee the security and the interests of Bulgarian individuals and juristic persons in countries where the internal political situation is unstable.

It is pointed out in the section treating Bulgaria's activity in the international organizations that this country will activate its participation in the United Nations Organization and in the specialized organizations, using the possibilities they offer for assisting the Bulgarian reforms, improving nuclear safety, protecting the environment and providing better health care. Prof. Berov's government intends to avail itself of the opportunity opened by the fact that it presides the 47th session of the UN General Assembly and to get a compensation for its losses arising in connection with the observance of the UN Security Council sanctions against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. It is declared in the programme that the export and import regulations will be brought into line with the international standards for export control so that Bulgaria be deleted from the list of countries subject to COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] restrictions.

New Police Director Discusses Threat of Crime

AU0902193593 Sofia BTA in English 1745 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Sofia, February 9 (BTA)—The new director of the National Police, Colonel Ivan Batsarov (47), a jurist from Sofia, said today that he cannot guarantee the security of citizens, especially in the outlying districts and in the late hours. That is why he advises people throughout the country not to walk the streets alone at night or, if this is impossible, to obtain self-protection devices.

This was the first press conference given by Colonel Batsarov after he was appointed to this post on January 22 by presidential decree. The press conference was also attended by his two deputies—Lieutenant Colonel Zlatko Bosilkov and Major Rumen Genov.

The National Police director said that professionals are leaving the police in large numbers because of the low remuneration and the poor legal protection and equipment of policemen in Bulgaria. Many of them become bodyguards and guards, tempted by three-fold higher wages. Colonel Batsarov said that from now on policemen will be given cash rewards for good work and that they, including the leadership of the National Police, will have to pass tests at least once a year.

Colonel Batsarov also said that a reception room will be opened at the directorate in which citizens will be able to set forth their opinion on the work of the police throughout this country. An anonymous round-the-clock telephone line will also be installed on which citizens will be able to report any wrongful acts of policemen.

We will continue to work for the independence of the National Police within the framework of the law and for raising the professionalism of all policemen in combatting crime, in maintaining public order and in enhancing road safety, Colonel Batsarov said. He expressed his conviction that in its work the police will greatly rely on the public and the state institutions because crime can be restricted only by joint efforts.

Proposed Nuclear Waste Processing Plant Viewed

AU1002125893 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 8 Feb 93 p 7

[Report by Bogomil Avramov: "We Will Be First Again—Plant for Processing Radioactive Materials To Be Constructed 200-300 Km From Sofia"]

[Excerpts] The scandal with the radioactive milk in Plovdiv was hardly accidental. The affair is a part of our misunderstood civilization which we continue to be proud of, despite the fact that the people continue to laugh at us. [passage omitted]

It is expected that a company which calls itself the Scientific Ecology Group, known by almost no one, would build the first plant for processing radioactive materials. This would be not only the first such plant in Bulgaria or the Balkans, but in the entire former Eastern bloc.... It appears that the plant will be located 200-300 kilometers from Sofia. The entire issue is treated as a "state secret"....

A news conference on this issue was given in the United States. According to the specialized press, the initial offer was extremely interesting. The Scientific Ecology Group will build the processing complex, because it must do so. The equipment is ready, stored in a warehouse near Oak Ridge. Who produces such equipment for the purpose of merely storing it? Bulgaria does not have the money needed for that equipment, however. On the other hand, perhaps it has the money but does not want to purchase the equipment. Who knows? We know that

the payment could be made later with electricity. The payment will be made to France, which for its part, will pay our debts to the producer of the installations. Every peddler on our impoverished streets knows what quashing the debts in this manner means. The scientists are also beginning to understand this. [passage omitted]

Sources, and by this I mean not only Bulgarian sources, claim that the liquid waste of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant already amounts to 4,000,000 liters. I do not know whether this is true, but if the milk our children drink is already radioactive, why should I not believe this figure? On the other hand, perhaps we tried to deceive the Americans in this area, because we plan to expand our nuclear facilities. Yes, we have people who are experts in such things.... Those 4,000,000 liters of low-radioactive waste, (and please do not think that if its radioactivity is low it means that it is safe), will be stored in reinforced-concrete containers. Regardless of how safe such containers are, occasionally they prove unsafe and leak. This is what international practice shows. Transporting the waste from Kozloduy to the storage facility is another matter. Reportedly, this installation should be completed in 1993. Does this mean that it is already under construction? Are we going to disgrace ourselves? How come we heard nothing about the Bulgarian delegation which has probably already visited Oak Ridge? Why is no one saying anything about the installation or the technology being used? Is it modern technology? Is the whole affair a trick? Are prohibited materials being used in the construction? Can they be second-hand materials?

May God protect us.... [passage omitted]

SDS Leaders Set Date for National Conference

AU0902193793 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] This afternoon the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] began a meeting in the National Assembly building in Sofia. Later the SDS National Coordinating Council also met.

In a declaration it adopted, the SDS National Coordinating Council categorically dissociates itself from Stoyan Ganev, strongly censures him, and declares that the council considers that he bears the entire responsibility for his statements and actions.

The SDS National Coordinating Council suspended the membership of the Christian Democratic Union in the SDS and restored the Civic Initiative Movement to regular membership.

It was also decided that three members of the Radical Democratic Party who supported the Lyuben Berov government are no longer members of the party.

The SDS National Coordinating Council elected Valeri Tsvetkov as leader of the analysis and political research group.

At its meeting today, the SDS National Coordinating Council decided that the SDS national conference will take place in Sofia on 13 and 14 March. SDS Chief Secretary Ivan Kurtev informed reporters that all the members of the SDS municipal coordinating councils will take part in the conference. Each of the parties and organizations in the SDS coalition will also be represented by 10 persons from their central leaderships, and SDS National Assembly deputies and SDS mayors will also participate in the conference. Kurtev said that about 1,600 people are expected to attend the conference. In his view, the main task of the conference will be to hear the views of the local leaderships on the SDS's future policy.

According to our reporter Antanoeta Kuncheva, the meeting of the SDS parliamentary group is still continuing. The deputies are discussing the text of a declaration that every SDS deputy will have to make to define his or her attitude to the Berov government. After it has adopted this declaration, the parliamentary group is likely to engage in electing a new leadership.

National-Radical Leader Explains Party's Goals

AU1002094293 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 4 Feb 93 p 2

[Interview with Dr. Ivan Georgiev, chairman of the Bulgarian National-Radical Party (BNRP), by Nikolay Bozhev; place and date not given: "We Are Struggling for Christian Values Against the Offensive of Islam"]

[Text] OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK editorial note: In publishing the following interview with Dr. Ivan Georgiev we realize that his statements and the policy of the Bulgarian National-Radical Party [BNRP] may well provoke disagreement, objections, and criticism among many citizens. Our editorial board does not endorse any of Dr. Georgiev's views. Our newspaper gives space to his party because it is a phenomenon in our political life that can be assessed in different ways, especially since it claims 35,000 members, mainly young people aged 18 to 25.

We are prepared to publish any opposing views.

[Bozhev] Why did you request an interview with OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK?

[Georgiev] We have approached all the media to publicize our platform. That is because we have been subjected to a total information blackout. We have no access to radio and television. The ruling forces have banned us from the public because they view the BNRP as a force capable of combating treason, national apostasy, nihilism, and the destructive processes in our economy.

[Bozhev] If your party were to come to power, what major changes would you make in social policy and economic life?

[Georgiev] We have drafted a sensible social program and are convinced that every country should try to achieve the best possible living standard. In our view, opportunities should be created for the development of the private, cooperative, and state-owned economic sectors. Unlike the International Monetary Fund, we think that domestic production should be protected. Whenever we launch a national product on the market, the same product should not be imported. Moreover, Bulgaria should not export raw materials. From such raw materials goods are processed abroad that we then purchase at high prices. It is better to process our own raw materials. We do not believe that a state can become rich only through commercial transactions. It is impossible to acquire wealth without production. The enormous interest rates on credits granted for production should be reduced. Turnover and income taxes should also be reduced, because it is high time for our economy to advance.

[Bozhev] Do you have any international relations?

[Georgiev] We have been members of the European Nationalist Union [ENU] since 23 August 1991. We enjoy the union's moral and sometimes even material support. The ENU is struggling to protect Christian values against the offensive of Islam in Europe. The Europeans fully realize that the Danube is not a reliable barrier against the invasion of Pan-Turkism. They are struggling to protect their social systems against "Gastarbeiter" [German word used—guest workers] and against alien, morally corrupting religions. Hence, we share a common struggle.

[Bozhev] Do you think the civil war in Yugoslavia is based on religious motives?

[Georgiev] No, I am convinced that what is being waged in that country is an armed conflict between different nations in the form of a civil war. It happened because Great Serbian chauvinism tried to assimilate other nationalities. Entire provinces in the newly established republics were deliberately populated with Serbs. The solution of the problem is difficult. Greece's claims that Macedonia should be recognized only if it changes its name are unjustified. The Greeks are afraid of Macedonian territorial claims because a compact group, approximately 360,000 people of Slavonic language, lives near Thessaloniki.

[Bozhev] You propose that Bulgaria and Macedonia should be united through a referendum. Are you not afraid that this may provoke a military conflict?

[Georgiev] What kind of military conflict are you talking about, considering that a Macedonian state exists, just like East and West Germany used to exist. After a referendum the two parts of Germany were reunited. There is a Macedonian state and a Bulgarian state—two states inhabited by the same nation. If the people of the Vardar area decide to join Bulgaria on the basis of a referendum, why should they be stopped?

[Bozhev] Nevertheless, why should Macedonia not exist as an independent and democratic state? I think that it would only be to the advantage of the local population.

[Georgiev] A journalist might have asked the same question before the Bulgarian Principality was unified with Eastern Rumelia.

[Bozhev] Would you send your son to a war from which he might not return?

[Georgiev] If everyone thought like that, we would never have liberated ourselves from the Turkish yoke. There is a risk in everything. Life and death are inseparable. There is nothing frightening about death, it is a nothing but a moment on the way to eternity. We should rather be concerned about our the legacy to future generations. Will our sons not be ashamed of their parents who prevented them from doing their duty toward the motherland at a crucial moment of history? People live for their honor. I like courageous people and despise cowards.

[Bozhev] Hearing you talk about life and death, do you not think that your party has a certain tendency toward mysticism?

[Georgiev] It is no mysticism, it is total realism. Both atheists and religious people can be realistic. No one asked to be born in a this particular epoch. It is true that a supreme force might have ordained that Dr. Ivan Georgiev should be born in 1941 and try to unify this nation that has been so polarized.

Klaus Rejects Burden of FRG Asylum Seekers

AU0902115593 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 5 Feb 93 pp 1, 30

[Report by Robert Dengler and Jan Kovarik: "Klaus: We Do Not Intend To Allow the Refugee Problem To Be Foisted on Us"]

[Text] Prague—We are emphasizing to all German politicians the quandary in which the asylum issue places us, and we do not intend to allow this problem to be forced on us. This is what Prime Minister Klaus said on Thursday [4 February] in response to a RUDE PRAVO question on whether he had noted the request from the Christian Democratic Union, his partner party in the FRG, for asylum seekers to undergo the asylum process regarding the FRG from refugee camps in the Czech Republic.

"I think the German side is well aware of this," added Klaus. "I have held talks recently with a number of leading German politicians. Of course, I discussed this matter with President Weizsaecker on Tuesday [2 February]. I had also discussed it earlier with the prime ministers of Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia."

On Thursday we asked First Deputy Interior Minister Jaroslav Kopriva, who is responsible for the refugee camps, the following question: Is it true that a draft agreement has been drawn up with the FRG making it possible for asylum seekers to move into local refugee camps from Germany; asylum seekers who would undergo the asylum process from our territory?

"So far, no one has agreed to conclude such a treaty on behalf of the Interior Ministry," replied Kopriva. "A series of negotiations is being conducted. Minister Ruml will hold talks with his Austrian counterpart on Monday [8 February]. The FRG Interior Ministry state secretary is coming to Prague on Thursday [11 February] and will discuss these issues with me and Deputy Minister Fendrych. This is an open issue, but no one has signed anything yet. I do not rule out the possibility that someone on the German side may submit such a draft. As far as I know, no such draft has been submitted to us officially," said Kopriva. In reply to a question on whether, under certain circumstances, the Czech negotiators would be willing to accede to this, Deputy Minister Kopriva said: "So far, the interior ministers have only discussed the method for transporting asylum seekers from the FRG to their original countries. In no way have they discussed housing them in our refugee camps. The camps do not have the capacity for this."

Final Stages of Federal Property Division Outlined

AU1002104993 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 8 Feb 93 pp 1, 3

[Report by "(do)": "A Price in a Nonexistent Currency"]

[Text] The value—in the sense of a trademark—of the Czechoslovak flag, which was taken over by the Czech Republic, is estimated by the Slovak Government at some 50 billion Czechoslovak korunas. Czech Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik made this statement when, as chairman of the "division commission," he was talking about the stage reached in the negotiations with Slovakia.

The problems associated with dividing property are, obviously, even greater now because the currency in which the value of this property was calculated no longer exists as of today. However, at the same time, there are more or less justified expectations that the exchange rates for the currencies that replaced the common currency will—in either the short or long-term—differ from each other. Therefore, automatically converting the value of the divided property from Czechoslovak korunas into Slovak korunas or Czech korunas would be very short-sighted.

The negotiations on dividing the former Czechoslovak State Bank's [SBCS] balance are continuing. Although, the balance is—apparently—not yet completely closed, it is already clear that Slovak commercial banks borrowed approximately 25 billion korunas more than Czech commercial banks from the SBCS reserves created by the commercial banks. According to Minister Kocarnik, it is impossible to repay this sum all at once—no matter how it is calculated—and, therefore, the issue involves, first and foremost, a repayment scheme staggered over a period of 10 years. Apparently, the possibility that Slovakia could repay what it borrowed by not charging the Czech side transit duty for using the gas pipeline is being taken into consideration. Another, or additional, option would be for Slovak enterprises to repay their debts to the Czech Consolidation Bank Prague and not to its Slovak partner.

However, Kocarnik admitted that the Slovak side had offered to repay in Slovak korunas (obviously, by a form of National Bank of Slovakia bonds), which he personally regards as more of a joke than a serious offer. Ivan Kocarnik is not so pessimistic as Tomas Jezek about possible compensation for the shares gained by Slovak investors in Czech enterprises within the framework of coupon privatization. Jezek thinks there is no legal way of demanding compensation. In the finance minister's opinion, however, some kind of compromise would be possible and viable.

The issue of "Slovakia's" gold is still unclear. Vladimir Meciar has declared that the fate of this property has already been decided since an agreement was signed acknowledging that 7,326 tonnes of this precious metal unquestionably belong to Slovakia. Jan Strasky, on the contrary, said that negotiations are continuing and that he knows nothing about a signed agreement. According to him, one of the possible options would be to divide the gold at a ratio of two to one with the proviso that the Czech share would be sold to Slovakia. He did not mention the price or the currency. The SBCS' dollar bonds placed on the European market are also involved in the division of the former State Bank's balance.

Meciar has said that Slovakia does not want to divide them at a ratio of two to one because their yield was utilized only in the Czech Republic. Jan Strasky commented on this on television and said that, if this was indeed the case, then the Czech Republic is willing to assume responsibility for the debt.

A new element has recently entered into the "agony of division": The final payments to the Federation's state budget (for 1992), which should have come from Slovakia, are much lower (by billions) than would correspond to the prevailing situation. Jan Strasky, who is a member of the division commission, merely thinks accounting errors are involved. Finance Ministry sources are a little more skeptical and are afraid this is deliberate. However, they concede that nothing is lost yet.

Klaus on Currency Switch, Broadcasting Issues

LD0902220893 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1800 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Regular interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Vaclav Musilek; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Musilek] Mr. Prime Minister, exchange of money [words indistinct] course of this demanding operation.

[Klaus] The separation was conducted completely peacefuly, smoothly, and I believed that it would be conducted in this way, but it was indeed smoother than we had envisaged because our citizens transferred most of their money to various paying-in accounts in the days preceding the currency separation, which was precisely what we wished, and transferred even more resources than we had thought. This means, if there was an exchange of roughly 10 billion korunas, then, with 10 million people in our country it is approximately 1,000 korunas per citizen which, as we all know, is far less than the estimated permitted exchange limit. Thanks to that, everything was much easier.

For an economist it is interesting to know whether the citizens will continue to play with the smaller amount of ready money and with larger amount of money in various pay-in accounts, which they may have opened just now. I wonder whether in the next few days there will be transfers of these deposits back into cash. Simply, we will see.

[Musilek] Since 8 February we have been using a new currency, the Czech koruny. What are the starting conditions for this new currency that has entered the economy, and above all what are its prospects?

[Klaus] There are two levels here, currency has two levels. One level is the internal level concerning internal economy, and the other is external concerning external economy.

As far as the internal level is concerned we are of course going to continue the present policy. [passage omitted]

I would say that within the internal sphere, domestic sphere, everything will more or less continue to function as it used to function. We do not expect any reversal of currency policy of the Czech National Bank. The task facing the bank will be difficult, as it will probably be difficult to estimate how much money to release into circulation, how much credit to give—as the economy is suddenly smaller, and who knows what will be the trade flow with Slovakia? However, the bank will solve this by continuing what it has been doing and by not changing anything. Only time will tell whether this was good or whether the policy should have been more flexible. The bank will certainly play a conservative tune and will not change anything.

But what is more important is the foreign economic aspect. What is at issue in this respect is the currency exchange rate and also the size of foreign currency reserves. These two issues are linked. [passage omitted] I am confident that the exchange rate will be maintained in the way as we set it for the Czechoslovak koruna almost 26 months ago. As far as the reserves are concerned, we lost some in the first weeks of this year and right now, before you arrived here, a delegation—an IMF mission—was here with me because we are negotiating a very quick and special deal, unprecedented in IMF history, which is the granting of a quick loan, the so-called precautionary credit line. It is a precautionaruy credit line enabling us to quickly increase our reserves. That's one thing.

The other thing is to send a signal to the rest of the world that the IMF is thus confirming the high standard of our economic policy.

We have just discussed this issue. An IMF mission is here now. As early as this week, we would like to sign a letter of intent, or simply to seal our interest in this matter by signing this document. I think that IMF President Camdessus could approve it in this form next week. But the process of approval by the board of executive directors is complex, and thus the approval will take place in a month's time, I think. It is nevertheless an absolute speed record, in obtaining something of this nature. And we need it as a signal for the international community.

Thus, I am confident that the exchange rate will remain the same— and we are doing our best to ensure this. We will attempt to boost our reserves a bit, not only through the IMF. We are also in the process of negotiating two or three other issues to ensure that we are moving safely, but we want to make sure that the reserves are a reliable guarantee.

[Musilek] Mr. Prime Minister, a different topic. As we know the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting has assigned a license for television broadcasting on today's CT2 channel of the society called CET 21. Seemingly this matter does not concern the government,

however, it is becoming apparent that the council, for example, did not wait for the comment of some ministries and decided without them. Will you discuss this situation, this policy?

[Klaus] I must say that the government will not discuss it. Simply put, it will not discuss it because it cannot discuss it. I do not know if the listeners know, but the parliament decided that the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting should be created, which received governmental status. This is simply an independent organization of, in a way, state administration,- nevertheless it is not subordinate to the government and is completely separate. Thus, in this country we have the government as one kind of state administration and then we have the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting as the second kind of administration, which has received governmental status.

The prime minister can be in charge of his ministers, but he cannot chair this council. I think this is an unnatural phenomenon, it is, in my view a mistake, but because of this, we have a ministry for television and radio apart from the other ministries and apart from the government, and this ministry is called the Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting. It is directly responsible to the parliament and the government has nothing to do with it. [passage omitted]

Citizens Optimistic About Economic Prospects

AU1002134393 Prague CTK in English 1347 GMT 8 Feb 93

[Text] Prague, Feb 8 (CTK)—Fifty-three percent of Czech citizens expect a revival of economic growth but only 27 percent envision an improvement in their own family's standard of living, according to a poll by the independent agency AISA.

The most optimism appeared among residents of large cities, in the upper income brackets, and among professionals and intellectuals. Business people especially expect economic revival and an increase in the standard of living.

The poll found that people consider the strong international position of the former Czechoslovakia the most important underlying basis for economic growth in the Czech Republic.

A surprising result of the poll, according to AISA, was that 58 percent of those polled fear recurring political and racial extremism in the Czech Republic, which they believe is tied to racial unrest in Germany. Nearly 70 percent believe the racial problems in Germany will continue.

Only 14 percent of employees and 18 percent of business people believe their current business could go bankrupt, and nearly half rule out the possibility entirely.

Nearly half of those polled believe that inflation will not exceed 25 percent this year, and 27 percent believe unemployment will not exceed 5 percent.

AISA questioned 824 citizens of the Czech Republic January 9-21, 1993.

Baudys Interviewed on Army's Current Problems

AU1002111793 Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 2 Feb 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Defense Minister Antonin Baudys by Pavla Grunthalova; place and date not given: "Officers Do Not Carry Marshal's Baton in Their Knapsacks"]

[Text] [Grunthalova] Sir, could you tell us what things you did not expect when you were installed in office, and what problems you were not prepared for?

[Baudys] I was prepared to face a number of problems. However, I was surprised by the fact that there were not many people in the Army who would be soundly active and assertive, willing to assume responsibility and risk. The Army needs such people, we must use them to advantage, and build on them.

[Grunthalova] As the first Czech Defense Minister you have to settle accounts with the heritage left after your "totalitarian" predecessors—and also with the heritage of the three post-November defense ministers—and establish a tradition of the Army of the democratic Czech state. With what are you going to begin?

[Baudys] This is a problem. One cannot say where one should begin. We must work simultaneously on many levels—on a concept for the Army—which must be prepared on the basis of the new military doctrine—and on the future integration of the Czech Republic in the defense system of Europe. Another thing is the solution of the problem with military education. Here, principal changes must be made as a consequence of the structural changes within the Army. We must start working on basic laws applicable to the Army relating to the fact that we will transform our Army into a half-professional one—and professional one in the future—while the length or service will be reduced, etc. Within the framework of the new concept for the Army, we must also consider replacing its weapons. For the time being, we have the technology of the former Warsaw pact. This technology is, in most cases, obsolete and does not correspond to our efforts to integrate ourselves in European security systems. However, all this is related to economic problems, too. That is, we have a lot of problems, and we must solve all of them simultaneously. Within about six months, we want to build a new structure within the Army. By then, we must have drafted our concept for work with personnel—selecting, recruiting, and hiring new people to establish new structures. I am afraid, however, that in the past three years, little was done in this direction, and that we have wasted these three years.

[Grunthalova] You will need a lot of capable collaborators for that. Do you have them?

[Baudys] Of course, I have not come to the ministry alone. If I were to come here alone, it would be useless for me to come at all. Finding capable collaborators is a great problem. The problem is that the Army, as well as other parts of the state administration, has difficulty in paying top experts.

The search for capable people in the Army is complicated by the fact that much depends on the attitudes and course of action of the superiors, who may not be interested in selecting the best and the most appropriate people. We must establish a new system of personnel work within the Army, and that is what we are trying to do together with my deputy, Mr. Pospisil.

[Grunthalova] The young and capable people are discouraged by the current problems surrounding personnel, are they not?

[Baudys] It is absolutely clear to me that thousands of young people with prospects left the Army just because they thought that very little had changed within it. Many of them were constantly meeting the same faces in commanders' positions, people who made life difficult for them and built their own careers on the fact that they were politically engaged, etc.

[Grunthalova] You said that in connection with restructuring the Army and preparing to integrate into NATO, it will be necessary to implement substantial personnel changes, and that professional soldiers, whose only profession was political lecturing, will have to leave the Army.

[Baudys] I do not mean that anyone who made his living in the Army by giving political lectures will have to leave it. However, he must have a qualification to perform activity that the Army needs. Either he has this qualification, or he will acquire it—he must be retrained. With the dubious qualification of a political lecturer he cannot make his living in the Army.

[Grunthalova] How did your subordinates react to your statement that professional soldiers who agreed with the occupation in 1968 are, in your opinion, traitors?

[Baudys] Some reacted very indignantly, some did not dare to say what they thought. In my opinion, we must say in no uncertain terms that professional soldiers are obliged to protect their country. If an uninvited army invades this country and he agrees with this aggression, then this is high treason. Our army could not defend itself, of course. No one is reproaching the soldiers for that. But to agree with the occupation is rather too much. If someone says that this was not high treason, then he is lying to himself.

I, personally, know a commander who stood at the gates and did not want to let the Soviet Army in. Of course, they took him away and fired him—kicked him out. But he was a man who behaved as a brave man and officer—in contradistinction to those who changed [their political credo] and said to themselves: The times have changed, we are going to agree with something else.

[Grunthalova] Is the year 1968, and the events surrounding it, one of the main traumas of our Army?

[Baudys] I believe that 1968 is one of the greatest traumas of our nations. One consequence is that quite different sorts of people embarked on the same boat—political prisoners of the 1950's, Christian dissidents, intellectual dissidents, and also former ardent proponents of the communist regime of the fifties, who had been expelled from the communist party. From November [1989] until today, we have seen the consequences of this union of various opponents of normalization. This is a very complicated situation.

'Integration' Into European Structures Supported

LD1002092193 Prague CTK in English 0721 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Budapest, Feb 10 (CTK correspondent)—Slovak Foreign Minister Milan Knazko voiced his support for Slovakia's full integration into democratic European structures and for cooperation with neighbouring countries in an interview on Hungarian television Tuesday [9 February].

In the interview, Knazko said that Central European states can become members of European integrational groups faster if they harmonise their steps and cooperate with each other than if they attempt it independently. Knazko praised the cooperation of the Visegrad group (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic), but stressed that the framework being built must now be completed by new activities. He said that an important step on this road is the agreement on the creation of duty-free zones. He also stressed that in the area of security policy, Slovakia has no other alternative than to orient itself towards NATO.

On the subject of Slovak ethnic policy, Knazko said that Bratislava is not afraid of comparisons to other countries and is prepared to receive a commission of foreign experts to judge the situation. He added that minorities are important to every state, and should bring neighbouring countries and peoples together.

Slovakia Protests Czech Use of Former CSFR Flag

AU0802153393 Prague CTK in English 2105 GMT 4 Feb 93

[Text] Bratislava, Feb 4 (CTK)—The protest of the Slovak Government against the former Czechoslovak flag being used as the Czech Republic's state symbol was submitted today by Slovak Foreign Minister Milan Knazko to his Czech counterpart, Josef Zieleniec.

As this decision was made by the Czech parliament, I could do nothing, Zieleniec said at a press conference following the two ministers' talks.

The ministers expressed the necessity for the two countries' foreign policies to be coordinated. Zieleniec said that the Czech Republic favours concrete cooperation within the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland), but it rejects this cooperation being an alternative to the country's integration into the European Community. We will not participate in building the Visegrad Group's political structures, Zieleniec stated.

Knazko said that for Slovakia the Visegrad group as well as the Central European Initiative (former Hexagonale, comprising the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, Italy, Austria, Poland, and Hungary) are secondary activities in the European integration. He voiced himself for more intensive participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in which both the NATO members and the former East bloc countries discuss the questions of security in Europe.

Knazko firmly believes that the Slovak foreign policy will not be the policy of one man's single party. Asked if the Slovak foreign policy can change in view of clashes within the ruling Movement For a Democratic Slovakia, Knazko said that he consulted the foreign political concept also with opposition parties and nongovernmental organisations in order to reach broader social agreement.

Kovac Confirmed as Sole Presidential Candidate

LD0902134293 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Michal Kovac is the only candidate for the post of president of Slovak Republic in the second round of elections. This was confirmed to TASR after today's session of the presidential elections commission by Chairman Milan Secansky. He said the commission had verified all the relevant facts stipulated by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and the election statutes for the submitted proposals. The commission also considered the proposal for Ivan Gasparovic, which was submitted by a group of deputies. Gasparovic, however, failed to submit his approval of the candidacy, so the proposal cannot be considered.

HZDS No Longer Insisting on Member Candidate

AU0802152993 Prague CTK in English 0904 GMT 5 Feb 93

[Excerpt] Prague, Feb 5 (CTK)—[Passage omitted] RUDE PRAVO quotes Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar as saying that Slovakia's ruling Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) is no longer insisting on a Slovak president being a HZDS member. Meciar says that, according to certain information, the Slovak opposition parties are going to propose Slovak Foreign Minister Milan Knazko or HZDS Council Chairman Rudolf Filkus as presidential candidates, against the HZDS's official candidate—Michal Kovac, former chairman of the now defunct Czechoslovak parliament.

We have asked Filkus to promise not to accept the candidacy if he is nominated by the Democratic Left Party (SDL). Filkus did not promise, Meciar said.

On the current conflict between the HZDS's leadership and Knazko and Filkus, the Slovak premier says that the Movement does not judge them by their statements and stands in the last period, but by the work they have done within the HZDS. Within the HZDS there is and has always been democracy, along with this, however, comes responsibility for the work done. It is unfortunate when vanity overtakes a person, Meciar says. [passage omitted]

Knazko Censured; Filkus Resigns

AU0902131493 Prague CTK in English 2017 GMT 6 Feb 93

[Text] Bratislava, Feb 6 (CTK)—The Presidium of the ruling Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) held an extraordinary closed-door session here today to try to resolve the situation within the movement and to discuss statements concerning the policies of the HZDS made by Slovak Foreign Minister and HZDS Deputy Chairman Milan Knazko and by HZDS Council Chairman Rudolf Filkus.

Slovak Premier and HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar accused Knazko last week of violating party discipline by calling on HZDS deputies not to vote for Roman Kovac, the HZDS's official presidential candidate, in the first round of presidential elections. In an interview with CTK, Filkus supported Knazko's view that a preliminary agreement between Slovak parliamentary parties should have been made before the presidential election.

The conflict between Meciar and Filkus is due to the fact that Meciar does not want to accept Filkus' interest in working in the economic sphere. Filkus has several times in the past expressed views on the economic transformation which differ from the official HZDS line. Meciar insists that Filkus continue to function in the diplomatic services.

HZDS Spokeswoman Ivana Salczerova told journalists today that the majority of the participants at today's session expressed the opinion that Knazko violated party discipline.

She said that the HZDS Presidium confirmed the legitimacy of the meeting of representatives of 22 HZDS district organisations in Trnava, West Slovakia, on January 31. At the meeting, the representatives expressed unambiguous support for Meciar and requested the HZDS Arbitration Commission to decide whether Knazko's and Filkus' behaviour is at variance with HZDS resolutions.

During a break of the HZDS session, Party Secretary Olga Keltosova told journalists that the decision of the HZDS Arbitration Commission on Knazko's behaviour confirmed the opinion of the majority of the HZDS Presidium members that Knazko's statements concerning party policies were at variance with the movement's statutes.

The chairman of the HZDS deputy group in the Slovak parliament, Ivan Laluha, said that Filkus would not run for the post of HZDS Council chairman in the future, nor would he run for the post of Slovak president in the second double-round presidential election. Knazko would not run for Slovak presidency either, Laluha added.

Keltosova said that Knazko's first official visit to the NATO headquarters in Brussels had been abolished mainly due to the fact that he did not consult it beforehand with representatives of individual ministries.

Delayed Solution to HZDS Crisis Predicted

AU1002094393 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 8 Feb 93 p 3

[Commentary by Igor Cibula: "The Movement For a Democratic Slovakia's Postponed Problems"]

[Text] The dissident Knazko-Filkus tandem did not win sympathy at the extraordinary Movement For a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Presidium meeting for its publicly expressed criticism of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's policy. The two representatives of "internal opposition" remained isolated, although some cursory observers had prematurely forecast a split within the HZDS. They had even sought an analogy with the Public Against Violence Movement's disintegration process, which was triggered two years ago by the very same main protagonists of the current dispute within the ruling movement. They had primarily based their expectations on the fact that signs of intensifying differences of opinion—especially in connection with the nomination of an official candidate for the office of president of the Slovak Republic—had been mounting recently within the HZDS.

Excommunicating Milan Knazko and Rudolf Filkus from the HZDS in the current complicated social situation would not be very wise, not only for the reason that the movement's founders are involved, but—first and foremost—from the point of view of not complicating future political development. Excommunicating Meciar's critics could also serve as an argument for those warning of the danger of an autocratic regime in Slovakia. This would not only damage the HZDS, it would also damage the Slovak Republic at a time when it is competing for the favor of the international community of democratic states. In this context, it appears that the HZDS Presidium has not descended to drastic measures of the kind envisaged by the fundamentalists from the so-called Trnava Initiative.

However, it is possible to predict with absolute certainty that the antagonism between Meciar and Knazko in particular will continue to intensify. We can expect a government reshuffle following the HZDS March assembly at the latest, a reshuffle involving changes in certain ministerial posts. Milan Knazko could—on this occasion—also find himself on the list of sacked ministers since it is hardly to be expected that Prime Minister Meciar would continue to put up with this "rebel" in his cabinet. The prime minister is already looking for a new foreign minister to ensure that Slovak diplomatic activity does not suffer from the consequences of the increasing political conflict between Prime Minister Meciar and Minister Knazko.

A fateful crisis may develop within the HZDS at a time when grave sociopolitical shocks substantiate the arguments put forward by Knazko and Filkus that the ruling

movement cannot resolve all of society's problems without proceeding conceptually and without also accepting—in a spirit of tolerance—cooperation with its other parliamentary partners. The results of the recent mayoral elections in Kosice and the presidential debacle of Roman Kovac suggest that the HZDS is beginning to lose its political initiative and that its support base is narrowing down. The most recent manifestations of businessmen's and workers' dissatisfaction with government policy are a warning that the government can no longer continue to count on the citizens' favor. Therefore, the HZDS, which following the parliamentary elections, assumed the main burden of responsibility for the fate of all the citizens of the independent Slovak Republic, should also take these circumstances into consideration when resolving its problems.

Data on 1992 Foreign Trade Statistics Relased

AU0802142393 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 5 Feb 93 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Deficit Trade Balance"]

[Text] Last year, foreign trade organizations operating on the territory of the Slovak Republic achieved a volume of trade of 199.3 billion korunas FCO [franco, all charges paid]. This information appears in the preliminary statistics for foreign trade of the Slovak Republic, which was given to TA SR by the Slovak Statistical Office yesterday. The volume declined by 1.9 percent in comparison with the same period of 1991. Advanced countries with market economies accounted for 52.7 percent of the overall trade with the Slovak Republic (the share of the EC states was 37.9 percent), developing countries 8.1 percent, and the former USSR 26.3 percent. The balance of foreign trade since the beginning of 1992 showed a deficit of 2.1 billion korunas, while in 1991 the deficit reached 9.6 billion korunas.

New Private Radios May Carry Ethnic Programming

LD0902214593 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1930 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Excerpts] Although there is no competition yet in television broadcasts in Slovakia, there is competition in radio broadcasts. It is true that, for the time being, only commercial programs have been broadcast, but is not excluded that a private radio could deal with nationality programs as well. Janos Protics's report follows:

It seems that the monopoly of the public service radio, or what we earlier called the state radio, has slowly started to end. After Poprad and Dubnica, in the capital Bratislava there are already two private radio stations operating. On 1 February, Radio (Twist) appeared on air—the owner of which is the well-known actor (?Ande Rit)—and RMC Radio, which can be heard on VHF, has officially been operating for almost two weeks. A coproprietor of the latter is Dr. Jozef Sevec, with whom I was talking about the start-up and problems of the independent radio.

[Begin Sevec recording in Slovak, fading to reporter's summary in Hungarian] As we have heard, the independent radio is not connected with any parties or movements and is not supported by foreign capital. After acquiring the necessary licenses, test broadcasts started on 12 December and the program was launched officially on 15 January. The program is aimed primarily at middle- aged people, that is to say it is for radio listeners in their most productive years. They pay particular attention to small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs. They try to provide the most possible information for them. Naturally, they do not forget about good music either; they primarily play the music of the sixties and seventies, said Jozef Sevec. [passage omitted]

According to surveys, the program can be received with good quality for about 100 kilometers around Bratislava, thus in the southern districts as well, but it reaches as far away as Gyoer and Vienna as well. [passage omitted] In Radio MRC, apart from classical commercials and advertisements, there are advertisements broadcast in Hungarian and German language as well, and there will be a bilingual information program as well in the future. And, what is very important, advertisements are significantly cheaper than on the state radio. I hear from Jozef Sevec that interest shown so far indicates that there is a future for commercial private radio broadcasts in our country. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Views Relations With Neighbors

AU0902125993 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 Feb 93 p 6

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Jozsef Martin; place and date not given: "The Strategic Goal of the Hungarian Government Is To Develop the Best Relations With Neighboring Countries"]

[Text] [Martin] With a slight exaggeration, we could say that Hungarian diplomacy held a "Slovak week" in recent days. In your opinion, are there any chances of a strategic improvement in Hungarian-Slovak relations, which have deteriorated very much as a result of the Bos debate?

[Jeszenszky] In speaking about "deterioration," we must make it clear to everyone that this was not the work of the Hungarian Government, and we did not divert the Danube. Ever since we came to power, we have been constantly in favor of a negotiated solution to the Bos issue, and we have made it clear that this is not a political debate or the revival of some kind of old conflict. In defending the Danube, we are defending not only Hungarian interests, the interests of the Hungarian population on both banks of the river, but also the interests of the Slovak population living on the northern bank of the Danube. We are also convinced that the hydroelectric power station is extremely disadvantageous for Slovakia as a whole, also from an economic viewpoint, because its electricity production is very expensive. Various press reports have also drawn attention to important problems, dangers, and possible solutions. Thus, it would be possible to find a solution to the Bos issue if Slovakia were not making an issue of prestige out of this. However, I am also convinced that many people in Slovakia, perhaps more people than previously, think today that good relations with neighboring countries, including Hungary, are very important for Slovakia. We have mutual economic and political interests, and preserving the Visegrad cooperation is of mutual interest too. Some signs show that the campaign-style rhetoric that emerged in connection with the Bos affair in Slovakia is diminishing. The fact that the Hungarian replies have always been restrained might ease this process. I hope that this change in tone is taking place not only because Bratislava is now considering the position of the EC on the matter, but also because this shows a genuine change coming from the emerging foreign policy of this newly independent country that also accepts responsibility along with its independence. Therefore, it is impossible to avoid the Bos issue; nor should we allow the long-term and mutually important interests of Hungarian-Slovak cooperation to lose ground because of the quite alarming measures connected with the Bos issue or the issue of the Hungarian national minority living in Slovakia.

[Martin] The Hungarian-Slovak debate has probably contributed to the strong emergence of the view that the future of the Visegard cooperation is in danger. Some declarations made in Prague which belittle this cooperation and stress the Czech Republic's clear commitment to the West are encouraging these opinions.

[Jeszenszky] Along with the historical ties and economic interests, as well as free trade considerations, the basis of the entire Visegrad cooperation is our mutual commitment to the West and the deepening of our relations with the EC. Therefore, no matter what it stresses, the concept of Czech Premier Klaus is not very different from the Hungarian and Polish positions. The Czechs say that we should refrain from making an institution out of this cooperation or expand it with military considerations, and thus present it as some kind of alternative to the EC. There is nothing new in this claim, because we said the same thing when we founded this cooperation, and there is not a single secretary working in the "Visegrad" offices. Thus, in the form they appear, Klaus' concepts are nothing new, and both Budapest and Warsaw share the essence of these concepts.

[Martin] The fact that Gyula Horn, who recently resigned from the position of chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament, submitted a new plan in Vienna, a plan aimed at developing a closer cooperation among Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary, is probably connected with the speculations about the future of the Visegrad cooperation. What is your opinion about this?

[Jeszenszky] I highly appreciate any bilateral or multilateral initiative that emerges either in the framework of the Visegrad cooperation or within the Central European Initiative that is also very important for us. However, I do not think that we should create new forums in addition to the existing ones, and I think that Gyula Horn is also aware of this. A party policy interpretation is the most obvious explanation of his initiative: the successor parties of the former communist parties would like to legitimize their new socialist clothes, and they want to strengthen their international acceptance by strengthening their ties with the authentic Austrian Social Democratic Party. However, if we consider the cooperation of countries or governments, there is no need to highlight and concentrate on the aforementioned four countries. The Central European Initiative provides a rather good framework, and I would not like to see Poland, the Czech Republic, or even Croatia being left out of this. The Visegrad cooperation will also continue because Austria is advancing toward the EC on a different trail, and we cannot get on this train. Nor would this be realistic in view of the current state of our economic restructuring. However, several high-level meetings between the EC and the Visegrad group are currently in preparation, and the very mechanism of these meetings denies the fact that Visegrad could be discarded.

One more thing about Gyula Horn's proposal: As I mentioned, I only see any sense in this proposal under limited circumstances, and I find it strange that Horn used extremely harsh words in connection with the

reservations brought up by myself and by others, too. A personal and relatively rare indirect debate took place here and, in connection with the world economic forum in Davos, Gyula Horn also got into a discussion with [Finance Minister] Mihaly Kupa.

In my view, Hungarian foreign policy can very well use the international links and the broad experiences of others, including that of Gyula Horn, but Horn's condescending and offensive terms say a lot in themselves. I feel that Horn has not been able to process for himself the events in the foreign affairs committee or that, as a result of the change of regime, his foreign political role has changed and, in spite of his resignation gesture, he went through these with resentment. In my view, it is very important in politics to separate our feelings from our words and especially from our steps and actions. Therefore, all this cannot disturb a kind of general consensus on foreign politics but, to put it mildly, Horn's often caustic style is not mine and I must say that it does not fit in with the usual international norms. It is also significant if, at international forums, a representative of a small country needs interpreters because he does not speak any of the major world languages.

[Martin] Hungarian-Slovak relations are going through a difficult period, and we can probably expect a long-lasting war with many dangers on our southern border. In this situation, Hungarian-Romanian relations are likely to increase in importance. Do you agree with this, and does the Foreign Ministry have a strategic plan generally to normalize these relations?

[Jeszenszky] On the basis of our published program, establishing the best possible relations with all our neighbors is the strategic goal of the Foreign Ministry and of the government. The Hungarian leadership has made very serious attempts to improve relations with Romania since the changes there and the fall of Ceausescu. In my view, relations with Romania are not gaining in importance simply because of relations with our neighbors—although this is a valid aspect—but relations with Hungary have gained in value for Bucharest because it could see that the national minority policy is an important element in getting closer to Europe and being included in the processes of integration. In the past few weeks, we have seen gestures in words and interviews and I find it very important that Foreign Minister Melescanu met Bela Marko, the newly elected leader of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. However, in my view, the kind of actions that are being implemented by Romania in bilateral relations are very important for overall Hungarian-Romanian relations and these cannot really be separated from the future of the Hungarian minority although they do not concentrate only on this issue. The temptation might be great for both sides to produce a sudden and rapid improvement in bilateral relations for local and international consumption through a few spectacular meetings. However, in my view, this is only treating the symptoms. It is important for a real rapprochement to take place, and people in Romania are very well aware of what is needed to achieve this. Hungary will be a partner to this.

[Martin] According to some views, the constant suspicion of certain Romanian political groups as to the Hungarian intention to change its borders could be arrested by a national statement by the six parliamentary parties to the effect that Hungary renounces even the peaceful adjustment of the borders for once and for all. What are your views on this?

[Jeszenszky] In the past two and a half years, the freely elected Hungarian Parliament and the government have made several statements making it clear that Hungary respects all international documents, including the peace treaty and the Helsinki Final Act. However, it has to be seen that the issue of the borders has been pushed into the foreground by Romania rather than by Hungary, although this has probably escaped the attention of most observers. I am convinced that Bucharest was guided in this by domestic political considerations rather than by real or irrational fears. Neither in Romania nor anywhere else in the world can sensible people think that a Hungary with 10 million people can endanger the sovereignty of a Romania with 23 million, and the military conditions only confirm that it is not realistic to talk about any kind of threat. However, unfortunately, all the Hungarians of Transylvania feel threatened—not without reason—and it is not only [Cluj Mayor] Funar's extremists who are to be blamed for this. Can Hungary halt this situation through any kind of statement? Ten years after the 1945 peace treaty, which was the last one to define the Hungarian-Romanian border, Janos Kadar had already confirmed in a speech in Tirgu Mures that Hungary did not have territorial claims on Romania. This speech is well remembered in Transylvania because it was followed by mass arrests and the Bolyai University was closed down.... It can be established that this speech by no means improved the situation of the Hungarians in Romania. Many people, especially in Transylvania, think that, rather than creating positive counter-gestures, another Hungarian gesture would only give a "free hand" to Bucharest. I am not saying that this would definitely happen, but such fears do exist. The decision-makers and those who form public opinion also have to take these fears into consideration. Therefore, in my view, the whole issue of the borders is an artificially exaggerated problem. The peace treaties and the Helsinki Final Act provide a perfectly adequate framework for settling this issue. In my view, we would first need to take actual steps in economic cooperation or by creating new border crossing points, because conditions have been unbearable for a long time on our common borders. These kinds of steps can be really effective in moving bilateral relations in a positive direction.

[Martin] It has become obvious that Hungarian security policy could not fully rely on NATO or the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. However, according to some opinions, problems connected with the Hungarian national minority are burdening our relations with our neighboring countries, and we should also do more to

promote economic cooperation, among other things, also because of security policy interests. Are these realistic opinions, or are they knocking on open doors?

[Jeszenszky] I do not see a necessary connection between the two. Undoubtedly, we need to strengthen our economic cooperation and we also need to implement and expand free trade as soon as possible. This whole region was a huge common market 100 years ago, and many areas became secondary regions and several busy roads became almost cul-de-sacs and railroads ceased to exist after World War I; all this was extremely harmful. The restoration and revival of these old economic routes in itself could lead to some kind of economic revival and prosperity. Therefore, this is a very important direction, and the Hungarian Government strongly supports and represents this idea. I am sure that the implementation of such a program will cool the emotions, and this also satisfies mutual and realistic interests. Money and financial interests will probably prove to be stronger than emotions. Therefore, I regard these steps as desirable from such a viewpoint too. However, in analyzing both the domestic and foreign aspects of the national minority issue, I think it is extremely important to make it clear that it is not Hungary that is "creating" the national minority conflict. After oppression, the national minorities want to make use of the opportunity of greater freedom but, unfortunately, they are also afraid, not only of the declarations or the inadmissible steps of some politicians, but also for their future. Ethnic cleansing did not start in Bosnia today, and the Council of Europe has also confirmed that artificial modification of ethnic conditions is totally unacceptable. However, one must also take into consideration that ethnic conditions have changed considerably in the areas inhabited by Hungarians or in mixed areas in recent decades. Because of this process, the national minorities are afraid of their own disappearance, even if this could take 100 or 200 years; thus, this process must be halted by all means. This lies behind the national minorities' efforts for self-government and autonomy. These efforts have not been devised by the Hungarian Government and I firmly reject the idea that we might be the ones who suggested them.

[Martin] The decisionmaking activity and personnel policy of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry have often been criticized lately. What is your opinion about this?

[Jeszenszky] I think that, just like Parliament itself, the Foreign Affairs Committee does not "conduct" the policy itself, but it prepares laws and, also because of the duration of its activity, it is unable to carry out day-to-day work. Therefore, I consider some opinions to be unrealistic, such as the recent statement of the newly-elected chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Laszlo Kovacs, that we should constantly coordinate our steps with the Committee. The opposition was repeatedly pointing out last year that I failed to discuss some of my proposals with them. I even dare say we made no proposals whatsoever either to NATO or the EC or a neighboring country without relying on the agreement of the political parties, at least at the level of the party programs. However, one needs quick reactions in everyday politics and, therefore, top diplomacy—in the EC too—has made incredible progress these days. There are often no opportunities for daily contacts; nor are they necessary. The government takes responsibility for diplomatic moves.

As for the critical observations regarding the activity of our personnel, criticism mostly voiced by former members of staff who left the Foreign Ministry voluntarily, the claim that almost half of the apparatus has changed is totally unfounded. About a quarter of our staff has changed in the last two and a half years, including natural attrition. I think it is a justified demand that the ambassadors who represent the new Hungary, especially in Western capitals, should be people who did not formerly regard NATO and the democratic countries as enemies, and who also know these countries well, including their language and culture. The overwhelming majority of the new diplomats appointed after successful examinations and in the wake of the introduction of fresh blood into the diplomatic corps have been carrying out their duties excellently and, therefore, it is wrong and unfair to claim that they mean well but are mere amateurs. I do not know of any case where we have recalled a good diplomat without offering him a new position in line with his talents. I do not like this differentiation between the "old" people and the "new" people, but I must point out that there is only one "new" deputy state secretary and two "new" heads of department in the Foreign Ministry, while the 30- to 40-year-old generation of the "old" staff are now in leading positions and enjoy the full confidence of the government. Thus, both those who claim that there has been too little change in the ministry and those who claim that there has been too much change are wrong. Perhaps it is also good that there has been an increase in the percentage of arts and sciences graduates as well as in the percentage of women among our staff. I do not think it is justified to make any considerable changes to our personnel policy and the composition of the foreign service either now or after 1994.

[Martin] In your opinion, is there a six-party and national consensus in our foreign policy?

[Jeszenszky] I do not think that there are any conceptional differences between the government and the opposition on the main trends of Hungarian foreign policy and in evaluating the tasks we are facing. This also derives from the programs of individual parties; therefore, this does not require any formal coordination. Some emphases might be different and some steps might be interpreted differently, but I think that the consensus has become even stronger lately. I think it is a promising development that part of the opposition seems to have abandoned their former practice of taking our internal political debates abroad. In the past, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] accused the government of neglecting our Eastern contacts. Our multilateral cooperation with the new Yeltsin leadership proves exactly

the opposite. It seems that the opposition parties who greatly prefer to call themselves liberal also admit that the government has a balanced orientation. In the current flexible international situation full of unpredictable factors, it is important to have a common and harmonious representation of our national interests, which is more important than at any time since 1945.

Goncz Airs Views on Role of Visegrad Group

AU0402173393 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 3 Feb 93 p 2

[CTK report: "Arpad Goncz Discusses 'Visegrad'"]

[Text] Prague—Hungarian President Arpad Goncz yesterday spoke against institutionalizing the Visegrad group. "It makes no sense to turn 'Visegrad' into an institution or to create some kind of secretariat; however, it is necessary to establish a continuous method of political dialogue and to increase the efficiency of economic cooperation," said Goncz to journalists at the end of his visit to Prague where he had attended the inauguration of President Vaclav Havel. Preserving the original aim of the Visegrad group—mutually assisting its member countries on the road to Europe—is very desirable, said the Hungarian president. He expressed his conviction that mutual contacts within the Visegrad group could be even closer.

Kazakh Prime Minister Concludes Official Visit

LD0902213093 Budapest MTI in English 2018 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Budapest, February 9 (MTI)—Kazakh Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko spoke with satisfaction on Tuesday [9 February] about his three-day visit to Hungary.

Giving a press conference before his departure, Tereshchenko said that the talks resulted in practical achievements, for instance an agricultural and a trade agreement.

The value of bilateral trade, now USD [U.S. dollars] 70 million, could increase to some hundreds of millions in a short time, the premier said. He recalled that the Videoton Electronics Company was cooperating with a Kazakh partner, and General Electric Tungsram installing a lamp factory in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan would continue to use Hungary's intensive plant growing systems, Tereshchenko said. For instance, it hopes to expand the land under intensive maize cultivation to 23,000 hectares—approximately 56,800 acres. Holding talks with [word indistinct] of the Babolna agricultural combine on Tuesday, Tereshchenko agreed that Kazakh farms would start applying Hungarian sweet corn, sunflower, sugar beet, and green pea growing technology this year.

The Kazakh prime minister and Hungarian Minister of International Economic Relations Bela Kadar agreed to present a common request to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to support the establishment of a joint bank.

The idea of opening a direct flight between Budapest and Alma-Ata was also raised. The politicians agreed on the need to sign agreements on investment protection and the elimination of double taxation as soon as possible.

Tereshchenko said his country had a keen interest in Hungary's experience in privatisation. In the near future, Kazakh experts are to come to Hungary for study trips, and a Hungarian state property agency delegation is to pay a visit to Kazakhstan.

Asked about the nuclear weapons stationed on Kazakh territory, the prime minister recalled that his country had ratified the SALT-II Treaty. Alma-Ata is committed to the withdrawal and destruction of all these nuclear weapons, Tereshchenko said.

Embargo on FRY Costs 'Hundreds of Millions'

LD0902194793 Budapest MTI in English 1904 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Budapest, February 9 (MTI)—The UN embargo imposed on Serbia and Montenegro has caused Hungary losses of "hundreds of millions of dollars", State Secretary of International Economic Relations Zoltan Bogar said in parliament's session today.

Replying to an interruption from a government coalition MP [member of parliament], Bogar said that Hungary was not allowed to import anything from Serbia and Montenegro, and its exports were limited to food and medicine. Hungary is also down USD [US dollars] 100 million because of lost fees from blocked or diverted transit freight.

Socialist Politician Views Change of Regime

AU0802145993 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 6 Feb 93 p 9

[Interview with Zoltan Gal, faction leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "The Essence of the Change of Regime Has Not Been Fulfilled"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Pinter] In your view, to what extent is the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] strategy established, and in the light of the domestic political events of the recent weeks, what changes are necessary in your party?

[Gal] Let us not discuss how rational this is, but it is a fact that Hungarian politics has started to prepare for the elections in 1994 with full steam. All of a sudden, the internal stability of parties has become very important. As far as the MSZP is concerned, I expect that the leadership that was formed at our May 1992 congress will lead our campaign. At the same time, we also have to

discuss how deep our political differences are, whether we have personal conflicts, and if they are caused by political reasons.

[Pinter] Your answer seems to suggest that the tensions are increasing. Is this the case?

[Gal] No. We do not have unbridgeable political differences paralyzing our work, but there are differences in style that are not negligible. We do not have identical views on the past activities of the various parties, our desirable relations with the various political forces, and on choosing our potential future allies. These issues are not very important between two parliamentary elections; however, we have to deal with these when the election strategy is at stake.

[Pinter] Do views differ on the possible cooperation with the liberal parties?

[Gal] They do, and so do our relations to the popular-national trend. I mean if, after the developments of the past few months, we can talk about the popular-national trend in its original meaning at all.

[Pinter] Why could we not?

[Gal] Because a radical right-wing, third-force, and loud mishmash exists under this label, which does everything it can to monopolize this ideological system. For this reason, in my view, everyone has to rethink the possible consequences of these phenomena. Politicians defining themselves as popular left wing cannot be left out of this critical analysis, either.

[Pinter] Is it possible that this is meant as a message for some of your party's politicians? Would the essence of this message be that, under the current circumstances, it is impossible to cooperate with any of the tendencies of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]? Am I wrong?

[Gal] I do not want to send any messages to anyone but my view is that, looking at the current MDF—disregarding some people who have little influence in the party—unfortunately, you were not wrong.

[Pinter] How powerful are the forces in the MSZP that expect to work together with the MDF?

[Gal] I cannot tell you exactly, but the party's direction is determined by the so-called center forces.

[Pinter] We hear about so many kinds of centers and center forces that I must ask you what, in your view, a Socialist Party center means?

[Gal] No one should be surprised at the abundance of centers because the parties have discovered that there is a demand for this in society and this is the best way to gain people's confidence. Who belongs to the center forces of the MSZP that is oriented toward the center left? People who, bearing the social-democratic values in mind, try to be engaged in politics with maximal openness, on the basis of sober pragmatism rather than on an ideological basis. In this sense, considering the country's situation, they make efforts to create and operate the rules of civil democracy, and have practical ideas on economic restructuring and reducing social tensions. Today, the real center politics is one that, both within the party and in inter-party relations, does not subordinate the control and management of social and economic processes to party political points of view. The party center is, of course, also affected by other parties' politics. In this respect, the only stable point seems to be—which I have already referred to and am not at all happy about—that due to the MDF's shift to the right, the possibility of establishing any significant links between our parties is disappearing. The forces that are creating programs and organizations for the complete suppression and elimination of the left wing are gaining increasing ground. No one in the MSZP can disregard this fact! [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Do you also agree with the view that a real change of the regime has not yet taken place in Hungary?

[Gal] Naturally, I do. However, before you ask how much I have contributed to the Hungarian Way Foundation, I would like to explain why I have this view. I have already mentioned what kind of position wage earners would be in if we look at one of the main directions of the change of the regime, namely the chances of becoming a member of the middle class. I could also mention the conditions of ownership that are far from stable, and the rather sluggish change of the economic structure. We can certainly say that the essence of the change of the regime has not been fulfilled because society's performance has not improved but in fact, in many respects—hopefully only temporarily—it has deteriorated. The change of the regime is undoubtedly a lengthy process and the conditions are unfavorable, but among the reasons for the failure, we must include the coalition government's bad policies that are not aware of the country's conditions and which subordinate everything to their own ideology and power interests. The issue is something different from what the loud supporters of the aforementioned foundation say. In connection with the change of the regime, we think in terms of structures rather than in the victory of a particular ideology, and especially not in personal changes that serve power interests—as is done by the coalition. Therefore, the Socialists see the essence of the change of the system to be in establishing the conditions that are necessary for society's better performance. [passage omitted]

Trade Union Alliance Head on Forming New Party

AU0802110593 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 3 Feb 93 p 3

[Interview with Janos Batonyi, chairman of the Party of National Solidarity and of the Solidarity Trade Union Workers' Alliance by "B.K."; place and date not given: "To Question What Happened to the Change of the Regime"]

[Text] The Solidarity Trade Union Workers' Alliance became known through its constant fight to protect the

interests of workers—especially since the six [trade unions] made the agreements on property which are considered a betrayal and extremely unlawful. In order to make the fight more effective, Janos Batonyi, chairman of the organization, has founded a new party.

[Batonyi] Relying on the support of our membership, in my view, we can function much more effectively in the protection of our interests if we engage in politics. This is why we have established the Party of National Solidarity to serve and represent the traditional national values and the real interests of the nation. We welcome everyone into this party, private people or legal entities, who agree with our goals. I would mention that we agree with very many sections of the often criticized ideas of Csurka because this kind of spirit can further the change of the regime. The formulations of the writer-politician fit in with our party's program, and we could provide a definite professional background to these sketches.

[B.K.] What makes you think that Csurka's ideas and your professional background would effectively promote a new party?

[Batonyi] Three years after the change of the regime, visiting the provinces and talking to workers, we keep hearing questions about what happened to the real and fundamental change of the regime. Using existing legal means, we want to implement an economic policy, a legal policy, and a foreign policy which today are rightfully expected by the people. We want to establish a rational and stable domestic economic system, see to it that corruption, inflation, unemployment, and poverty are removed as soon as possible, and establish productivity in Hungarian industry and agriculture.

[B.K.] Almost all parties have these ideas....

[Batonyi] Experience shows that, even if these ideas do exist, they are only on paper or on the level of demagogy. Parliament is also unable to do its work in such a way as to show even a vague promise of progress. It is overpoliticized, although putting the economy in order can be the only guarantee for social progress and for the establishment of prosperity. This is what the Party of National Solidarity wishes to establish.

Walesa To Dissolve Sejm If Budget Not Approved

LD0902133393 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] President Lech Walesa met today with Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka.

[Begin recording] [Suchocka] Mr. President, I think that the most important issue of this week is a debate on the budget, which is going to take place in the Sejm. So, I would like to talk to you about it.

[Walesa] I am determined to act within the law. If there is no budget I am going to dissolve parliament. My mind is set on it. We have no time for destruction. I would like this parliament to continue because there is still a lot to do, but we cannot play games for too long. The public demands swift and concrete [actions] from us. If we are not able to work it out, I shall have no choice.

[Suchocka] Mr. President, that is why I have come here with concrete proposals that have been submitted to parliament by the government. Well, we are going to discuss it in detail later but the constitution gives you particular powers.

[Walesa] I am afraid that the media will say that this is blackmail by the President. But I have already paid so many bills for someone else's actions. So they can say that I blackmail the parliament, they can indeed, if it is going to serve the cause. [end recording]

Culture Council Reminded of Dignity of Presidency

AU0802135293 Warsaw PAP in English 1610 GMT 4 Feb 93

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 4—The Presidential Council for Culture today issued a statement in which it expressed deep concern about the political climate in Poland over the past few weeks.

"The stateliness of the republic symbolized by the office of the president of the Republic of Poland should be protected by law, especially by the republic's supreme organs of authority, the Sejm, Senate and government," the Council stressed in the statement.

Members of the Council appealed to all parliamentary political parties as well as to mass media not to forget about "the dignity and good name of the republic, which is being discredited by the language used in current disputes and by the atmosphere of street brawls in public life."

President Lech Walesa, addressing the Council members, said that he had decided not to sign Professor Zbigniew Klajnert's nomination for the post of minister of culture and arts as the Council and some artists' milieus are against Klajnert's candidacy.

The president also referred to the much discussed law on radio and television, signed by him last January. Walesa, who vetoed a similar law passed by previous parliament, explained that he signed the law because it was approved by a democratically elected parliament and because he had promised representatives of radio and TV media to do so.

The president also expressed the opinion that the law's "quality will depend upon executive regulations, which should be carefully focused on at this time." The law, to come in force on March 1, is still to be examined by the Constitutional Tribunal which is to decide whether it does not undermine the constitutional principle of freedom of speech.

Speaking on culture's encounter with the brutal laws of the market economy, Lech Walesa stressed the need for careful consideration in selecting areas of culture that are to be invested in, so as to best promote national culture and education. He added that investments ought to be made wisely, as funds are limited in today's difficult economic situation.

The president also appealed to the Council for wise advice and good proposals concerning the president's three candidates for members of the nine-person National Radio and Television Council, a new body set up by the law on radio and TV. One of the tasks of the Council will be the granting of licences to radio and TV stations.

Conflict Over Walesa Called 'Destructive for All'

AU0902160793 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 Feb 93 pp 16, 17

[Article by Adam Michnik: "The Second War at the Top"]

[Excerpts] History, as we know, repeats itself as farce. The first war at the top was a moral shock, because it destroyed the "Solidarity" ethos. The second marks the decline of the political scene. Its consequences, however, may be graver than those of the first, which brought Walesa and Kaczynski, who were in agreement with each other to the end, to the Belweder [presidential residence].

Let us consider what sense today's conflicts make, conflicts that strike fear into some and inspire revulsion in others. [passage omitted]

The Belweder game is a simple one—to gain control of all the important centers of power by using the mafia method of appointing "its people": the law and order apparatus, the justice system, the news media, and the special services. In this sense, Jaroslaw Kaczynski is right: Following the personnel actions inspired by the Belweder, it is difficult to shake off a feeling of foreboding.

The Belweder is also right, however, in charging that Kaczynski and his colleagues are destabilizing the state and exposing it to the greatest possible danger through

their inexorable drive to recover the power that they lost as a result of that failed vile act of provocation of 4 June 1992.

In times such as these, there can only be two ways of defending the state interest—compromise or the seizure of total power and the abandonment of democratic procedures.

The government coalition headed by Hanna Suchocka is an attempt to rescue Poland by means of a compromise between opposing elements. The endeavors of the Belweder on the one hand and those of Kaczynski and his colleagues on the other hand prompt reflection on an authoritarian solution.

It would appear that the conflict has gained momentum that is difficult to control. The result is the profound debasement of political life. The worst forms of populism and abhorrent anti-Semitism have returned. Mutual accusations of theft and collaboration are heard. Some talk of insects, others allude to the supposed homosexuality of their adversaries, and yet others burn effigies of the current president and engage in the most sordid slander without furnishing a shred of proof.

It is a battle for the same electorate, one that is susceptible to arguments of this type; a battle that is destructive for all the groups that grew out of the anticommunist opposition, for the current president and for the office of the presidency, for parliament and the parliamentary opposition, for Poland and Polish democracy.

Public life in Poland increasingly tends to swing between parliamentary imbecility and the aggressive mob-rule of the streets. Experience teaches us that at such times, the emergence of a populist dictatorship is something exceptionally straightforward.

I was always an enemy of decommunization and rabid anti-communist rhetoric. I always considered the threat of a communist return to power a fairy tale for the naive, fairy tales written to temper the hearts of the politicians in the Belweder camp.

Today, however, I wonder whether the stubborn and consistent destruction of the "Solidarity" ethos might not lead to a dramatic shift in public opinion, toward the post-communist formation.

In the end, people who detested communists all their lives and spent a considerable amount of time in communist prisons might come to believe that today the people who burn an effigy of the current president outside the Belweder pose a greater danger to Poland than the post-communists.

Please do not forget that it was not I who urged people to vote for Lech Walesa. It was not I who promised the Poles that Walesa would perform a miracle, that he would create a surfeit of bread and turn water into wine. It was not I who compared him to Moses leading the Jews to the promised land.

I did declare, however, that a cornerstone of the democratic order is respect for the democratically expressed will of the people. That is why today I consider an attempt to bring down President Walesa by whipping up disturbances in the streets to be irresponsible adventurism and destructive of Poland's fragile statehood. To call the president of the Republic of Poland an agent of the communist security service in public is an insult and an affront to the Polish nation and state. It is impermissible.

It does not please me at all that Walesa is now reaping what he has sown.

I derive no satisfaction at all from the fact that I warned of his irresponsibility and incompetence. It is not Walesa who is calling people into the streets to destroy the law. That is now being done by his enemies and those who were until recently his aides-de-camp.

I do not want to take any sides in the disputes between Minister Wachowski and Drzycimski on the one hand and Parys and Macierewicz on the other. I am on the side of Polish democracy and Polish reform. That means the stubborn defense of the law and democracy, as well as the ability to rise above differences of secondary importance.

A great responsibility is being assumed by those who are today striking at the fragile Polish state with their slogans of higher wages, the defense of Christian values, decommunization, or screening. I would like to assure them that they will be issued with a bill for that.

They often scare us with the specter of a Lithuanian syndrome in Poland: The post-communists might win in an election. That is a possibility that cannot be excluded. It might be worse, however, than that. Instead of Lithuania, we might have an internal Yugoslavia: a bloody conflict that no one will be able to control.

Then we will be able to raise our wages, defend Christian values in the mass media, and decommunize each other to our hearts content, until we are intoxicated with it. But then, please remember that I was against it.

With that lack of common sense that is typical of me, however, I believe that Poland will succeed in creating a sensible center.

I believe that people who can manage to grasp the impending danger and the exceptional nature of the current opportunity will be able to reach agreement. Poland has a chance today. We can obtain lasting independence and democracy, as well as normalcy.

The only thing is that this requires a willingness to compromise and a spirit of humility by all of us: President Lech Walesa And Primate Jozef Glemp, Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Aleksander Kwasniewski and Leszek Moczulski, Wojciech Jaruzelski and Zbigniew Bujak.

Poland is standing on the borderline between the abyss of a catastrophe and the hope of an opportunity. Which will it choose?

Walesa Appoints New Culture, Arts Minister

LD0902181193 Warsaw PAP in English 1726 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Warsaw, Feb 9—President Lech Walesa approved Tuesday [9 February] nomination of Jerzy Goral for the post of minister of culture and arts, the government press office reported.

Goral's candidature was forwarded by the Christian National Union (ZChN) Party on Monday, following the president's refusal to accept the nomination of Zbigniew Klajnert, ZChN's first candidate for the post.

Jerzy Goral, 49, who had hitherto worked in the Sejm's (lower house) chancellery, is a lawyer specialising in academic information and documentation, copyright and press law. The new minister said that his ZChN's membership is bound to influence the work of the Culture Ministry and added that he is going to take up his job on Wednesday, after all formalities are completed.

Privatization Minister Views Progress

AU0902085893 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA Weekend Supplement in Polish 29-31 Jan 93 p V

[Interview with Janusz Lewandowski, minister of ownership transformations, by Jaroslaw Szczepanski; date and place not given: "Even More Slowly Than We Expected"]

[Text] [Szczepanski] At what stage of privatization are we today?

[Lewandowski] Half a post-socialist economy and half a private economy. Those are the simplest parameters. Measured in terms of the output of the private and state sectors, and the structure of employment, we are the country with the largest private sector in post-communist Europe. However, measured in terms of the rate of privatization, we are at the stage of having transformed 2,000 former state enterprises into private ones. That means that privatization is proceeding more slowly than we expected.

[Szczepanski] Can it proceed more quickly?

[Lewandowski] Of course it can. That greater speed would no longer have to be a function of the readiness to make decisions, because, it seems to me, people are psychologically prepared for it. They know that the final result of the work that this ministry does is the signing of a contract. That might entail a certain risk, but they have already become accustomed to that. The methods for speeding up procedures that the law on privatization was supposed to bring have not produced results, because the law was held up as a result of negotiations. The second barrier is reprivatization and confusion about ownership relations. The faster work proceeds to establish who owns what, that is, the fundamental work aimed at introducing order into the ownership laws in Poland, the sooner we will have a product for sale in the form of enterprises. It will not be ready as long as these relations are unclear. If real wages grow over time, then it will be possible to sell more. If there is a law on mass privatization, then that will be a true qualitative breakthrough. It would be possible to achieve this much more quickly, if these processes in Poland were technocratic ones, if they consisted in making decisions behind a desk on the basis of the law or analyses. However, the process is negotiated and established over an inordinately long period of time. This process slows things down. These are, however, objective Polish conditions.

[Szczepanski] Should privatization proceed faster?

[Lewandowski] There us no doubt that it should. That manner of thinking, that one could proceed slowly, is a manner of pondering on the economy. It is enough to become engrossed in the economy to know how hundreds of enterprises are plaintively issuing appeals, because they want to find a better owner for themselves than the state, especially if it involves some injection of capital or access to some market. I am under constant pressure, which my critics are not aware of—there is great pressure for privatization from the firms. The most serious criticism of the ministry is not that we are plundering national assets or privatizing blindly or haphazardly, as that is the language of politics and the mass media. What I keep hearing from industry is why are things taking so long, when will it finally be our turn. It is obvious to me that there is a great deal of concern about this issue.

[Szczepanski] You have been accused of selling off indebted enterprises for small amounts of money, and now you have started to sell off enterprises in a bad state for even less, that is, for a symbolic one zloty. Is that not squandering national assets?

[Lewandowski] It is an attempt to do something useful with those assets that we have inherited. That is the purpose of those measures. It would be best if some vital economic organisms were to emerge rather than scrapheaps. It frequently happens in privatization that we sell off a factory for which it is impossible to make some kind of sensible commercial offer, sometimes a factory that has recently been struggling with the burden of debt. That was the case with the Szczecin shipyard and that is why it was possible to sell it for one zloty rather than a negative amount. Privatization often takes the form of a payment for a certain share holding. It is bargained over, it is even as if it were cajoled, that is, it is a fig leaf, because what really matters are investments, certain social guarantees. [sentence as published]

[Szczepanski] Do you think that social packages make it practically impossible to sell off factories?

[Lewandowski] No, because investors—sound ones—do not spend money in Poland only to buy shares, but also to get acquainted with the area. What is increasingly becoming a piece of conventional wisdom about Poland is that social issues are important in our country because the trade unions are strong. That does not encourage investment because of the increased risk and the need for special additional investment. That is the right way to interpret what is going on here.

[Szczepanski] What do factories that want to privatize have to do?

[Lewandowski] Of the almost 1,900 plants and over 100 state farms that had been privatized by the end of the third quarter of last year—those are the statistics that we have today and those are the figures that we gave in the report on the state of privatization—800 had been privatized on the initiative of the work forces, according to the so-called employee leasing system. So, one simply has to put forward one's own ideas, the management's ideas, and those of the work force, and we check them by looking at the map of privatization across the country, the map of strategic choices. Sometimes, we put forward initiatives of our own, by using the sector approach, or mass privatization.

[Szczepanski] The high appraisals of the value of some plants mean that work forces cannot buy them although they very much want to. What is the solution to that?

[Lewandowski] The practical advice that I give most often is not to leave things solely with the work force, but to look for a partner. It usually benefits employees when they have someone in their midst who sees things differently, who has committed capital, and wants to derive some benefits, some profits, as a result. However, we in Poland also sell in installments, requiring 40 percent to be paid immediately. There is a whole series of ways of making the terms cheaper, but it is not just a question of price, but also of the terms under which something is sold.

[Szczepanski] Does the privatization path that a plant takes depend more on the work force or on the management?

[Lewandowski] In the case of RAFAKO [expansion unknown], there was agreement among the work force, which is highly qualified and looks at its interests in the long term, and in light of that it is a good partner for, among other things, obtaining the funds needed to privatize. In view of that, the work force and the management were able to propose a joint commercial offer. It should be very much stressed that RAFAKO responded to the idea of a commercial offer, one that would pay in terms of the valuation of the plant.

[Szczepanski] A question that is often asked is whether a sensible form of privatization can be carried out if there is no economic strategy for the country.

[Lewandowski] One can respond to enterprises' ideas and that is what should be done in individual cases. That is how privatization works in the eastern part of Germany. That is the most effective way of privatizing in Europe and involves putting a firm up for auction and finding investors without looking at links to the economy of the country and repercussions for the work force. In Poland, a moment's thought, an attempt to place things within a broader strategy is necessary in some sectors. That is why since the middle of 1991, we have always had a full sectoral picture, a situation report, and only later do we examine individual cases.

[Szczepanski] Does the purchase of Polish factories by foreign capital not threaten Polish interests?

[Lewandowski] So far, there has not been a case that would confirm that gloomy prognosis. So, the prognosis itself is questionable. There is great fear of this, but a dose of megalomania too, in imagining that those enormous Western companies that operate on enormous markets are afraid of Polish competitors.... By buying Polish factories, they want to enter the Polish market and mostly, they get on very well with the work forces and management. I have far fewer conflicts with foreign investors than with Polish ones. There is one other solution that we apply extensively and in a way dispels those fears, that is, investment obligations. If someone commits himself to investing so many millions of dollars in a factory over so many years, then he definitely wants to make an economic success of it and not just get rid of the competition.

[Szczepanski] Is the liquidation of plants a form of ownership transformation?

[Lewandowski] Yes, because these liquidations are caused by economic factors and the person who acts as receiver regarding the assets tries to sell the plant. In that way, by satisfying creditors, what was state property becomes private property.

[Szczepanski] In your opinion, is privatization good or bad?

[Lewandowski] In my opinion, it is an institutional necessity, and, regardless of its consequences, a prerequisite for the development of a market economy in Poland. The one without the other is inconceivable. So, we have to take the Polish economy through this operation. That is because the state economy is mortally ill and it requires surgery in the form of ownership change, not in every area, but in the overwhelming part of the economy.

[Szczepanski] Is the ministry doing enough?

[Lewandowski] Definitely not, because we are a collection of officials. Some are fanatics who look around Poland at what is going on with surprise and find themselves being accused of the very worst things. However, we know how the service is viewed in Poland. After the war, the idea of public service was lost in the highest

echelons. These officials are only privatization people to some extent, and in part they are officials who are no different from all state officials in their everyday conduct.

[Szczepanski] How do you assess your people?

[Lewandowski] We always favor the ability to produce original solutions. There are procedures that repeat themselves, for example, in liquidation privatization, and they can be given a routine form. But in the case of every great capital undertaking, in the case of every contract, in view of the unique conditions regarding debt, claims, community issues, and competitors, original solutions have to be found. I place the ability to deal with atypical situations very highly in my assessment of people.

[Szczepanski] For what reasons can someone be sacked from the ministry on the spot?

[Lewandowski] For suspicion of corruption. Unfortunately, the accursed thing is that one hears rumors, but there are no hard facts. I have received warnings, and people have been dismissed as a result. However, neither detailed inspections or hints from outside brought to light what we suspected. These people try to adhere to norms, and not doing so in as sensitive a department as this would be grounds for dismissal. Another reason would be burying one's head in the sand, beating about the bush, which is very prevalent in administration. Vacillating is an excellent way of surviving as an official, but not in this department.

Sejm Passes Law on Privatization of State Firms

AU0802134493 Warsaw PAP in English 2256 GMT 5 Feb 93

[Text) Warsaw, Feb. 5—The Sejm today passed a law on ownership transformations of state enterprises of vital importance for the national economy. The law makes it possible to simplify and speed up the process of privatization in the energy sector, that is mines, power stations and fuels trade. Also, the privatization of those firms will be supervised by the minister of trade and industry, and not by the minister for privatization, as has been the rule so far.

The chamber amended the laws regulating the functioning of law courts, public prosecutor's offices, the Supreme Court, and several others. As a result of the amendments, the minister of justice has been given greater powers in appointing judges. Also, the president will now have the right to dismiss a judge who "violated the principle of (judicial) independence."

The plenary session heard a report of two Sejm committees on the government draft amendments to the tax laws. A vote on the draft is expected Saturday [6 February]. The committees rejected the government proposal to introduce another personal income bracket, i.e above 194.4 million zlotys (ca. 12,000 dollars) annually, to be taxed at the rate of 50 percent (the highest tax rate at present is 40 percent). They have also modified the government draft in a way alleviating somewhat the burden of taxation shouldered by the lowest income earners, without any change in the expected total revenue from personal income tax.

Paradoxically, the government 50-percent tax proposal was backed by opposition caucuses and criticised by caucuses of the parties making up the ruling coalition.

The draft, supported Friday by most of the caucuses, provides for new taxation principles with regard to leasing operations, banks, and churches.

The majority of caucuses gave their support to the draft law on unfair competition, to be put to the vote Saturday. There was a considerable divergence of opinion, however, on the issue of a complete ban on media advertising of tobacco products, alcoholic drinks and medicines.

State 'Sabotage' of Family Farms Denied

PM1002104993 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 3 Feb 93 p 4

[Interview with Adam Tanski, chairman of the State Treasury Agricultural Property Agency, by correspondent Marek Burczyk; place and date not given]

[Text] [Burczyk] The rate at which state farm [PGR] land is being transferred to State Treasury ownership is much higher than the rate at which this recovered landed property is being restructured and redistributed. In other words, the area of land under your management is rapidly increasing. Consequently, are you not afraid that your agency will eventually turn into a super-massive PGR structure or into a replica of a "ministry for PGR administration"—the latter having already had a historical precedent?

[Tanski] There is, of course, the temptation—and the danger—that the agency will tend to restrict its mission to specific interventions in a variety of individual matters. There are even formal preconditions for such a development: The agency has the status of a legal entity, while individual farms turned over to the State Treasury have no corresponding position. We are fully aware of this situation, and that is why we are doing everything in our power to avoid slipping into the old, thoroughly compromised grooves. To this end, we do everything we can to promote the farms' independence within the terms of their plenipotentiary powers. The aforementioned danger is also averted by our practice of entrusting the management of these farms to private agents: We negotiate with them fixed-term agreements concerning administration and management of the farms held by the State Treasury. These agreements are binding for the duration of the transition period before the property is finally privatized.

[Burczyk] Along with the landed properties resulting from the disbanding of the PGR farms, the agency also takes over their liabilities and obligations. The former PGR's were very heavily in debt.

[Tanski] Indeed. The sum total of their debts amounts to 17 trillion zlotys [Z]. This is a considerable figure. Nevertheless, I hope that we will be able to meet this challenge. The agency has already secured the right to issue securities in the form of bonds, and this gives everyone concerned the time necessary to "catch our breath." As a result of the issue of agency bonds, the state of the banks' assets will immediately improve, and we will gain the time necessary to accumulate the money with which we will subsequently buy back the bonds. Negotiations with the state farms' creditors are currently in progress, and it is to be expected that they will conclude with an agreement. It is worth noting that the first stage has been reached already: We succeeded in negotiating certain common principles of cooperation with the PGR's' main creditor, the Food Industry Bank.

[Burczyk] When will the first bonds be issued?

[Tanski] Once we have concluded negotiations. I believe this could take place by the middle of this year.

[Burczyk] Will your bonds be also offered to the general public?

[Tanski] They certainly will during the second stage of the operations! This was suggested by the chairman of the Securities Commission. To this end we must prepare an offer prospectus. As long as the bond market operates between banks only—which is the most important aspect of the scheme as far as we are concerned—we do not need to issue an offer prospectus.

[Burczyk] It is said that, given the changed circumstances, the agency is currently promoting the creation of vast landed estates and that it actually makes it difficult for peasant family farms to purchase post-PGR land...

[Tanski] These are merely empty and demagogic accusations, formulated in the not altogether clear interests of the current political games and strategies. We believe that the process of agricultural land ownership transformations should incorporate both the interests of family farms—which depend on the freedom to acquire more land and thereby increase the agricultural production area—and the general public interest. The latter would entail preventing the squandering of the colossal assets which were at the disposal of the former PGR estates. These assets include not only land but also buildings, facilities, equipment and machines. Their estimated total value amounts to something like Z100 trillion. What will happen to these fixed assets when we strip away the land itself without any thought about the associated property? This is why all appeals for a more "dynamic," or "spontaneous" parceling out of the PGR estates must simply be judged as economically irresponsible. It is true that we should place as much land as possible at the disposal of peasant family farms, but it must be done in a way that will ensure that the "leftovers" can still constitute healthy, viable, and fully economically operational farms. Here, statistics can provide the best example of the demagogic irresponsibility of the accusations leveled against us, alleging that we ignore or virtually sabotage the interests of individual family farms. Last year we offered some 249,000 hectares of agricultural land to farmers. Of this, only 9,500 hectares were actually purchased, and another 49,000 hectares were leased out. A mere one-fourth of our offer was taken up! So what do these figures suggest? They certainly do not support the thesis that the agency underestimates or ignores farmers' needs! They attest to an exceptionally low demand for agricultural land.

[Burczyk] But why is that demand so low?

[Tanski] This is associated with a sudden collapse of the profitability of agricultural production and an acute shortage of available finance accessible to farmers. This is why—if we really want to act in the interest of increasing the area of land owned by family farms—we must secure an influx of financial resources available to those who want to purchase agricultural land for that purpose. On its part, the agency is prepared to declare full cooperation with such a scheme through the introduction of very favorable loan payment terms. These would involve interest rates of only one-fourth of the value of the rate of the refinancing loans, payable over many years.

Rightist Leader on Market Economy, Regionalization

PM0802170993 Katowice TRYBUNA SLASKA in Polish 30-31 Jan 93 p 1

[Interview with Aleksander Hall, Conservative Party leader, by correspondent Gabriela Lecka; place and date not given]

[Text] [Lecka] You are an advocate of a right-oriented program, but one that is right-oriented in a rational manner and which combines a market economy with traditional national, social, and moral values. Could it be that political parties' position on these two issues, that is, market economy and moral liberalization, will ultimately serve to clarify the current "mosaic" of political groups and orientations in Poland?

[Hall] These are not the only criteria at the moment. For example, we are now engaged in another, and very important, debate on which forces will be winners in Poland: those hailing from the old political system, or those that grew out of the tradition of August 1980. Moreover, I believe that certain tangible interests of individual social groups, classes, or corporate entities can also influence the ultimate shape of our political configuration in Poland. I am convinced that Poland today does indeed need a strong camp capable of combining respect for traditional values with recognition of new values carried in the free market system. Such a

camp should also be competent to lead a dialogue with other trends present in our public life. I think that is exactly what Poland needs.

[Lecka] What is your position on the question of regionalization—a particularly "burning" issue here in Upper Silesia?

[Hall] Poland as a country suffers from too much centralization. Too many decisions are still made in Warsaw. So far, only one step has been taken toward regionalization, and even that single step is far too small. And we all know that regionalization is the system of the future. The only questions that still need to be discussed are the rate of the regionalization process and the range of competence to be entrusted to local authorities. Nevertheless, I am opposed to the view that regionalization should be a step leading to full regional autonomy. Poland should represent more than just a federation of regions and provinces. At the same time, I believe that a concept of patriotism which interprets it as universal leveling denying recognition or respect to the specific character of each individual historic province and each individual local community is a concept that greatly impoverishes the true sense of the term.

Solidarity Dissidents To Form Separate Team

AU0802143493 Warsaw PAP in English 2238 GMT 5 Feb 93

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 5—Some of the Sejm deputies and senators elected on the Solidarity trade union ticket decided today to form a semi-independent team within the framework of the existing Solidarity parliamentary caucus.

The news was broken at a press conference held by the leader of the dissenters, Deputy Alojzy Pietrzyk. He said they believed the parliamentary representation of the union concentrated on issues other than defending workers rights.

Other members of the newly formed team declared they did not approve of certain aspects of the government's fiscal policy, the course of privatisation of state enterprises, and many other aspects of the socio-economic policy pursued by the government.

Pietrzyk told reporters that the group would vote on the draft 1993 budget in line with a stand to be taken by the Solidarity National Commission next Wednesday [10 February].

Members of the group criticised the present leaders of the Solidarity Sejm caucus for their lack of a clear strategy and firm priorities.

More on Solidarity 'Rift'

AU1002103493 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 8 Feb 93 p 2

[Report by 'K.K.': "Solidarity Deputies Less Solidary Now"]

[Text] A rift in the Solidarity parliamentary club, which is headed by Bogdan Borusewicz, was officially announced on Friday [5 February]. A group of ten deputies and one senator, led by Deputies Alojzy Pietrzyk, Elzbieta Seferowicz, and Andrzej Smirnow, declared that they were forming an independent group. The new group will nevertheless remain within the Solidarity parliamentary club, they said.

"This is not a split," the deputies said. "The team we are forming is purely programmatic in nature, and there will be no formal internal disciplinary moves." They objected to the fact that the Solidarity parliamentary club had voted for the government's economic, social, and fiscal policies, and had thus identified itself with the government coalition. Because of this support by the Solidarity parliamentary club, the entire Solidarity trade union was now considered jointly responsible for the failure of these government policies, they said.

Asked whether the Suchocka Government should resign, the deputies replied: "The idea of forming a ruling coalition was a good one and Solidarity has made a valuable contribution to it, but the entire concept has not been entirely successful because the Center Accord and Movement for the Republic have refused to join the coalition. In such a situation, the Solidarity club is politically expendable. A sudden change of government would destabilize the country, therefore we will not act to overthrow the present government and current political setup. But neither will we tolerate a situation where Solidarity is a passive victim of the reforms pursued by various parties without having had much influence on these reforms."

The deputies said that their support for the government's budget would depend on the stance of the Solidarity National Commission, which is due to meet in Gdansk on 10 February.

Walesa Asks Sejm Speaker To Discipline Deputies

AU0802141893 Warsaw PAP in English 2131 GMT 4 Feb 93

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 4—Polish President Lech Walesa wrote today to Sejm (lower house) speaker Wieslaw Chrzanowski to call for steps to be taken to discipline deputies who consciously infringe the law and the constitution.

In an apparent reference to the street demonstrations and other protests organised by the right-wing opposition and others in recent days, President Walesa said that "this breach of legal and constitutional order, which

each deputy is sworn by oath to respect, is intolerable. There can be no place for this in the state of law we are creating. The political attitudes and the behaviour of parliamentarians are not their private affair."

President Walesa asked Chrzanowski what action he intended to take to discipline deputies. He continued: "Is the presidium of the Sejm in a position to make deputies legally responsible in instances where, instead of using the forum of parliament, they air their disputes in the worst of possible forms—taking them onto the streets?"

"The Sejm's indifference in these matters injures the interests of the state and its citizens," Walesa wrote.

Union, Government Disagree Over Arms Industry

LD0902225993 Warsaw PAP in English 2207 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 9—Unionists from the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), who met Tuesday [9 February] with Deputy Industry Minister Waldemar Szajewski to discuss Polish arms industry, decided to start a collective dispute with the government after the minister had presented information on arms plants.

Stanislaw Janas, chairman of trade unions in the electro-engineering industry and Zdzislaw Tuszynski of the Metal Workers Federation obliged workplace unions to organise strike ballot in their plants if OPZZ demands are not met.

OPZZ unionists want the government to pay for deliveries to the former Soviet Union and to make up for losses due to the U.N. embargoes to Iraq and former Yugoslavia.

As for the enterprise pact the OPZZ Council will take a final decision whether to sign it or not on Thursday.

Meanwhile at a meeting in Elblag, leader of the OPZZ trade unions Ewa Spychalska accused the government of lack of economic programme and particularly of industrial strategy and blamed it for incorrect banking and privatisation policies.

UP Objects To 'Brutalization of Political Life'

AU0402144393 Warsaw PAP in English 2103 GMT 2 Feb 93

[Text] Warsaw, Feb. 2—At a press conference today, head of the Union of Labour (UP) Ryszard Bugaj protested against "the brutalisation of political life in Poland" and vowed that the party would press for parliamentary resolutions "making it necessary to substantiate charges" directed against public officials.

Bugaj accused the prosecutor general of not defending the prestige of the offices of state president and Sejm speaker, even though "the interested parties deny the authenticity of the charges directed against them".

In a related resolution, the UP National Council called on deputies, senators and civil servants, accused publicly of acting as communist agents or of misconduct, to bring libel cases to court or, where the charges are true, to resign from office.

Bugaj also said that charges laid against President Lech Walesa by Centre Alliance (PC) leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski are untrue. "The charge that Lech Walesa has changed his programme is untrue because he has never had one," he said.

Bugaj stressed that it was Jaroslaw Kaczynski who had originally presented Lech Walesa as Poland's "saviour" and called the present anti-Walesa campaign "a brutal but smart political trick designed to channel society's aggression against the person of the president."

Also today, the UP met with a sharp response from Sejm deputy speaker Andrzej Kern following the party's adoption of a resolution calling on him to resign from his parliamentary post until such time as "there is a clarification of his role in the actions of the Lodz prosecutor's office in a matter to which he was a party, and until there is also a clarification in open court of accusations against him relating to his moral character."

Deputy speaker Kern said that "the allegations against me are stupid and laughable. In both cases I have a clear conscience, and I see no need to suspend my duties."

The UP resolution refers specifically to allegations that he used his political influence to persuade the Lodz prosecutors office to detain for questioning the parents of a youth whom he accused of abducting his daughter Monika against her will in the summer of 1992.

"When my daughter was taken from me, I lodged notification of an offence. (...) in my opinion, the Lodz prosecutor was only doing his duty," Kern said.

The second charge relates to allegations by Marzena Domaros (also known as Anastazja Potocka) in her sensationalist book *Erotic Immunities*, published in November 1992, that she was raped by Kern in his bedroom at the hotel for parliamentary deputies.

"Just as in the past there were certain principles that you didn't duel with certain people, it is not fitting that I should go to court against that lady," Kern explained.

Ex-Interior Minister Kiszczak To Face Trial

AU0802134693 Warsaw PAP in English 1502 GMT 3 Feb 93

[Text] Katowice, Feb. 3—A trial against former Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak over the killing of nine miners during a protest strike in the "Wujek" colliery on December 16, 1981 will begin before the provincial court in Katowice on March 10, court spokesman Eugeniusz Czora said today.

The other 23 defendants are charged with causing the deaths of the miners.

In December 1981 riot police were called in to quell the strike staged in protest against the imposition of martial law. Nine people were killed when the police opened fire at the striking miners.

KGB General Says No Plan To Intervene Existed

AU1002095793 Warsaw PAP in English 1433 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Moscow, Feb. 9—Neither in 1980 nor in 1981 was Poland threatened with a Soviet military intervention, according to KGB General Vitaliy Pavlov, who served as the KGB's chief officer in Warsaw in the years 1973 to 1984.

The Soviet leaders had never even put the question of whether to intervene militarily in Poland, the KGB general told PAP. To support his claim, the general referred to a conversation held by Mikhail Suslov, the Soviet number two, with General Wojciech Jaruzelski on 12 December 1981, a day before martial law was introduced in Poland. Suslov told Jaruzelski that any kind of military assistance was out of the question.

Pavlov also referred to a conversation between Yuriy Andropov, then heading the KGB, and General Czeslaw Kiszczak, then Poland's minister of internal affairs, held in October 1981. Andropov told Kiszczak to inform Jaruzelski that the Soviets had no intention of intervening militarily in Poland. "We do not want and cannot afford to do it. Afghanistan is enough for us," Pavlov quoted Andropov as saying.

The former KGB resident in Warsaw admitted that there was a possibility of Soviet military intervention in the event of complications in introducing martial law by Poles themselves. "If it came to bloodshed and large-scale fighting, the states of the Warsaw treaty would take measures to ensure the security of (militarily important) transport routes leading through Poland," he said. "If the extreme wing of Solidarity launched a bloody struggle to take over power in Poland, the danger of intervention could become real," Pavlov added.

He claimed that martial law was imposed not because of any pressure from the USSR, but due to the striving of the Polish leaders of the day to "solve the problem by their own means." Kiszczak and Defence Minister Florian Siwicki were determined to take quick action to prevent a bloody confrontation of political opponents. The ministers put pressure on the ruling communist politicians.

Pavlov also claimed that the myth of "a foreign danger" was deliberately used by Polish leaders to persuade Solidarity to make concessions. As an example, he quoted the notorious "Sojusz-81" military exercises held in March 1981 not only with the consent of the Polish authorities, but at their outright request.

The KGB general admitted that the then East German and Bulgarian leaders, Erich Honecker and Todor Zhivkov, pressed for a military intervention in Poland by the Warsaw Pact Forces. "I think that Jaruzelski was emotionally concerned about such a possibility, but as a politician and basing on the facts and reports available to him he should have known that there would be no intervention," Pavlov stated.

He also declared that the KGB had not a single informer inside the Solidarity union in the years 1980-81. "Why should we have such informers when we could get all the information we wanted from the Polish authorities which had complete knowledge of what was going on inside the union?" Pavlov maintained.

Assembly Agrees To Inspection of Bugged Phones

AU0902123393 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 4 Feb 93 p 4

[Article by Marcela Feraru: "In Order To Discover Wiretapping, the Communications Ministry Will Cooperate With EVENIMENTUL ZILEI—the Assembly of Deputies Decides To Take Self-Defense Measures"]

[Text] The permanent Bureau of the Assembly of Deputies has decided to hear experts of the Communication Ministry in connection with the EVENIMENTUL ZILEI discovery of listening devices in parliament aimed at tapping private conversations. Although this decision was adopted by a vote, this issue was not included on the agenda of the 3 February meeting of that chamber's Permanent Bureau.

As a result of the protest by several Permanent Bureau members whose telephones seem to have been bugged, the requested experts appeared at the Permanent Bureau. Their explanations were not satisfactory. Those experts said that they cannot state their findings before studying the BIRD [expansion unknown] device, but claimed that it is possible that such an instrument should indicate the existence of listening devices. The conclusion was that a team from the Ministry of Telecommunications, simultaneously with a team from the EVENIMENTUL ZILEI daily should carry out a detailed inspection of those telephones that activated the BIRD device.

"The results will be made public" was the conclusion of the Permanent Bureau of the Assembly of Deputies.

Melescanu Praises EEC Association Accord

AU0902113293 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 4 Feb 93 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Dumitru Tinu; place and date not given: "A Hot Line Bucharest-Brussels"]

[Text] [Tinu] Mr. Minister, to begin with I would suggest that you define the importance of the association accord between Romania and the EEC, signed last Monday [1 February] in Brussels.

[Melescanu] Through this act, the Romanian Government expressed its very clear foreign policy choice, namely the option for integration into European structures. This is the main political significance of the signing of the Brussels accord. Actually, it is the first step in a whole process.

[Tinu] What is the relationship between the association with the EEC and the other target, which we hope to reach this year, namely joining the Council of Europe as a full member?

[Melescanu] Each of these structures has its importance and rules. Personally, I believe that the axis around which all European structures revolve is the EEC in Brussels. The EEC is the clearest and best defined expression of the European idea. Through its very closely knit structure and sizable budget, it is the best synthesis of European unity. From this viewpoint, our association is a positive act that will facilitate our admission to the Council of Europe.

[Tinu] Does that mean that we are dealing here with relations of interdependence?

[Melescanu] Indeed. In its turn, our admittance to the Council of Europe will also have another positive impact, since it will speed up the ratification of the EEC association accord.

[Tinu] With the association to the EEC, we are leaving behind an obscure political zone, in which we excelled throughout our history with our talent to keep a balancing act between the various great powers of the day. Are we taking our leave of this in sadness or in joy?

[Melescanu] To avoid a direct answer, I would like to recall a well-known fact; namely, that politics is devoid of sentiment. Therefore, the issue is not whether we laugh or cry when we go through with this parting. One must admit that a look back might give cause for a certain amount of nostalgia. In the past, Romanian diplomacy excelled in the intelligent exploitation of rivalries going on among the great powers in this geographical region. As a matter of fact, this—along with our armed forces, when circumstances required it—was one of the main instruments that ensured our national identity. At the same time, one must take into consideration the fact that the system of alliances we are entering now also offers modern instruments for the achievement of the same goal: the preservation of our identity in a world that has undergone radical changes. Today's Europe is fundamentally different from former Europe, which was a continent of confrontation, where Romania was playing on the card of political balance. We are at the hour of European integration and we must take this step.

[Tinu] Will this association with a new system of alliances, with certain supranational structures, not touch the sensitive cord of national pride somehow?

[Melescanu] Of course, it is only natural that a certain feeling of frustration may occur if we are unable to explain clearly the changes that have taken place and the instruments we will use in this new system of alliances. However, I would like to point out that this is only a change of emphasis. If, until now, the promotion of our national interests meant the exclusive assertion of an autonomous position in international forums, from now on this will be done within the framework of coordinated positions, that will be collectively expressed. It is up to us and our skills to argue and defend our national interests in the process of elaboration of these collective positions. Therefore, it is to Romania's advantage if our position—when Romania is admitted to these international forums—can rely on the support of a group of countries

whose weight cannot simply be ignored. Therefore, the accent shifts to the period of preparation. The struggle will be to ensure that stances are being worked out that also reflect our national interests.

[Tinu] To sum up, I understand that this does not mean abandoning the concept of independence, which still stirs deeply rooted feelings in us, feelings that were cleverly manipulated by the former dictator, who kept repeating this sacred principle until hysterical exhaustion.

[Melescanu] I would like to point out that all political forces are displaying ever greater understanding for the goal of our integration into European structures. As a matter of fact, at the Consultative Council within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—where representatives of all parties are present—we intend to devote the first session to the association accord signed in Brussels. We plan to undertake an in-depth analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of this association as well as of the rights and obligations incumbent upon us.

[Tinu] Anticipating the questions that will be raised at that meeting, I would like you to explain the mechanism of the EEC system of consultations in foreign policy matters. Will there be a Bucharest-Brussels hot line? Or, to put it differently, will we need approval for our foreign policy acts?

[Melescanu] This is not the right approach to this question, as we are primarily dealing here with Romania's participation in consultations at all levels for the adoption of common decisions, that is, through meetings at the level of heads of state, prime ministers, and foreign ministers. Second, there is also a parliamentary component, which will ensure the preparation of political decisions, by tackling certain problems of interest to all the countries in the community. There will be no need for advance approval of any foreign policy act. The issue is different: If until now, the EEC was one of the elements that had to be taken into consideration, from now on it becomes the main point of reference.

[Tinu] Let us recapitulate: What are we gaining and what are we losing?

[Melescanu] First, from an economic viewpoint, we gain in terms of fast and greater access for Romanian products to the EEC markets. Second, we gain greater support in the sphere of technical assistance, credits, and nonrepayable grants. Finally, this also represents a kind of insurance for foreign investors. Therefore, we hope that this accord will also have an impact on foreign investment in Romania. It will also influence the granting of the most-favored-nation status by the United States. Obviously, there is also the big disadvantage of the opening of the Romanian market to penetration by Western products, which amounts to a weakening of the system of protection of Romanian industry, which will be obliged to face some very tough realities. On the political plane, the signing of this accord signals a recognition of the fact that Romania has made sufficient progress along the road to democratization, so that it can be accepted as an EEC member, and that its targets are compatible with the values promoted by the European Community states. In other words, we now have a clearer picture of the Romanian society's place, role, and prospects.

[Tinu] In the aircraft that flew us home from Brussels, you talked about a concentric system—with a nucleus representing the 12 EEC members, followed by an outside circle with the European Free Trade Association, and a third circle with the associated countries, including Romania. How does the "Visegrad triangle" (Hungary, Poland, [and the former] Czecho-Slovakia) harmonize with this third circle? Do you not think that it is a dissonant element in the ensemble of the European architecture?

[Melescanu] I believe that the main goal of that "trilateral" arrangement was the interest of these countries, which were at a more advanced economic and political stage, in accelerating their integration into European structures. When all the east European countries enjoy the same treatment in their relations with the EEC, things will change.

[Tinu] Do you think that the policy of differentiated treatment of east European countries is going to be abandoned?

[Melescanu] I believe that, as far as the EEC is concerned, the idea of differentiated treatment is no longer current.

[Tinu] Will Romania be able to recover the lost ground? What signals did you receive from Brussels?

[Melescanu] This association process brings to my mind the image of the 3,000-meter hurdles. In terms of this comparison, one must say that Romania has started with a certain delay. Ahead of us is a group—the "trilateral" countries—that have gained an advantage. They began sooner than we did and also enjoyed greater support than we did. Personally, I believe that Romania is like a strong athlete, which, through its demographic share, resources, and great intelligence capital, has great chances of catching up with this group. My conviction is that, when this race is over, we will be among the first at the finish line.

[Tinu] Is it true that there are conditions attached to the Brussels document taking effect?

[Melescanu] At the initial phase, there was a clause that stipulated the unilateral suspension of the accord in the event of serious human rights violations. This clause was conceived at a time when there was some concern about developments in Romania. This idea was abandoned, because it contained an essential flaw. You cannot be a member of a club if you do not enjoy its confidence in your ability to meet its requirements. The human rights idea can be perceived in the entire philosophy of the

accord, through the assertion of the same values and the assumption of the obligation to observe them.

Secretary Ene Discusses Purpose of Sofia Talks

AU0902193693 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1444 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 9/2/1993—While in Sofia, Secretary of State Constantin Ene of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania said that the purpose of his visit in Bulgaria was to have consultations with Bulgarian officials on the enforcement of the UN resolutions setting sanctions against Yugoslavia.

The two sides intend to exchange views on the recent cases of flagrant violation of the embargo and to agree on concrete means of cooperation in future.

"We are pleased to say that the Bulgarian side has accepted our proposal," Mr. Ene said. He showed that besides the already existing good cooperation between the various specialized bodies, it was important for the two countries to establish a fast system of communication at political level, namely between the two ministries of external affairs, for prompt consultations between the two countries in case new special situations arise.

Secretary of State Ene also mentioned in the context the possibility of extending the cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria at United Nations level in their relations with various international missions, and the prospects of trilateral communication between Romania, Bulgaria and the Ukraine, so that the states directly concerned should be able to bring their contribution to the adequate enforcement of the embargo and cooperate in compliance with the provisions of the Security Council resolutions.

Communique Issued Answering Trade Union Requests

AU0802210793 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2002 GMT 8 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 8/2/1993—About the requirement of the 15 national trade union confederations to meet with Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu on the matter of the national collective work contract, government spokeswoman Doina Jalea released Monday, February 8, a communique reading that:

Premier Vacaroiu has decided that mediation on behalf of the government will be made by Minister of State Dan Mircea Popescu, minister of Labor and Social Protection, together with representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Health, Education, and of the National Statistics Board.

If divergent opinions—of the trade union confederations' representatives and of the employers'—still exist after this mediation and prevent finalization of the negotiations, the Romanian premier stated he was willing to participate in a dialogue with the employers and the trade unions in order to eliminate the sources of disagreement.

Trade Unions Call Off Threatened Strike

AU0902200093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1944 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 99/2/1993—The spokeswoman for the government announced that Premier Vacaroiu would meet Wednesday, February 10, at the government's headquarters, with representatives of 15 union confederations and of the employers' associations.

The meeting will also be attended by the ministers of labour and social protection, finance, health, education, and the chairman of the National Board of Statistics.

The Romanian premier is going to mediate the dialogue between the employers' associations and the unions, in search of solutions to diverging opinions on the all-country labour contract.

Following this decision, the 15 union confederations, decided, for their part, to call off the nationwide strike scheduled for February 10.

Committee Expels Dissident PRM Parliamentarian

AU1002111393 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 6 Feb 93 p 8

[Article by Adrian Halpert: "A Party Figure, Deputy Ion Hristu, Was Expelled From the Romania Mare Party"]

[Excerpts] At the 5 February news conference of the Romania Mare Party [PRM], party leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor announced the decision of the PRM Steering Committee to expel Ion Hristu, Constanta County PRM deputy, from the party. Mr. Hristu was the man who dared denounce the "lack of democracy within the party" and the "trend toward the party's takeover by former communist activists."

The break came after a meeting of the PRM Parliamentary Group at the Senate headquarters to elect the new group leaders in the two chambers. The meeting turned into a true denunciation of Deputy Ion Hristu, who was asked to sign an already written protest that maintained that there are no dissensions or disagreements within the PRM, as EVENIMENTUL ZILEI claimed on the basis of sure information received. All attempts to convince him to sign the document, from open threats to ardent appeals, failed to move Mr. Hristu from his resolve. [passage omitted]

After the end of the meeting, Ion Hristu received threatening telephone calls at his hotel, urging that he "better sign the protest or else." Back in Constanta, his wife received telephone calls claiming that Mr. Hristu has a mistress in Bucharest. The decision of the PRM Steering

Committee to exclude the Constanta deputy was allegedly prompted by his "immoral life," his actions that "undermined the party's unity" and "his abusive use of 260,000 lei donated by a private company to the PRM for personal purposes." [passage omitted]

At the same news conference, Corneliu Vadim Tudor announced that he is going to sue the "anti-Romanian newspaper EVENIMENTUL ZILEI" following the "increase in unloyal and aberrant attacks that are part and parcel of a well-concerted action from abroad." The PRM leader said that all news referring to a split in the party are "sinister slanders and jokes"; he said all that just a few moments after announcing the expulsion of the Constanta deputy from the party. [passage omitted]

PSM Considers Communist Restoration 'Impossible'

AU0802174993 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1614 GMT 8 Feb 933

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 8/2/1993—Deputy Chairman of the Socialist Party of Labour [PSM] Tudor Mohora, a deputy to Romania's Parliament assessed in a news conference on February 8 as "positive" the activity of the Romanian delegation to the EEC Parliamentary Assembly, saying that the fears about the presence of Senator Adrian Paunescu at that forum proved to be groundless, as he had done his duty to the full.

Referring then to the embargo on Yugoslavia, he said that instead of giving due importance to the cause that generated the embargo violation, the Security Council put pressure on Romania and Bulgaria.

The speaker welcomed the convergence of all political forces on that matter, as it resulted at the recent round-table conference on the attitude of the political forces in Romania regarding the situation on the Danube.

The PSM leader also expressed worry about the situation in the Republic of Moldova, generated by domestic conflicts and considered as welcome the Romanian Parliament's statement, saying the PSM thought the relations with Moldova were and had to be "special."

PSM Chairman Ilie Verdet assessed in the same news conference the communist restoration was impossible, also speaking up for an end to be put to the indiscriminate condemnation of all former Securitate and of the former members of the Romanian Communist Party.

FSN, Opposition Parties Believed To Join Government

AU1002083993 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 4 Feb 93

[Article by Marcela Feraru and Dan Andronic: "In the Case of a Government Reshuffle the FSN and the Parties Included in the Convention Are Willing To Join the FDSN"]

[Text] Increasingly insistent rumors regarding the fact that a possible government reshuffle would bring about a completely different approach from the opposition to the issue of a possible participation in the government, are taking a more concrete shape. The recent movements within the Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN]—such as the administrative structures at all levels acquiring a political nature—have emphasized the mistake made by the opposition when refusing to accept the participation in the establishment of a national unity government.

Persons close to the leadership of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], some of whom even hold decisive positions, informed us that certain parties that belong to the CDR would be ready to take part in the future government. "This would be the only way to release foreign financial resources, when the national economy is on the point of being stifled due to lack of credit" said one of the cited sources. Likewise, it is said that a government reshuffle could take place in two months' time.

Sources in the National Salvation Front [FSN] parliamentary group informed us that certain people who belong to the leadership of that party have made clear attempts to get closer to the FDSN. These attempts are aimed at merging an FSN wing with the FDSN and they show the FSN's willingness to participate in a future government.

The FDSN plenary meeting scheduled for the end of February will mark a possible government reshuffle, as a result of which the FSN and the parties that belong to the CDR will be able to renegotiate conditions for participation in the government. The FDSN and the opposition parties have already made certain attempts of moving closer to each other, according to information that we received from the FDSN Executive Bureau, however, persons in the FDSN leadership have not taken a joint attitude on this issue.

Dragomir Comments on Party, Political Issues

AU1002114593 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1035 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 10/2/1993—"The breaking off between the government and the opposition is representing the corridor through which extremism leaks in," is the opinion of Caius Traian Dragomir, vice president of the National Salvation Front (FSN) expressed in an interview granted to the daily ROMANIA LIBERA. Answering accusations brought by his party colleagues that he would be "the Trojan horse" of the Democratic National Salvation Front within the National Salvation Front, as well as the news according to which a breaking off between Mr. Dragomir and the National Salvation Front was taking place, he opined that "some divergent points of view do exist; they are to be found in my statements and in statements made by my colleagues." However Mr. Dragomir rejects "the story with the Trojan horse," recalling his election campaign which is seen by him as "the most anticommunist one. My position can no longer be of a retreat, but clearly

towards a capitalist society," said Mr. Dragomir. "The bad thing is that there is a certain group within the National Salvation Front, and my feeling is that such groups are not only within the National Salvation Front, which is trying, strongly and with great fuss, to keep a holding of the leadership and make the party become their own property," added Mr. Dragomir.

Referring to information according to which the National Salvation Front have started negotiations to participate in the governing alongside the Democratic National Salvation Front, Mr. Dragomir answered that, even if he did not know of such an initiative, he considered that "in this very moment, government openness must not be unilateral." It can be done, but Mr. Dragomir hopes that negotiations "will have the acceptance of a greater coalition of parties. I am faithful to the idea of a united coalition, which can be done by important political figures, and not necessarily by party leaders".

FDSN Concerned About Moldovan Situation

AU0902200193 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1946 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 9/2/1993—In a statement sent to ROMPRES the Central Executive Bureau of the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) expresses its "concern over the appearance of phenomena which may have a negative influence upon the future of the Republic of Moldova, of the normal course of the political, economic and social reforms in that country."

"In keeping with its political platform," the statement reads, "the FDSN will continue its endeavors to amplify the fraternity and integration relations between the two Romanian states, in agreement with the aspirations towards freedom of all Romanians and with their national ideals."

About the stands taken by several personalities of political and cultural life in the Republic of Moldova—according to which the biggest and most efficient support Romania could grant the democratic forces across the Prut would consist of the economic, political and social activity of reform implementation and strengthening of the state of law—the document underscores that the FDSN has "understood them properly and shares them entirely." The text alludes to the recently published interview of former Moldovan Premier Mircea Druc.

Docked Ships Negative Impact on Economy Alleged

AU0902125293 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Currently the convoy Giurgiu III, consisting of three transportation units and carrying sugar, is on its way toward the Iron Gate II on the Danube. Our correspondent Cornel Sorescu informed us that the convoy resumed its journey this morning from Drobeta-Turnu Severin, where it had spent the night. The Drobeta-Turnu Severin Port Authorities also informed us that several vessels are standing in Danube ports as a result of the sanctions imposed through the UN Security Council resolutions. Thus, four barges carrying soy beans and four carrying rolled steel are in Orsova and two barges carrying rolled steel are in Drobeta-Turnu Severin, in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution. The situation of having these ships and others stationary has a negative impact on the economic activity of Romanian navigation.

Justice Minister Ninosu Defends Doina Cornea

AU1002123593 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1148 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 10/2/1993—Romanian Minister of Justice Petre Ninosu is quoted by daily ROMANIA LIBERA as saying that the summoning of Mrs. Doina Cornea by the Procurator's Office was "inconceivable." He opined that "Mrs. Cornea could not be subpoenaed as a defendant, as there is no proof in this respect."

Mrs. Doina Cornea is one of the Romanian personalities known abroad for her courage and open opposition to the dictatorial regime, for her constant demarche in favour of democracy in Romania.

Mrs. Doina Cornea has been recently summoned to the Bucharest city Procurator's Office to be heard about a complaint accusing her of having incited to undermining the state power.

Romania's President Ion Iliescu declared his "surprise" at Mrs. Cornea's being summoned to the Prosecutor's Office.

Sarajevo Airlift Resumes After Three-Day Hiatus

AU1002120493 Paris AFP in English 1133 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Sarajevo, Feb 10 (AFP)—U.N. relief flights to the besieged Bosnian capital Sarajevo resumed Wednesday [10 February] from Zagreb after a three-day halt following an attack on a German aid plane.

A movement control officer at Sarajevo airport, which is controlled by U.N. troops, said one Canadian aid plane arrived early Wednesday from Zagreb, as well as two U.N. Protection Force flights. He said that from his schedule, it appeared the Canadian and British air force flights were resuming from Zagreb, but not German air force flights.

The air forces carry the food and fuel supplied by the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Aid flights from all rear bases were halted after the attack on the German C-160 Saturday, but resumed from the southern Croatian city of Split and from the Rhein-Main airbase near Frankfurt on Monday. U.N. officials are now looking at relocating the Zagreb base to Italy.

The German plane was hit by antiaircraft fire south of Zagreb, the Croatian capital, as it was flying close to the Serb-dominated Krajina enclave, where fierce fighting is taking place between Croat and Serb forces. The plane staggered back to Zagreb on one engine. The loadmaster was injured, and the plane was holed by shrapnel.

U.N. Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali said U.N. troops had seen Serb soldiers fire the shots, and raised an energetic protest. Air routes from Zagreb which avoid the area add precious time to both incoming and outgoing flights. The amount of food, medicines and fuel reaching the beleaguered capital, which has been under siege by Serb gunners for 10 months is already barely sufficient. Aid officials say the city needs a minimum of 230 tonnes of aid a day.

About half of that comes in on overland routes, but the convoys are often blocked at Serb checkpoints.

Convoys Leave To Supply Usora, Gradacac

LD0902215093 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] This morning, Mostar citizens were woken by the sounding of the general alert: The chetniks were attacking the front lines of the Croatian Defense Council formations at the foot of Mt. Velez, but without result.

A convoy with goods and technical equipment has left Hercegovina for Gradacac and Usora, where both Croats and Muslims have been heroically fighting the chetnik aggressor. Authorities in the Tuzla region said yesterday that due to the lack of ammunition they would be forced to defend themselves from the chetniks with chlorine canisters. There has been a lack of ammunition because of the blockade of roads in central Bosnia imposed by fighting between the Croats and Muslims.

Convoys have now left for Gradacac and Usora! Bosnia-Hercegovina Defense Minister Bozo Rajic will tell you whether they will reach their destination in light of the road blockades in Bosnia-Hercegovina:

[Begin recording] Representatives of the Bosnia- Hercegovina Army and the General Staff of the Croatian Defense Council are ready to cooperate. I inform the public with pleasure that the aid will reach our heroes who have been fighting for months, and that neither Usora nor Gradacac will fall into chetnik hands, particularly as they will not now be forced to use chemical weapons in despair, which they would have to use for self-defense in an emergency. [end recording]

Defense Minister Bozo Rajic issued an order today charging all Bosnia-Hercegovina Army units and the Croatian Defense Council to allow the convoys for the defenders of Usora and Gradacac to pass. Sefer Halilovic, on behalf of the Army, and Milivoje Petkovic, on behalf of the Croatian Defense Council, are personally responsible for the safety of the convoys. [passage omitted]

Sarajevo Mayor Meets With Vance-Owen Envoy

AU0802181293 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Feb 93

[Report by Senada Cumurovic on news conference by Sarajevo Mayor Muhamed Kresevljakovic in Sarajevo on 8 February—recorded]

[Text] Sarajevo Mayor Muhamed Kresevljakovic held a news conference today concerning the talks he had with the special envoy of Vance and Owen [Conference on Yugoslavia] on the future organization of Sarajevo. Senada Cumurovic reports.

[Cumurovic] Those two again, Cyrus Vance and David Owen, and their maps that divide everything in Bosnia-Hercegovina that has never been divided before! Such a task must have been on their minds when they sent Jeremy Brade to put forth to Muhamed Kresevljakovic, mayor of Sarajevo, some very bizarre ideas, to say the least.

[Kresevljakovic] I held talks with the special envoy of the cochairmen of the Geneva conference on Saturday [6 February] afternoon at his request. The said gentleman proposed, among other things, that the extraterritorial part of the city should be from Marijin Dvor to the Cathedral, and that the borders of Hadzici commune should be changed to the advantage of Ilidza. I rejected this proposal with indignation and reminded the esteemed gentleman that the Bosnia-Hercegovina delegation in Geneva had a diametrically opposite view, that it did not sign the proposed Vance-Owen map, that talks were still under way in New York, and after that I ended the conversation.

[Cumurovic] After the mayor's statement, reporters started asking questions. The first question was: What does it mean in fact, this extraterritorial part from the Cathedral to Marijin Dvor.

[Kresevljakovic] You know that this has been a proposal for a long time concerning Sarajevo as the capital. That is a part of the city where the government's institutions should be placed, the assembly, all the institutions the way there are envisaged by the constitution that should result from the talks in Geneva.

[Cumurovic] That extraterritorial part should be under the control of the republic. The next question was whether the other communes would be ethnically divided. Muhamed Kresevljakovic said:

[Kresevljakovic] There was no mention of that. There was only talk connected with things spoken about in Geneva—that is, that the part where the government's institutions should be placed would be extraterritorial. So, they should be in that part from Marijin Dvor to the Cathedral.

[Cumurovic] Asked what the special envoy did come to talk about, Kresevljakovic said:

[Kresevljakovic] I think that it was only an informative conversation connected to [changes thought], probing our views. There was absolutely no mention of an ethnic division, maybe that is where the misunderstanding is. There was absolutely no mention of it. The man did not say a word about it. He did not mention any ethnic group in the city.

[Cumurovic] There were other questions, too, but despite the fact that they covered many issues, you have heard all that you needed to. The mayor claims that they did not discuss the division of Sarajevo, but some extraterritorial part from the Cathedral to Marijin Dvor.

Presidency Adviser Rejects Sarajevo Partition

AU0802194793 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 8 Feb 93

[Report on news conference by Kemal Muftic, adviser to the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, by Mladen Bosnjak, in Sarajevo on 8 February—recorded]

[Text] [Muftic] You are creating a sensation out of something that is a total non-event.

[Bosnjak] That is what Kemal Muftic, adviser to the Presidency, has had to repeat several times today as an answer to questions on the possible partitions of Sarajevo. Let us remind you: On Saturday [6 February], Jeremy Brade, one of the associates of Vance and Owen, visited Sarajevo and requested a meeting with Sarajevo Mayor Muhamed Kresevljakovic. He then spoke about the organization and extraterritorial status of one part of the city.

Whether it was because of the misunderstanding of the essence of those talks or the awkward phrasing or misinterpretation of the talks between Brade and Kresevljakovic, suspicions, nevertheless, still arose and speculation emerged that they talked about the division of Sarajevo. Several foreign reporters insisted on answers on the subject, and Kemal Muftic today gave them the answer we have already heard. We have selected several sentences of Mr. Muftic's out of this fairly long questioning as an illustration of the pronouncement that this was a clear case of much ado about nothing.

[Muftic] We accepted the principle of the internal organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina as presented, but if they come along with proposals for partitioning Sarajevo, I think that is frivolous. If they really plan to partition Sarajevo, then they cannot be serious.

[Bosnjak] So, according to Kemal Muftic, who is the adviser to the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency and who therefore should know, Vance-Owen thoughts along the lines of partitioning Sarajevo will be rejected by the top state body of authority. In other words, Mr. Jeremy Brade came to our city to talk about something, to propose something. That something cannot pass even as a proposal, let alone be discussed or accepted as something more serious. That is exactly how his visit should be seen and not as some kind of a sensation.

Commentary Calls Partition Proposal 'Sadistic'

AU0902160893 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Commentary by Dragan Stanojlovic]

[Text] Sometime in midsummer last year, when the war terror had already set its roots deep into the tragic Bosnia-Hercegovina country, I remembered perhaps the most brutal test of the readiness of a human being to face life as it is. This was carried out by some Eskimo tribes by placing a newborn baby on fur and leaving it naked like that for some 10 hours outside their igloos to the mercy of the polar cold. If it survived it survived. I was then thinking about the fate of the only just-recognized sovereign Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Today I cannot help but picture a truck full of calves whose ultimate fate is to be taken to a slaughterhouse. Now I think of the surviving Bosnians and Hercegovinans. Over 10 months have gone by, and there seems to be no end to this tragically poor joke of a life. During all this time, however, those whom we have elected to be our authorities have been prancing through various Lisbons, Londons, Genevas, New Yorks, and they are deciding our fate in the shadows of barrooms without even thinking of asking us what we want.

At the time we cast our votes for them, we literally wanted a better life since we had a good one even before the November elections. They promised it to us but instead gave us nothing but war and suffering that, in

terms of numbers of victims and horrors, is not remembered by recent history. They keep trying to divide us with sadistic determination, forgetting that it was exactly attempts at that that took us into war, so in analogy, a partition of Bosnia- Hercegovina into tiny ethnic territories simply cannot be taken as a solution to this bloodshed.

It is easy to explain why the greater Serbian criminals, with their powerful death industry, insist on what they allege is their part of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and why, like them, the same is now preached with increasing determination by the Croatian nationalistic authorities. The Drina River has for a very long time been a thorn in their side. But how to explain that the official, therefore the legal and legitimate leaders of the independent, sovereign, indivisible, etc. Bosnia-Hercegovina, are also taking a lively part in these discussions about partitions? In whose name can they accept that Bijeljina is Serbian, Capljina Croatian, and Tuzla Muslim, and all that after the abhorrent and ongoing act of genocide against the Muslim people, and the incredible suffering of all those Bosnians and Hercegovinians who have not accepted to be shut off into pure ethnic pens, and by that have brought onto themselves the fate identical to that of the Muslim people?

The voice of the people cannot be heard above the grumble of the guns, but all these gunners who allegedly speak for the people must understand that a just and lasting peace will not be brought to Bosnia-Hercegovina by any partition of its territory into ethnic fragments. Blood has rendered Bosnia-Hercegovina united, but it is blood mixed with happy lives and loving hugs. That is why any partition of the entity that is Bosnia-Hercegovina will bring nothing but more bloodshed. In the name of that, the blood of the innocent and the brave that has been spilled so far obliges all of us still alive to unite and win together a just peace for this country and its long-suffering people. Through politics or the use of armed force, it makes no difference as, in this case, the goal—a unified and sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina—in all reality justifies any means.

Refugees in Tuzla 'In Extremely Bad Shape'

AU0902124793 Paris AFP in English 1239 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Geneva, Feb 9 (AFP)—Nearly 5,000 starving Bosnian Moslems, many wounded or having lost toes and fingers to frostbite, have arrived recently in the Tuzla area of northern Bosnia, a UNHCR spokeswoman said here Tuesday [9 February].

Sylvana Foa, from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), said the victims of Serbian "ethnic cleansing" were "in extremely bad shape."

"They are horribly malnourished, they have severe frostbite and they are showing signs of scabies, head lice and war wounds.

"We have 50 severe cases of frostbite. Some of them are losing their fingers and their toes," she said.

The refugees were starved out of the towns of Cerska, Zvornik and Kamenica where they also endured daily shelling by Serbian militia, Foa said.

The UNHCR has repeatedly sought to be allowed to send food aid to Cerska, but the Serbs controlling the access roads have refused.

The refugees fled to Tuzla along what the Serbs call a "humanitarian corridor," but it is a one-way route, the spokeswoman said.

In the area of Trebinja in southeastern Bosnia the forced displacements have apparently ended, she said. Some 4,000 people—the entire Moslem population of the town—have left heading for the border with Montenegro.

Meanwhile, 15 ill or wounded children from Sarajevo were to be flown to France for treatment on Thursday, the Medecins du Monde Humanitarian organisation said in Paris Tuesday.

The children would be accompanied by relatives.

Izetbegovic Discusses War, Peace Efforts

AU0902212193

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1603 GMT on 9 February carries a 40-minute report by Predrag Smoljan on the address by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, to a protest meeting in the International Press Center in Sarajevo by citizens of eastern Bosnia on the tragedy of the population in this region on 9 February. The report includes recorded portions of Izetbegovic's address.

Izetbegovic begins by talking about the suffering of the people in eastern Bosnia and reminds the citizens how the war broke out despite all the negotiations and all the efforts to avoid it. He says that "this war has been imposed on us, as you well know, and when we think about how this tragedy came about, we have no reason at all to tell ourselves that we are in any way guilty for what has happened to us. We bear no blame for what has happened to us. We did not want the war." He says that "this is not war. We know what war is. It is a clash between two armies. This has been from the very start a clash between a very well-equipped army, unfortunately one of the best equipped armies in the world, and empty-handed people. We tried to avoid the clash because we realized that we would not have stood a chance in a direct conflict. We thought that we should seek out political solutions, separate, if we had to, in a civilized manner."

He says that his meeting with the citizens is "both pleasant and unpleasant. It is unpleasant because I cannot help you, I cannot help you much. I have no

means to help you. We have found ourselves, we the Bosnian people, between a cruel enemy and a hypocritical friend." Talking of the beginnings of the war, he says that "they thought that they would eliminate us within a fortnight. We have confiscated documents, papers that show that they counted on the Bosnian war not being longer than 15 to 20 days, as they practically had Bosnia occupied. They thought they just had to deal with some resistance nests, as they call them, and Zepa was one of the places mentioned. They thought Bosnia would be conquered in some 15 to 20 days, and then it would be divided. How? It would be divided as if there were no Muslim people. That was the plan, to divide it between two countries. You and us, thanks not so much to the weapons, which we did not have in abundance anyway, but thanks to our readiness to resist, we showed them that this would not be the case. So, as much as we dislike all these plans coming from the far-away Geneva and America, we still have to realize one thing: There can be no solution without the Muslim people in Bosnia-Hercegovina."

Izetbegovic apologizes for talking only about the Muslim people by saying that "I am the president of the country and I should speak more about Bosnia-Hercegovina on this occasion, but we are talking about the people, about the suffering of the people in Zepca, Srebrenica, Vlasenica, Cerska. I am now speaking about these people, but I am not forgetting that other nations have also suffered. The goal is to destroy Bosnia as a country, but the plan is to destroy it through the destruction of the people, and the Muslim people are the backbone of Bosnia-Hercegovina." He says that "we hope that we will preserve Bosnia-Hercegovina. We will preserve it not thanks to those negotiators, but thanks to the people who are ready to face death."

Izetbegovic tells the citizens that "we have written yet another letter. It has been sent out to the presidents of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, the chairman of the Security Council and Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali." He then proceeds to read the letter, the contents of which are concerned mostly with the "appeals to help eastern Bosnia, which is dying of hunger."

He says that "today the people of Gorazde are expecting a convoy. We spent all day yesterday on the telephone to [UNPROFOR General] Morillon, we visited him two days ago. He went to Pale yesterday to get permission for passage. He returned yesterday and said to me very briefly: I will keep trying, but I do not think I will get it. I warned him that it is Tuesday [9 February] today and that the people of Gorazde were expecting the convoy. As you can see, things are very bad. When we finally look back at things, we will be able to say that everything we got, and what we will get in the end, will be what we managed to defend with our own hands."

Izetbegovic then discusses the proposed maps for Bosnia-Hercegovina, saying "I do not know what will happen. I hope, I firmly hope that we will manage to defend Bosnia-Hercegovina," and "these miserable maps do envisage parts in which the Bosnian army will be in control immediately. Unfortunately, some parts have remained under chetnik control, for example, Gacko, Nevesinje, [word indistinct], but we have not accepted these maps. Some parts around Banja Luka have also remained under chetnik control. The last correction that they have offered us—I received it last night, gives us Brcko—one corridor to Brcko, where the Bosnian army would be in control, so we would have access to the Sava River. They asked me if I agreed, and I said it was an improvement but that it was not enough, that the map needed more improvement. I think that in the end we will manage to salvage a large part of our country immediately, and to return a large number of our people. We will be able to say: Come back, you have somewhere to return. The chetniks are no longer there; the Bosnian army is there now. Srebrenica, Vlasenica, Zvornik, and Zepa are also supposed to be under the control of the Bosnian Army."

Izetbegovic continues, saying that "I will do whatever depends on me, and not much does. You can see that things are being solved far away from us, in New York; they are deciding our fate there. We have sent intelligent people there, people who know how to defend our cause. They are trying as hard as they can. You could read in today's newspaper that we have set four conditions for negotiations. The first condition is that the humanitarian convoys must get through. That is the first condition." Izetbegovic then asks if anyone wants to ask any questions, and the reporter Predrag Smoljan says that the only question asked is: Has Alija Izetbegovic decided as the president to partition Bosnia-Hercegovina?

Izetbegovic says "we have never accepted the partition; we have not accepted it. What we are being offered, you know well that we have refused to sign those papers, is that so? You know that we have refused, right? Are there any misunderstandings regarding that? I am talking about the maps that we have been offered, what they look like. We refused to sign those maps, and I retreated to Sarajevo while I sent Silajdzic to go and quibble with them there in New York. He knows what he is supposed to do."

"I am talking about the maps that have been suggested so far. Vance [Conference on Yugoslavia cochairman] has visualized the liberation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in two phases. The first phase sees the armies still there, and it is clear. This army stays here, and that one stays there. When I said to him that the chetniks could not stay anywhere, he said: By all means, get rid of them, Izetbegovic. Take a Hoover and vacuum them up if you can. Who is going to get rid of them for you? Who? If you can do that, President, do it. We cannot do it for you. We can only make sure that it is done gradually. That means, the Chetniks must be forced to leave the purely Muslim areas, to return Foca, Zvornik, Vlasenica, the entire eastern Bosnia, to return Prijedor, Kozarac, Brcko, Jajce, Donji Vakuf. That is the first stage.

"Then, they would withdraw into the parts where they are in the majority. Let us be perfectly honest, that is what would happen according to the maps, and this is how that conversation went. They would pull back to where they are in the majority. [Words indistinct] everyone would be demilitarized, everyone would hand in their weapons under pressure from the international community, and after that the state would start functioning on the entire territory. The state as a state has been set, and it is to remain as one, but now there are three armies in this state—the chetnik army, the Croatian Defense Council army and the Bosnian Army. These armies have the manpower, the weapons, equipment, everything. How to get rid of that? Since no one from the outside wants to come and get rid of the chetniks, and we are not able to, we have been offered, they say, listen, if you can, go ahead and finish the job. We say, we could if we got the weapons. They say they are not giving it. They say that would lead to the spreading of an endless war. But here, they said, accept the withdrawal of the chetniks from some territories that they hold now.

"That is why we are in a dilemma now. Should we reject this gradual approach to the solution for fear of being cheated in future? One part of it is that something should be done immediately. The chetniks should immediately hand over their heavy artillery, but they say that their army without its artillery is not much of an army. We believe so, too. If they were forced to hand over their heavy artillery, no problem. That is what we thought, but this plan that we have rejected says that for a while the chetniks would keep control over parts of eastern Hercegovina, Trebinje, Gacko, Nevesinje [word indistinct]. Then they would hold control of part of Bijeljina and the Banja Luka region, that is, a big chunk of territory. So they would maintain control over these three places, but they would have to pull out of Jajce, as I have said, within 45 days, according to the plan [words indistinct]."

Izetbegovic says "the problem is that we can, of course, reject that, but we can also say: Let us solve the problem gradually. Have them pull out of those parts first, so that our people can return to Jajce, Prijedor, anywhere from where they would pull out within 45 days and the Bosnian army would move in. When the Bosnian army takes those parts we can tell our people that they can return to their homes, to rebuild." He says "they said if you accept that, we will force them to withdraw, and they will withdraw. If you do not accept, then it is up to you to see that they withdraw, but do you have the forces for that?"

"The decision is very hard," Izetbegovic says, "if we reject we might not even get that. I have spoken, and I will tell you this openly, to Yasir 'Arafat about a month ago. Since the Palestinians are in a similar situation, I asked him: You know our situation. He said: I know it well. What would you do if you were in my shoes, I asked. He said: Are they offering you a piece of land? I said: They are not offering it, we have a good piece of land under our control, but we want the whole country. He said: Take that piece of land, dear Alija, and get your people back into the country because you could lose them. Solve the rest later. You will lose the people to the world."

Expounding on how difficult the decision is, Izetbegovic says that "by rejecting the plan, we could make the war last another year or so, and I do not know how things will develop. It depends on whether the world will help us or not. I do not know if it will help us."

Talking about what the future might hold for the country, Izetbegovic says that "there is a great remedy called time," and "new generations will come, slowly some of the horror will be forgotten, provided, of course, that the ones guilty of this are punished. There will be no remedy without that." He says that "those who have bloodied there hands cannot be forgiven, but the only ones who are to be forgiven regardless of everything are the women and children. Let us not be an army that does what they are doing to us. Let us never fight against women and children. We will never win if we do."

Cease-Fire Reportedly Broken by Serb Attack

LD0902164293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] In Sarajevo, a cease-fire which came into effect at midnight was largely respected until 1000 when six artillery shells hit the district of Hrasno Brdo in Novo Sarajevo and the Stari Grad municipality came under fire from chetnik antiaircraft and machine guns. The police have reported that a sniper has injured one person at Sedrenik. That the current cease-fire, like the previous 19, is not to be believed in was reinforced by the Serbs when they shelled Dobrinja with artillery weapons.

Representatives of the UN peacekeeping forces said at a news conference today that a scheduled meeting of a mixed military group subcommittee, which will discuss repairs to the city's electricity and water systems, was taking place at Sarajevo airport. Two such repairs were carried out successfully yesterday, and if the cease-fire negotiated by General Morillon [UN Protection Force commander in Bosnia-Hercegovina] lasts, more substantial repairs to the city infrastructure will be possible.

It was also revealed at the news conference that one woman was killed and a child was injured last night in an attempt to cross the runway at the airport on foot and to reach free territory. The UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] said that Serb snipers were to blame for the tragedy.

U.S. Plan To End Fighting Reported

AU0902151293 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Report by Sarajevo correspondent Risto Djogo]

[Text] No detonations can be heard in Sarajevo today. There is an almost unreal lull, probably a result of the

cease-fire that Muslim commander Sefer Halilovic proclaimed for the first time. The Serbian army has accepted this cease-fire. Only snipers are active. Residents of Grbavica, Vraca, Lukavica, and Nedjarici are trying to protect themselves from sniper fire from Muslim positions. Serbian military sources have reported some green berets regrouping in Zetva, the Kosevo Stadium, and Mt. Igman. It is unclear whether they are preparing for a new offensive or whether this is a simple parade.

The Muslim media has not commented much on the UN Security Council's consultative meeting. All attention is focused on the plan to settle the crisis in the former Bosnia-Hercegovina that Clinton may present tomorrow. The U.S. Administration is expected to extend support to the Muslim side—above all, weapons—and tighten sanctions against Serbia.

Trebinje Official Denies 'Ethnic Cleansing'

AU1002081993 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 93 p 14

[Report by R.G.: "We Are Not Driving the Muslims Away"]

[Text] Yesterday, Bozidar Vucurevic, Chairman of the Assembly of the Trebinje municipality, addressed the public and announced that there was no ethnic cleansing in Trebinje.

While not denying the fact that many Muslim families have moved away from the area, Vucurevic said that the municipal authorities were ready to guarantee the personal and material safety of all those Muslims who wished to remain. The unit for special purposes of the Internal Ministry of the Serbian Republic [of Bosnia-Hercegovina] has been engaged for this purpose, said Vucurevic.

"The moving away of Muslims from Trebinje cannot be compared to the fate of the Serbian people in Mostar, Konjic, Sarajevo, Zenica, and some other places," added the chairman of the Trebinje municipality.

According to Vucurevic, there are many reasons why the Muslims are leaving:

"A large number of refugees whose families have been killed by the Ustasha and whose property has been confiscated, have moved to the territory of Trebinje from other municipalities. These people find it hard to believe that the mutual existence of Serbs and Muslims is possible, although in the case of Trebinje this has been so for centuries."

Vucurevic also pointed out that war profiteers frequently come to this municipality, where they then frighten and rob the citizens.

"However, the moving away of Muslims from Trebinje has been influenced by the detrimental policy of Alija Izetbegovic because these people are not going into the unknown. We know that there is a reception center in Rozaje, from which they are then redirected according to the plans of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]," said Vucurevic, Chairman of the Assembly of the Trebinje municipality.

Army Using Chlorine Tankers as Defense in Brcko

AU0902125893

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1100 GMT on 9 February carries a report on fighting in Brcko.

Brcko correspondents Hamid Deronjic and Nihad Salihovic report that the "aggressor" is shelling Licki Most, Rijeke, Dizdarusa, Omerbegovaca, Lipovac, Brod, and Brodusa. The correspondents add: "Bosnia-Hercegovina Army units have installed tankers containing liquid chlorine near Ulice and along the Bukovac-Bosanska Bijela line. If the aggressor continues to shell civilian facilities, there is a high probability of his hitting the tankers and causing a major ecological disaster with a chlorine leak."

Small Percent of Needed Medicine Reaches Sarajevo

AU0902164293 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] According to the Bosnia-Hercegovina Headquarters for Health Protection, the humanitarian aid that is now delivered to Sarajevo satisfies only 53.6 percent of the city's needs. The situation is far more devastating with the delivery of medicine. According to the needs of the city, 105 tonnes of medicine and sanitary materials should have arrived last week, but only nine tonnes did. That satisfies 8.5 percent of Sarajevo's needs.

Mazowiecki Says Human Rights Must Be UN Priority

AU1002075793 Paris AFP in English 0114 GMT 10 Feb

[Excerpts] Geneva, Feb 10 (AFP)—The United Nations Human Rights Commission special rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, bluntly told the United Nations Tuesday [9 February] it had no choice but to act swiftly to halt human rights abuses in Bosnia-Hercegovina or be accused of "complicity" in the atrocities.

The former Polish prime minister said in a report that the U.N. should secure "in the shortest possible time" the release under international supervision of all captives, the removal of blockades round towns and the creation of safe areas in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

"What point is there in monitoring human rights unless this leads to the restoration of a minimum of respect for life and dignity," the special rapporteur told the commission. Unless this was achieved, he said the role of the

commission would be reduced to "passively recording the events of this tragedy. Would this not make us accomplices?" he said.

Mazowiecki warned the commission not to fall into the "trap of indifference and cynicism." He said "contempt for international conventions and for engagements solemnly entered into, can have very serious consequences for the credibility of the international system."

The warning from Mazowiecki came shortly after it was announced in Geneva that nearly 5,000 Bosnian Moslems, victims of "ethnic cleansing" had been registered in the Tuzla region by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

The United States, the European Community, Canada, Germany and Austria were among several countries who spoke up at Tuesday's session in favour of setting up an international court to try war criminals.

Mazowiecki acknowledged that he was asking the U.N. to take "very difficult decisions." But he said "just offering sympathy to people whose rights have been so brutally trodden underfoot while condemning the perpetrators of such acts only in words, would be an avowal of impotence."

At present, the United Nations and the means at its disposal were "not in a position to respond to the challenges we are confronting," said Mazowiecki who is to deliver another report in a few days' time. [passage omitted]

Mazowiecki blamed the Serbs for human rights abuses in Bosnia. "We are increasingly faced with the evidence that (Bosnian) Serb leaders are most responsible for the policy of ethnic cleansing of which the Moslems are the main victims. It is hard to imagine that this policy was possible without the active support of the government of Serbia," said Mazowiecki, who also expressed concern about "nationalist trends" posing a threat to Serbs in Croatia.

The representative of the rump Yugoslavia, now reduced to Serbia and Montenegro, Vladimir Pavicevic accused the media of spreading "continued propaganda of moral and political disqualification of the Serbian people and false presentation of the actual activities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

As the Security Council debates whether to back the peace plan for Bosnia-Hercegovina drawn up by the Yugoslavia conference cochairmen Cyrus Vance for the U.N. and David Owen for the European Community, Mazowiecki said "respect for fundamental human rights must take priority in the decisions to be taken now."

HDZ Big Winner in Chamber of Counties Election

LD0902165793 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] As we have been reporting, the electoral commission of the Republic of Croatia is still receiving reports on the results of the elections for the Chamber of Counties of the Croatian Assembly. Here are the latest results:

As is known, the elections were held in 21 counties. Results for 13 counties have so far been completely processed. Twenty-one parties with independent lists and five coalitions contested 63 seats in the Chamber of Counties. According to preliminary results which had arrived in the republican electoral commission by 1200 today, the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] won in 19 counties. The HDZ is followed by the Croatian Social-Liberal Party [Hrvatska Socijalno-Liberalna Stranka—HSLS], the Croatian Peasants' Party [Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka—HSS], and the Istrian Democratic Assembly [Istarski Demokratski Sabor—IDS]. The HSLS won in Medjimurje county and the IDS in Istria county.

The HDZ is estimated to have won 37 mandates in the Chamber of Counties. It is supposed that the HSLS will have 18 seats, two of which, according to a coalition agreement, belong to the Party of Democratic Changes [Stranka Demokratskih Promjena] and one to the Croatian People's Party [Hrvatska Narodna Stranka]. The HSS won five seats and the IDS three seats in the Chamber of Counties.

According to the latest official reports, 3,675,356 people in Croatia have the right of vote. The turn-out for the elections was more than 70 percent. The electoral commission of the Republic of Croatia knows that the elections will probably be annulled at three polling stations—in Turanj, in Moscenica in Petrinja municipality, and in Mihanovicev Dol in Klanjec. The release of the final results of the elections for the Assembly's Chamber of Counties has been announced for 1300 on Thursday 11 February.

Opposition Said Defeating HDZ in Larger Towns

LD0902171493 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1340 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Zagreb, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—The Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], despite its convincing victory in the parliamentary elections for the Chamber of Counties, cannot be satisfied with the results achieved in the local council elections. The latest results, which journalists find difficult to obtain because they are not being sent to the same place, show that the opposition will seriously undermine the HDZ position in the cities.

The unofficial results so far show that the opposition has won the majority of votes in the local council elections in Osijek, Split, Rijeka, Varazdin, Pula, Koprivnica, and some other big towns.

In Zagreb, however, the HDZ won 45.6 percent of votes and will have 35 seats out of 60 in the city assembly. They also won in Sisak, Karlovac, Gospic, Zadar, and Dubrovnik.

Serbs Arrest Belgian Soldiers for 'Spying'

LD1002112393 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1014 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Knin, 10 Feb (TANJUG)—Members of the police force of the Republic of Serb Krajina have arrested a five-member patrol of the Belgian contingent of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] plainclothes police stationed in Sector East in Baranja, the ISKRA agency reports.

They were arrested, ISKRA adds, in an area where they are not allowed to operate without a permit allowing them free movement in the region of western Slavonia. One patrol managed to escape, and the other, the five-member one, tried to destroy its equipment after it was detected. This indicates, ISKRA says, "an attempt to destroy evidence of their spying activities."

Slobodan Jarcevic, foreign minister of the Republic of Serb Krajina, lodged a protest over this event with the UN Security Council and the UNPROFOR commander. The arrested policemen will be charged before the court with illegal activities on the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina according to the laws of the Republic of Serb Krajina, the protest note says.

Talks Held With Bosnian Croats on Cooperation

LD0902211393 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Video report by Ivo Sipek]

[Text] [Announcer] Dalmatia and Herceg-Bosna, two regions of two neighboring and independent states, are closer than ever. Economic cooperation will soon be confirmed with an appropriate treaty.

[Begin Sipek recording] The Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna has significant economic, industrial, energy, and hydroelectric potential, and it easily complements development and economic plans of Croatia—specifically Dalmatia.

It would not make economic sense to develop identical capacity for primary production within a 200-km radius, as used to the case. It is possible to have good economic cooperation in several fields. According to experts from Croatia and the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna, it is possible to have very good cooperation in the field of

military industry. Namely, there are several large military facilities near Mostar, and it would be very expensive for Croatia to waste money on such facilities.

Similar proposals were voiced at a meeting of leaders of the economic chamber of the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna and the Split economic chamber. Jago Lasic, the chairman of the Mostar-based chamber, urged discussion about and further work on forging cooperation in the fields of textiles, construction, and the shoe industry. His Split counterpart informed the meeting about the energy and hydroelectric power situation. Talks about aluminum plants in Sibenik and Mostar, ports, roads, and railroads are forthcoming. [end recording]

Government Rejects Negotiation With Krajina Serbs

LD0902170393 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1635 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Zagreb, Feb 9 (TANJUG)—The Croatian Government will not in the future negotiate at the United Nations with Serbs from the U.N.-protected Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) because the RSK delegation has not appeared at the current peace talks in New York.

A statement released by Croatia's permanent mission to the United Nations, which was published in the Croatian capital Zagreb on Tuesday [9 February], said that the Croatian Government was, however, "prepared to restart negotiations within the conference on the former Yugoslavia about a special status for the areas in which Serbs constituted the majority population before the war and about other problems concerning human and minority rights in the Republic of Croatia."

RSK authorities on Friday decided against going to New York and said they would agree to talks with the Croats only when Croatia had unconditionally implemented all decisions stemming from resolutions 762 and 802 of the U.N. Security Council and when the Croatian Army had suspended its aggression on the RSK and withdrawn to behind the U.N. truce line.

Croatia's aggression on the RSK, which started on January 22, has caused heavy civilian casualties among the RSK Serbs and extensive material damage.

The Croatian government also said that it could not accept any solution [words indistinct] might threaten the sovereignty or diminish the integrity of the Republic of Croatia or the authority of its government in the entire territory within its internationally recognized borders.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and other top-ranking officials of this former Yugoslav republic have repeatedly stressed that they will not agree to a renewal of the U.N. peacekeepers' mandate if they do not help them restore sovereignty over the RSK territory.

The RSK was proclaimed in 1991 in territories where Serbs are the majority population in protest against Croatia's violent secession from the former Yugoslavia.

Croatian Serbs Call for 'Joint Serbian State'

LD0902231293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2024 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Knin, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—The governments of the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina [SR] and the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] in Croatia exchanged views about the political and military situation in the republics, economic relations, balance of payments and monetary systems, and other issues of mutual interest at a joint session held in Knin this evening.

The joint session was chaired by SR Prime Minister Vladimir Lukic and Zdravko Zecevic of the RSK.

Addressing a large number of journalists at a news conference held after the session, Zecevic announced that another joint session of the assemblies of the SR and the RSK will be held within 15 days.

"Regardless of what the world thinks, our proposal is that a joint session of all Serbian republics be held. If we do not manage to do that at this moment, then, in the first phase we shall put forward a proposal on unifying the SR and the RSK and call a referendum about this," Zecevic said.

SR Prime Minister Vladimir Lukic said, "Our people are ready and resolved to fight for their right to self-determination and the creation of a joint Serbian state.

"It is our wish that our economic and political relations be integrated and, hence, that every one of the Serbs can feel that they are living in one state," Lukic said.

Lukic, Zecevic Hold Talks on Croat 'Aggression'

LD0902211493 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1902 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Belgrade, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—A delegation of the government of the Serb Republic (in Bosnia-Hercegovina), led by Prime Minister Vladimir Lukic, arrived in Knin this afternoon, the (Krajina) ISKRA news agency reports. It then met a delegation of the government of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], led by Prime Minister Zdravko Zecevic.

Members of the two governments exchanged views about the latest situation in the wake of the brutal aggression by the Republic of Croatia on the RSK.

Vladimir Lukic, prime minister of the Serb Republic reiterated its firm commitment to implement fully and reactivate the protocol on joint cooperation, including a joint military-defense alliance, adopted at a joint session of the assemblies of the two republics held in Prijedor last autumn.

The RSK prime minister expressed firm readiness that the RSK will insist on implementation of all points of Security Council Resolution No. 802 on the unconditional withdrawal of Croatian forces from occupied territories.

Serbs Claim Victory Over Croat Forces

LD0902190893 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1749 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Knin, 9 February (TANJUG)—In today's battles in the north Dalmatian theater, Serb forces have completely crushed the Imotski, Osijek, and Slavonski Brod battalions of the Croatian Army, the press were told late this afternoon by Colonel Kosta Novakovic, spokesman for the general staff of the army of the Republic of Serb Krajina.

An official statement by the general staff stresses, that "the aggressor's forces suffered great losses in personnel and a large amount of combat hardware and other military equipment was destroyed or captured."

Asked by TANJUG's correspondent about the location of the fiercest operations and the situation in the villages in the frontline—Islam Grcki, Islam Latinski, Kasic, and Smilcic—Colonel Novakovic said that it is precisely in the area of these villages that the fiercest battles are being waged.

There were also fierce clashes in the Novigrad area today. It was confirmed to the press that the town and its surroundings are largely under the control and "in the hands" of Serb forces.

According to unofficial reports by Krajina's forces and Colonel Novakovic's reply, most of the battles continue to rage along the main lines of the Croatian forces' offensive—from Zadar to Benkovac and to the northern area of Obrovac. Croatian forces again mortared this town on the Zrmanja River today.

At the press conference it was also confirmed that Serb forces have taken control of the Mali Alan pass on Mount Velebit, which would be used "as a launching pad" for taking control of broader areas.

Fierce battles are also being waged at this pass. Krajina's forces "are crushing, step by step, the enemy's stubborn resistance, emplacements, positions, and bunkers."

There is no peace in the Lika theater either. From the village of Bivalje near Gospic, Croatian forces have shelled the Serb village of Rebac in Gracac municipality.

As of today, the army of the Republic of Serb Krajina, it was said, has a new coat of arms, which features a rising two-headed eagle with a crown and a shield with four S's [Reference to a historical Serbian slogan: Samo Sloga Srbina Spasova—Only Harmony Will Save the Serbs].

Croats Launch 'Offensive' on Krajina Villages

LD1002112093 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1051 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Knin, Feb 10 (TANJUG)—Fighting continued unabated on Tuesday [9 February] night in Northern Dalmatia after the Croatian forces on January 22 launched an offensive on the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK)—the U.N. protected area in former Yugoslavia.

The Croatian forces again opened artillery fire at Obrovac and nearby villages, aiming only at civilian targets such as the health center, bus station and the center of the town, as well as the knitted fabrics factory Trio, the Krajina Army Command said on Wednesday morning.

The Croatian artillery attacked also villages around Benkovac, Korlat, Smiljcic and Biljani Donji.

The Krajina Army Command said the attacks were aimed against the civilian population, but added that there were no casualties. [Word indistinct] the Croatian forces regularly fail in their attempts to infiltrate terrorist groups, one of which was crushed near Novigrad. The group was made up of 25 men, 16 of whom were killed in a brief and fierce clash with the RSK forces, the statement added.

After a war in Croatia, the RSK was put under U.N. protection in early 1992, under the Vance plan.

Krajina Front 'Enormous'; Volunteers Arriving

AU0902154793 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Report by Krajina correspondent Dragan Mihovic]

[Text] The line of contact—that is, the front line—is enormous. Large groups of men and large amounts of weapons are spread. Weapons are ready for combat in some places, while fierce clashes take place in others. The (?fiercest fighting) last night and this morning was in Novigrad. Although there is no official confirmation, it appears that the Serbian fighters have most certainly retaken this place. The Mali Halan pass, which was fought over for several days, is under Serbian control today. There was also some fighting in the Zadar hinterland, in Ravni Kotari. As we have learned, the fiercest fighting took place around Islam Grcki, Gornji Zemunik, and Donje Biljane. The government of the republic of Serbian Krajina is currently in session in Knin. The session began this morning and is closed to the public. Despite everything, pensioners were promised their pensions tomorrow, if this is relevant at all. Judging by everything, a new front is being opened in Lika. In Vrebac, near Gospic, the Croatian army opened artillery and mortar fire even though this is the so-called pink zone. Although no information is being published, there is no doubt that the Serbian side suffered some casualties yesterday and overnight. In any case, new volunteers are arriving in Knin. A team of journalists from the most

prominent Russian media has also arrived. Along with the Greek journalist crew, which consists of more than 10 teams, they will be trying to get a better understanding of this area and its fate and explain this to their people.

Army Denies Serb Recapture of Villages

LD0902230893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 2200 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] The recaptured area around Zadar has been heavily shelled today with the blasting heard in the town itself. The Croatian forces were forced to return fire due to the fierce Serbian attacks. As well, Serbian helicopters have been spotted flying over the area.

Serbs have been spreading rumors that they have recaptured certain villages under Croat control. However, the Croatian Army command in Zadar has denied this by saying that its forces are controlling the whole of the territory recaptured during Operation Maslenica.

Elite Units Called on To Defeat Serbs

93BA0546A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 93 pp 24-25

[Article by Marko Barisic: "Year of Guard Brigades: Elite Croatian Units Will Know How To Defeat Unwieldy Serbian Corps"]

[Text] It is the beginning of 1993, the year in which political and military experts believe that we will see the final unraveling of the entire Yugoslav crisis. The first of the year belongs to diplomacy; it appears, however, that the negotiations in Geneva and elsewhere are simply breathing space during which negotiators from the warring sides, with the help of the international community, are endeavoring to establish the spheres of interest and models for the postwar structure of the newly emerged states, primarily because of temporarily unfavorable conditions for waging war (low temperatures, heavy snowfall).

The war in Croatia and the much bloodier one in Bosnia-Hercegovina [B-H] are on hold: The former because of the Vance Plan, under which Serbs in Croatia become a national minority with the right to two autonomous kotars, and the latter because of the current negotiations on 10 provinces in B-H and the threat of international military intervention, which has at least calmed the Serb aggressor raids in Bosnia. But still, it appears that the autonomous kotars in Croatia and the Serbian provinces in B-H are the most that the international community can concede to the Serbs.

Such a solution does not even allow for discussion of the possible statehood of Serb para-state enclaves, least of all some sort of "league of Serbian states," which means the Serbian state will not once again use a political solution to cross the Drina River, nor achieve its primary goal in the war. Since this time the Serbs will not want to "lose in peace what they have captured in war," Croatia and B-H have only war as a means for regaining territory under Serb occupation (in Croatia that is the UNPAs [United Nations Protected Areas], and in B-H it is the occupied parts of Croatian and Muslim provinces), the ultimate goal being the complete seizure of the Serbian corridor through the Bosnian Sava valley. Specifically, by interrupting the corridor, the Croatian and Bosnian "borderlands" become isolated enclaves, which with time will become lifeless regions, without any prospects whatsoever for the future. This is why one can speak of the uniformity of the Croatian and Bosnian battlefield, not only for geostrategic reasons, but primarily for the sake of political decisions by the international community through which the Serb para-states are extinguished. Since the UN Peacekeeping Forces will not be able to play the role (of returning the occupied territories to Croatian or B-H control), the only option that remains is for both states to use their own armed forces to regain control over the territory that belongs to them (even in the event of international intervention, those forces would be directed only at destroying major Serbian military potential, and would not be involved in the struggle for territory).

Success of the Tigers

This operation, the recovery of occupied territories, must be quick and efficient (any protracted fighting would once again mean an international conference, negotiations, compromises...). And needed for this are elite units, mobile and powerful enough to shatter and surprise, with tactics and operative strikes, the unwieldy Serbian corps, which have already fortified themselves in possible directions of penetration. In other words, the Croatian units must capable of doing that which only one "brigade of tigers" managed to do to the eastern Hercegovian corps: bring uncertainty to the rear lines through sabotage while using armored spearheads to break the combat line, which then falls to pieces with such an unwieldy and inflexible military machine.

The success of the "tigers" is not a fluke. It is not only the product of the warriors' courage and the commanders' resolve, but most of all the result of the military concept of Western armies, which the Croatian Armed Forces have gradually begun to apply to their own structure. In this way, they are definitively abandoning the strategy of nationwide defense and social self-protection (ONO and DSZ), the strategy on which the aggressor JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] was founded (and which is moreover identical to all other armies of the former Warsaw Pact). For Serbia, that strategy was inadequate for conquest purposes (because the small but mobile Croatian units inflicted major losses on it), while for Croatia it was too expensive for defense purposes due to the ravages of war and need to care for the large number of refugees. (The successes of the Serbian armed forces in B-H are the result of the lack of organization and the shortage of weapons among the Muslims, so that until recently that was not a classic conflict between two armed forces.)

Croatian Legend

The basic difference between the concept of the army in Western and Eastern countries lies in the command structure. A military command in Eastern-type armies has on the average 30 pages of text, and it prescribes everything, absolutely everything, and commanders in the field must stick to it even if circumstances change, or rather, a command can be changed only after headquarters is informed of the new situation, after which headquarters issues a second, modified command. With Western armies, the military command is two or three pages long. It stipulates the objective and the way in which the task must be carried out, but everything else is left up to the commanders of specific units in the field (at the front). In this way, commanders have unfettered hands and can show initiative, because during the operation no other commands can come to them other than the ones that they themselves issue. And when changed circumstances arise, they must adapt on their own because there is no headquarters to which they would shift the responsibility.

In addition, the constant reporting to headquarters slows down operations, and units seem immobile and unadaptable in a war when despite well-planned campaigns and good intelligence they must always reckon with surprises by the opposing side. This was especially evident in the battle for Vukovar. The Serb commanders were told: Capture this city, there are 200 ZNG [Croatian National Guard Corps] members there, 300 MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] members, and the ordinary citizens (around 1,000 of them) have weapons. When the paramilitary formations and the regular JNA failed, an elite guard brigade was sent in, but it too ended up largely in flames. This was because their system of battle and combat line were shattered by small Croatian units, which were waiting for them deep in their territory. While they were notifying headquarters and headquarters was issuing a new command, the battle was already over. However, the battle of Vukovar too was not a clash between two armed forces, but rather an encounter between one army and a group of citizens defending their city. That is why the battle of Vukovar is a Croatian legend, because military science has no explanation for how they managed for such a long time to withstand the aggression and inflict such losses on the enemy (300 destroyed tanks, 12,000 dead soldiers), something that will not be forgotten for a long time.

Besides the difference in the command structure (the difference in weaponry relates primarily to the types of weapons) of the Eastern and Western model, there is also a difference in the organization of the individual units. For example, a JA [Yugoslav Army] motorized brigade has all of its own support structures (from logistics to its own IPD [expansion unknown], SIS [expansion unknown],...), which makes it an unwieldy and expensive machine, while a motorized brigade based on the Western model has nothing of its own aside from the means for combat; instead, it gets what it needs on the spot, so that it is much cheaper and more mobile. As the public already knows in part, Croatia has formed seven guard brigades (Zagreb, Osijek, Sisak, Split, Gospic, Varazdin, and Vukovar) that will make up the backbone of the future professional armed forces.

Decisive Spring

Soldiers in the guard brigades sign a contract, receive a salary and benefits, and can serve there until age 35. During that time the issue of housing will be resolved for them, members of the family will be assured of jobs, and after age 35 they can continue working as an instructor or something similar.

However, in order for someone even to be accepted into a guard brigade, he must literally know everything (the handling of all types of weaponry, physical readiness, psychological stability...). Besides them, Croatia also has reserve (home guard) brigades, which are activated depending on the needs on specific fronts. At the moment, because of the war, there are also R (war) brigades, which will not be part of the future structure of the Croatian Armed Forces, but which are indispensable for now. Finally, there are "service" brigades (young recruits), in which the Croatian population receives training, during the regular term of military service, in military skills in order to defend the country—but during which term a selection process is carried out: Those who demonstrate ability and who want to can cross over into the guard brigades, while the others are either redirected into the home guard brigades or are left to handle a work obligation or other civilian needs, without which it would be impossible to wage war.

Thus, it is obvious that the main burden of war and the possible liberation of the occupied territory will be borne by the guard brigades. They are using this time of neither war nor peace for training, because the spring that is approaching will in many ways be decisive for the entire geopolitical region extending from Slavonia through Bosnia and Hercegovina, to Dalmatia. We were told that the manner of training, the type of weaponry, and the number of soldiers in the guard brigades must remain a military secret for now.

Serbs Mobilizing RSK Refugees in Yugoslavia

LD0902223593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2032 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 9 (TANJUG)—The response to the latest mobilization call of conscripts from the Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) who found refuge in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has so far been good, chief of the mobilization staff of the RSK army, Colonel Rade Tanjga, said at a news conference in Belgrade today.

Col. Tanjga, however, did not reveal the number of conscripts that responded to the mobilization call-up issued on Monday [8 Ferbuary] by president of the RSK Goran Hadzic. All conscripts between the ages of 16 and 65 who were presently outside the RSK were called up

because of the continuing offensive launched against Krajina by the army of the breakaway Yugoslav republic of Croatia on January 22.

The Croatian offensive against Krajina, the predominantly Serb-populated territory under U.N. protection, has claimed over 1,000 lives, including 850 civilians.

"According to the official lists, there are now in Yugoslavia 60,000 men from the RSK fit for military service. If we succeed in drafting 20,000 conscripts in the first wave, we shall manage to save Krajina," said Col. Tanjga.

Tanjga also said that the RSK could not be defended without the help of its citizens presently living outside its territory.

"According to reliable information, Croatia now has 220,000 troops. Sixty thousand of them are fighting against Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina, but the rest will attack us," said Tanjga. "It means," added Tanjga, "that the RSK would have to have 60,000 armed men to be able to defend itself."

Tanjga also said that those who did not respond to the mobilization call would be regarded as deserters and would be prosecuted just like they would be in any other country in case of a foreign aggression.

The RSK Foreign Minister Slobodan Jarcevic told the press conference that the RSK authorities had been informed that Croatia was preparing for a total war.

"Croatia's aim is to annex our territory," said Jarcevic, "but this cannot happen, because the RSK is a state of the Serb people created through a disintegration of Croatia, just like Croatia was formed by the disintegration of former Yugoslavia."

Krajina Serbs in FRY Drafted for Defense

LD0902164793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1455 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Belgrade, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—Colonel Rade Tanjga, head of the mobilization headquarters of the army of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], said in Belgrade today that the response of able-bodied men from the RSK who are currently in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is good "for the first stages of the mobilization drive."

Colonel Tanjga told a press conference that "according to official records, there are 60,000 able-bodied men from the RSK on Yugoslav territory. If we manage to mobilize 20,000 people to begin with, then we will save the RSK."

According to him, conscripts and reservists who pay no heed to draft papers will be treated as deserters, and appropriate legal measures will be undertaken against them.

RSK Foreign Minister Slobodan Jarcevic explained that the RSK is a state of the Serb people set up after the breakup of Croatia, as Croatia was created after the breakup of Yugoslavia. He stressed that the RSK "has the right to defend itself against the aggression of the Republic of Croatia, and from violence and the extermination of the Serb people."

Krajina Government in 'Permanent Session'

LD0902205593 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1858 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—The government of the Republic of Serb Krajina discussed the current military situation and reports from battlefields at a session held today, the ISKRA news agency reported this evening.

The situation with regard to the intensive Croatian aggression was assessed as satisfactory. It was also decided that the government will be in permanent session and make concrete decisions as long as the war situation remains, ISKRA reports. [passage omitted]

The session also considered the issue of supplies and a report on energy facilities, specifically the Obrovac and Manojlovac hydroelectric power stations, where special security measures have been introduced.

The session also discussed the functioning of legislative bodies under war conditions, and concluded that even under these conditions all legal bodies are functioning, ISKRA reports.

Succession Coordinator Assesses Present Situation

AU0902200693 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 93 p 5

[Interview with Bozo Marendic, coordinator of the Croatian commission for succession, by Visnja Staresina; place and date not given: "Up Against the Wall Soon"]

[Text] [Staresina] If you want to assess common property, it is necessary to have good documentation. Did Croatia manage to obtain the documents necessary for the assessment?

[Marendic] We have something. We have very valuable and surprisingly good documents. We possess, for example, the complete files of all military-owned apartments, with all the parameters necessary for a precise assessment. We also have very good documents concerning military property on the whole territory of the former Yugoslavia. As far as the finances are concerned, we are fortunate enough to have the documents and the information from international organizations, which constitute a firm argument. The weakest point is the documentation concerning the equipment of some of the military-owned facilities. The problem is that we have no access to the former federal archives, where the original

documents have been preserved. In our assessment we often use auxiliary documents, such as analyses, reports, or accounts. They are very good control instruments, but they cannot be used as proof.

[Staresina] Do you know what happened to the common property in the meantime: hard-currency reserves, gold, real estate...?

[Marendic] We know that the hard-currency reserves, which amounted to $5.5 billion, have mostly been used up. A part of it is blocked in the accounts with world-renowned banks, and some of it is hidden. We do not know what happened with gold; its value was almost $1 billion. We assume that gold is hidden, too. Real estate cannot be taken away, but it can be destroyed, the equipment can be taken away, including paintings, furniture.... We do not know, for example, what the situation is like in the former Yugoslav embassies now, but we found out what it was like on 13 December 1990. If anyone has done any damage, he will have to pay for it.

[Staresina] "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Serbia in other words, is still in possession of the buildings in which the embassies of ex-Yugoslavia were situated. Can Serbia sell these buildings?

[Marendic] Yes, it can. This property is not blocked, although we asked for it to be blocked. If Serbs do so, we are going to ask for reimbursements.

[Staresina] Serbia changed its negotiators in the succession team. [Outgoing FRY Prime Minister Milan] Panic's team was considered more cooperative than [Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic's. Was there a change again after Milosevic won the election?

[Marendic] When Panic's team came, this seemed to be a big change at the first sight. However, this was only a result of political pressure. Serbia has in the meantime been condemned by the international community; the new states are internationally recognized. A third team is negotiating now. It is a mixture of Panic's and the Milosevic's. The changes are most obvious as far as the relations to other negotiators are concerned; they have finer manners. They are not as rude as they used to be. Among the negotiators there are experts with international reputation, who have not demonstrated any political extremism, but basically they are still protecting the interests of their boss, and their cooperation is only formal. We are probably going to find ourselves up against the wall again; it will not be possible to resolve this problem without an international court of arbitration.

[Staresina] How long could the process of succession last in your opinion?

[Marendic] Succession can only be made in peace. It is a big task, but it can be accomplished very quickly if the necessary conditions have been fulfilled. We think that this process could go on for two years, but we proposed to divide the property as we proceed, segment by segment instead of waiting until the process of succession has been completed.

Transformation of Croatian Enterprises

93BA0527A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jan 93 pp 5-7

[Article by Marko Barisic: "Daddy, Buy Me a Business Firm"]

[Text] Aside from winning the war, the most important process taking place at the moment in Croatia is the transformation of social ownership. By 28 February of this year, approximately 2,300 enterprises will by their own initiative or by force of law become private or government-owned. So far, about 1,500 cases have been handled, and the remainder are expected before the deadline mentioned.

"I think we have achieved an absolute success, although the moment has been rather unfortunate for the transformation," says Ivan Hren, assistant director of the Agency for Restructuring. "The consequences of the war, the decline in the purchasing power of our public, and the withdrawal of many business partners who have sent us letters of intent are the reasons why this process has not gone as envisaged."

Nevertheless, in the agency they do not conceal their satisfaction with what has been done so far and particularly with the model of transformation, which was constructed for peacetime. They received a laudatory assessment from the World Bank, which agrees with the aim of automatically transforming (nationalizing) firms which have not drawn up plans for transformation or with which it has not been possible to reach agreement, in order to avert a legal problem because of undefined ownership status.

So far, about 140 million marks have been paid into the fund, 70 million of this in cash (the rest in old foreign exchange savings and bonds). The reason why this sum is so small is the agreed payment schedule, which calls for paying 5 percent in the first year, 10 percent in the second year, and the remainder before the end of five years. But one gets the impression that the government, that is, the Fund for Privatization (the Agency for Restructuring and the Fund for Renewal have merged) was not so interested in what it could earn as in dealing with the socialist ballast of social ownership, which has been holding back any attempt at introducing market mechanisms. It is not from the intentions of the legislator, but from the consequences, that one can also draw some other conclusions that suggest that the purpose of this law on transformation was to change the social system entirely. Put simply, the aim was to go from a society without classes to a society with classes, from carefree citizens who did not have capital or responsibility the intention was to create small businessmen and an eternally present lumpenproletariat, even using the

aid of the state to accomplish this. There are several things that need to be borne in mind here.

Pliva the Exception

Foreign capital is not coming to Croatia, because under the law it cannot come. That is, firms may be purchased only by persons who have the domovnica (certificate of citizenship), which automatically excludes foreign nationals. To be sure, foreign investors may supplement the capital of certain firms, which means that domestic juridical or natural persons must have the major share in ownership and decisionmaking.

Nor can a foreigner purchase socially owned firms, because under the law the workers have the right to purchase 50 percent of the shares in the estimated value of the firm (if they themselves are unable to purchase that much, those employed in the government administration and public firms have preference up to that value). And, finally, Croatia has not wanted to auction off its best firms, because 10-15 percent of what is offered is usually sold in such an operation. Ivan Hren wonders: "Why sell the best to foreigners and leave the worst for our own population?" But it is well-known that the government is not even thinking about selling firms of interest to the state, the profitable monopolies (INA, the refineries, the shipyards...). The recent case with Pliva explains quite a bit of this. At the same time, the decision on transformation was made, and it was accompanied by an advertisement in newspapers about the purchase of shares for the employees, the news came in from Pliva D.D. [Pliva Joint Stock Company] that it had almost entirely become the property of the Fund for Development and Pension Funds, that is, the state.

From what we have heard, the government is interested in maintaining control over the production of drugs, but it intends to turn over cosmetics and food production to interested parties. Thus, governmentalization, nationalization, is occurring along with privatization. The extent to which it is inevitable lies not only in the domain of the law, but also in the domain of national interest, but it seems that this was not the interest of the legislator. The Fund for Privatization has a share in 70 percent of the socially owned firms that have been privatized, and in a majority of cases (Pliva D.D. is an exception) it holds only that portion which has not been sold.

One gets the impression that the purpose of the state in adopting a law like this was to create a class of businessmen, a stratum of people who with a little money and the blessing of the law would obtain ownership to certain business firms so that in the future they would represent a middle class, a bridge between big capital (the state and foreigners) and the small entrepreneurs who did everything through their own work. As a matter of fact, what this does for them is the primitive accumulation of capital. That intention can also be taken to explain why the legal authorities of this state have avoided bringing war profiteers to court, those who have enriched themselves embezzling arms and humanitarian aid, using the patriotic enthusiasm of a majority of the public. The government obviously does not want a society of honest and poor citizens equal in all respects, but diverse strata between which there will be friction and struggle, so as to give the entire nation the urgently needed liveliness and make it possible to climb out of lethargy and despondency. This situation is in need not only of the courts, but also a careful examination of the entire problem. After all, it is by no means in the interest of Croatia to sell off its potential to foreigners (in that way it would become a colony—a banana republic), nor is it in its interest to prolong socialism (distributing shares to everyone in accordance with Markovic's concept is only a perpetuation of self-management), nor are there any particular reasons to lay the foundations of society on corruption and privilege (toleration of war profiteers and privileges to those associated with the government).

No Discharges

How the privatized socially owned enterprises, that is, joint stock companies, will conduct business and make decisions is still an open question. To what extent is it justified for a worker to buy stock by mortgaging his own property (his house, his apartment...)? After all, in concluding the agreement with the agency, the new firm committed itself not to discharge workers for a certain time, and in that way the state protected itself against possible social unrest. The general director, who held that position in the past as well, can put the worker on minimum income, not because he has worked poorly, but because he is redundant. If a worker is receiving the minimum income, he will not be able to make regular payments on the shares he has purchased, and he will therefore quit and seek another job. He will have the stock and an uncertain present, which will force him to sell the stock. That presumably is supposed to be the model by which the privatized firms will become the private property of individuals. Of a new class.

However, this is not the main problem of this transformation. The meeting of a joint stock company cannot be like a meeting of the workers' council. The problem is the way in which the purchase is made, the linkup of various interest groups distributed among government institutions, firms, and banks. It is their monopoly of information, the granting of manager loans, fictitious mortgages. It is well-known that even in the previous system apartments were purchased with mortgages on fictitious real estate, and the lack of a clause on revaluation took its toll.

That is no longer the case, but we should not allow something similar to occur if enterprises are not purchased by those who are capable of it and who then go to ruin together with the employees and their shares of stock which never got even the scent of the stock exchange. From what we have learned unofficially, half of the stock in an enterprise is usually purchased by a few directors, and they, if they begin to fail, can always sell the firm, avoid the problem of their mortgages, which are

fictitious anyway, and continue to be fairly rich when they put the workers out on the street.

In any case, the effects are yet to be seen, and until then it is not out of the way to recommend to the sons of those who are close to the seats of power not to hesitate to shout, no matter how old they are: Daddy, come buy me a business firm, because who knows when the situation will straighten out and whether conditions this favorable will come again. Daddy will make a mistake if he does not do it. At least secure the purchase by taking a mortgage on the firm he wants.

Situation of Muslims in Croatia Viewed

93BA0546B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 93 pp 10-13

[Article by Ivan Sabic: "In the Name of the State and of Allah: Of Three Muslim Currents in Croatia, Strongest Is That of Semso Tankovic and Mustafa Ceric"]

[Text] At the time of the 1991 census, there were around 100,000 Muslims and an undetermined number of Croats of the Muslim faith living in Croatia. Since the beginning of the war in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina], which has forced millions of people to leave their homes, a vast river of refugees has poured into Croatia, the majority of them Muslims, which has put Muslim religious and political organizations in Croatia in a fundamentally different position. Principally because they are now in a situation where in one way or another they must concern themselves with a significantly larger number of people or, at the very least, take them into account when making any sort of decision. All of this has ultimately resulted in greater interest among the Croatian public in the work of these organizations. Especially after ties with Sarajevo, where overall Muslim policy is formulated, became symbolic due to the flareup of fighting in B-H.

Most statements by Muslim religious and political leaders in Croatia show that they actually agree on only one thing—the future structure of Bosnia-Hercegovina—but even there they do not use the vocabulary.

While people from the leadership of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] for Croatia and leading figures from the Islamic Community in Croatia say that a civil republic is the only acceptable solution for B-H, Croats of the Muslim faith, who are primarily grouped around the Croatian Muslim Democratic Party [HMDS], prefer to talk about the unity of Croats of the two religions and victory over the Serb conquerors, while leaving all discussion of the end result for some other time.

A significantly more obvious and bitter division among Muslim public figures in Croatia exists concerning the question of the attitude of the Croatian state toward citizens of Muslim nationality and toward events in B-H. Naturally, this leads automatically to different attitudes by Muslim religious and political leaders toward Croatia, or rather towards the current leadership of the Republic of Croatia, as some of them prefer to say. This in turn results in the creation of more or less formal groups of Muslim intellectuals formed on the basis of similarities in or even the sameness of positions on the aforementioned problems.

Equating Belgrade and Zagreb

Back in June of last year, Dr. Semso Tankovic, the chairman of the SDA for Croatia, wrote that the "position of the (Bosnian) Muslims, ... precisely because of the new Croatian authorities, has reached the lowest possible level." At the time, he called Muslims who did not agree with his position "young Turks," probably because they had already told him that the policy that he intended to pursue in Croatia at that time was "hardline." Dr. Tankovic used the same opportunity to inform the readers of GLOBUS, in which his thoughts were being published, that the policy pursued by Alija Izetbegovic and his closest associates during the last prewar months was lucid.

Since the blood was already running knee-deep in B-H, especially in the regions populated predominantly by Muslims, which clearly does not back up the assertion about a lucid policy, Dr. Tankovic took it upon himself to find out who was to blame for this situation, aside from the Serbs who already had their own role in the war in B-H. In the "pashaluk of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats," there remained only one candidate for that role. Tankovic did not reject it.

The head imam of the Zagreb mosque, Dr. Mustafa Ceric, also tried on several occasions to provide a logical explanation of what was happening to the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, but without threatening the stature and work of Alija Izetbegovic. "Before the conflict in B-H began, we suggested to Muslim countries that they not interfere in resolving our state's problems, because we were counting on Europe," Ceric said at a press conference last 20 August. In his opinion, Europe did not react to the war in B-H as it should have; on the contrary, stories about the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism began to be heard there. "That fear, which was first spread primarily from Belgrade, has lately been present in Zagreb as well, unfortunately," Ceric asserted. Thus, in Ceric's opinion, Croatia succeeded for some time in hiding its responsibility for the situation in B-H, but in the end it was revealed after all: To be sure, its units did not commit atrocities in the Muslim villages that the "lucid" president of the B-H Presidency forgot to arm, but they did help Belgrade dissuade Europe from deciding to protect Izetbegovic's flock.

Four months later, Dr. Ceric once again sees Croatia and Croats in the role of the party to blame for the situation in B-H. He alleges that "Herceg-Bosnia and Krajina are the same thing in terms of political goals," that "the position of Muslims in Croatia today is at the lowest point in the history of Muslims and Croats," and he substantiates his allegation with the information that "there is not a Muslim instructor at Zagreb University,"

that there is "not a single Bosnian Muslim" in the Assembly, that "Muslims must prove their loyalty before getting certificate of domicile".... He also noted that he does not know "what would have happened to us if God had not sent Alija Izetbegovic at this moment." So much that it is known who is not to blame for the catastrophe that the Muslim nation in B-H is undergoing.

Staff in the Mosque

According to allegations by people who attend prayers at the Zagreb mosque, the head imam has advanced such theories at religious gatherings as well. The HMDS has reacted strongly to all of this. HMDS representatives have presented their objections regarding the conduct of the head imam of the Zagreb mosque to the president of the Meshihat of the Islamic Community for Croatia and Slovenia, Sevko Omerbasic.

"Our most important objection relations to the usurpation of the Islamic Community by the SDA," says Asef Rushaidat, the political secretary of the HMDS. "There is no way that we can tolerate the Zagreb mosque, which should be a place for prayer to Allah, being a refuge for a political movement that is working to disrupt relations between Croats and Muslims. We called attention to a khutbah [sermon] given by Mr. Ceric. That was the first time in the history of the Islamic Community that an imam had attacked Cardinal Kuharic, and the khutbah ended with the image that the Croats are worse than the communists, and all of this because of a dispute over one facility. Apparently Ceric was forgetting that Croatia has made thousands of facilities available to refugees from B-H and that no one in Croatia has raised any questions about that."

Nor is the HMDS leadership satisfied with the organization of the Islamic Community for Croatia. Specifically, it has not been transfigured since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, so that Article 1 of the Statutes of the Islamic Community for Croatia and Slovenia states that it is a constituent element of the Islamic Community of the SFRY. This leads one to conclude that there are people within that community who are still counting on the reestablishment of Yugoslavia.

Although Sevko Omerbasic did not address most of the problems that Dr. Tankovic and Dr. Ceric mentioned in justifying their charges against "the new Croatian authorities," the fact that he belongs to a special camp is in a certain sense indicated by his rather good relations with those authorities, which were crowned by his tours around the Islamic world, during which he did quite a bit to advance the cause of the Republic of Croatia, followed by an entire series of recognitions of the independence of the young Croatian state.

The almost identical positions of Semso Tankovic and Mustafa Ceric, the good relations between Sevko Omerbasic and the Croatian state authorities, and the existence of a group of Croats of Muslim faith gathered around the HMDS indicate that there is a reasonable amount of truth to the theory often mentioned lately about three currents within the body of Muslims in Croatia. Thus far, they have had neither the reason nor the occasion to take a close look at their relative strengths. Judging from the posts held by their leaders, however, and from the attitude of the Muslim people, the current grouped around Tankovic and Ceric easily prevails.

Islamic Community President Supports Croatia

93BA0546C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jan 93 p 12

[Commentary by Sevko Omerbasic, president of the Meshihat of the Islamic community for Croatia and Slovenia: "We Are Not for Reconstruction of Yugoslavia"]

[Text] It is true that relations between Croats and Muslims are in a certain state of crisis. There are various reasons for this that are more or less known. The war is clearly the most important one, and then there are the other ones: national, political.... I am thinking most of all of relations in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina]. It is normal that the disrupted relations in B-H are reflected here in Croatia as well, but I would not agree that they are at the lowest point. Quite frankly, I am happy that in this type of situation there have not been more serious clashes.

In order for allied relations to remain at a high level, a great deal of trust is needed, but that is shaken by the enemy's adroit maneuvering. One high-ranking officer of the HV [Croatian Armed Forces] skillfully observed how during negotiations the enemy takes advantage of even the slightest opportunity to sow discord between Muslims and Croats, and in that he has had a certain amount of success.

The worsening position of Muslims in Croatia has not been reflected in official policy, but rather in individual cases such as domicile certificates, employment problems, work permits for foreigners, and other things.

There are no political currents within the Islamic Community [IZ], but there are different views held by individuals. Political positions should be expressed through parties, national positions as well, but religious positions should be expressed through religious institutions. I express my own political positions and do not hold that they are derived from the position of the Meshihat or a party. I reserve that freedom for myself. It is normal for me to try to be sensible, but I also do not deny that to others, and it is up to the public to judge expressed positions.

I am convinced that it has never occurred to the SDA to usurp the rights of the islamic Community, so that I consider such gossip unfounded.

During a recent visit, representatives of the HMDS [Croatian Muslim Democratic Party] presented to me, as

president of the Meshihat, objections concerning the statutory organization of the Islamic Community, among other things.

However, I must note that for many years the IZ was part of the Islamic Community of B-H. The Meshihat for Croatia and Slovenia was founded in 1989, and after that there was political fighting, followed by war in Croatia, and then in B-H.

With the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, and then of B-H as well, it will be necessary to undertake essential changes in the organization of the Islamic Community. Right now, the Islamic Community is in a phase of considering and discussing the question of its structure. There is no doubt that it will be administratively independent in the territory of Croatia, but there are proposals to preserve, hierarchically, certain ties that will not threaten the integrity of the newly established states. Something like the structure of the Catholic Church in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Anyone who links the current Article 1 of the Statutes of the Islamic Community of Croatia and Slovenia with efforts to reconstruct the collapsed state is wrong. The Islamic Community was one of the first ones, in July 1990, to say what it thought about the creation of new states on the soil of the former Yugoslavia.

The Islamic Community has strongly supported all efforts by the Croatian state and its leadership, and there has never been any doubt about its positions. It would take us too long to list these efforts. If only others had given part of what the Islamic Community has given.

Federal

Kontic Accepts Premiership Without 'Elation'

LD0902224993 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2211 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 9 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister-designate Radoje Kontic told TANJUG Tuesday [9 February] that he has accepted his mandate without any great elation on account of the very serious situation the country was in.

Kontic was speaking after meeting Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic, who had earlier on Tuesday proposed him as mandatary to form the new Federal Government.

He said his only preoccupation was drafting a recovery programme and creating a universally acceptable cabinet, to which end he would in the next few days consult many experts, scholars and politicians.

Kontic told reporters that he would say all he had to say when he presented his programme and cabinet to the Federal Assembly.

Kontic received the support of five of the six groups of deputies in the federal parliament with whom Cosic had held consultations. Presidential Press Advisor Dragoslav Rancic said that Cosic had proposed in the contacts the formation of a concentration or democratic unity government, but that in view of conflicting opinions on the matter expressed at the meetings the prime minister-designate would have the final say.

Fertilizer Shortage Threatens Food Production

LD1002120393 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1144 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Belgrade, February 10 (TANJUG)—The agricultural production in Yugoslavia is threatened by a fertilizer shortage, the Director of the Community of Fertilizer Producers Agrohemija, Caslav Dkurdjevic, said on Wednesday [10 February].

Roughly 600,000 tonnes of fertilizer will be necessary if 2.5 million hectares are to be sown with wheat, according to Agrohemija experts.

The manufacturers have only around 10,000 tonnes of fertilizers in stock. None of the seven fertilizer factories are currently working, although February used to be the month when the demand for these products was the highest because of spring sowing.

"The factories lack raw materials and natural gas. The most critical shortage is in ammonia," Dkurdjevic said.

Representatives of the fertilizer factory in Pancevo, the leading Ammonia producer in Yugoslavia, say that the plant would require 45,000 cubic meters of natural gas per hour if it was to start production again.

The import of natural gas stopped eight months ago when the United Nations introduced sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav government has since mid-September last year been seeking of the world community to permit deliveries of oil, oil derivatives, and natural gas to Yugoslavia for humanitarian purposes.

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Ilija Djukic on Tuesday received assurances from the chairman of the UN Sanctions Committee that he will in particular urge that natural gas deliveries to Yugoslavia be permitted.

U.S. Intervention in Bosnia Likened to Vietnam

AU0902125393 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Feb 93 p 2

[Commentary by Miroslav Lazanski: "Flying by Force"]

[Text] Will Washington accept the arguments by Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance and force Alija Izetbegovic to halt combat operations and come to the peace talks? Will the Vietnam syndrome be stronger than the Islamic influence in Congress, the State Department, and other bodies of American politics and military power?

What does the American insistence on the right to use force in the no-fly zone above Bosnia-Hercegovina mean, since all the UN and American intelligence data show that Serbian aircraft have not flown from Banja Luka airport since December 1992, and that the ban on flying has been violated by Croatian planes? Does Washington need a new UN resolution on the right to use force only as an excuse to make an underhand military intervention in former Yugoslavia?

American foreign policy has always had contradictory impulses: the need for power and, at the same time, moralization. It shows the tendency away from "idealistic campaigns" (which could be the case with Bosnia-Hercegovina) to isolation caused by the loss of illusions. Moralistic exaggerations in American political attitudes have sometimes pushed Washington even into real war adventures, which were paid for in blood. The catastrophe in Vietnam discredited the theory about antiguerrilla operations chosen by American politicians to avoid not only direct military intervention in internal conflicts in the Third World, but also their own losses.

How will American pilots react if the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina is violated by Croatian aircraft? Does it mean that the theory about antiguerrilla operations collapses here, or will it mean direct involvement by American military forces in the internal conflict in former Yugoslavia? If Serbian planes are not flying, why is there the need to push for a new UN resolution on the right to use force? Only because the Islamic countries have to be satisfied?

The basic problem in the former Bosnia-Hercegovina is not a military one, so the answer to it cannot be military

either. The war in former Yugoslavia is not a single entity, for it consists of numerous types of operations with different requirements. That is why it is impossible to develop, for this type of conflict, a single military doctrine which would be sensible and conceptually coherent.

The Pentagon is aware of all these things and when Admiral Mike Cramer, chief of the American military intelligence service DIA (much stronger than the CIA), and General Martin Brandtner, director for operations in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warn the White House—as was also done before by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and General Colin Powell, the present chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—then one has to remember Vietnam. At that time, American generals were also warning Lyndon Johnson and his administration that Vietnam was a trap, but the Pentagon would not listen. The wrong decision was made in spite of the warnings by the intelligence service. The policy of "limited military action and limited risk" was later transformed into the policy of "general commitment." The result: approximately 50,000 dead American soldiers.

Is Washington really confined to the moral imperative that "nothing should be changed by force," although everything was changed by force in former Yugoslavia, or is the Islamic factor so influential? Or is the new administration advocating the domino theory about Serbian domination in the Balkans? Unless Vance and Owen's present opposition to Washington is another little game aimed at making the Serbs in the former Bosnia-Hercegovina subsequently face yet another ultimatum—whereby the cochairman of the Geneva peace talks will appear as saviors—Washington will have to solve the following dilemma in the next few days: Is the present cautious and reserved approach to the Bosnian crisis, and to the Yugoslav tragedy in general, still cheaper than the price of a direct military adventure first in Bosnia-Hercegovina and later who knows where?

Serbia

Prime Minister-Designate Addresses Assembly

AU1002114793 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0926 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Speech by Nikola Sainovic, prime minister-designate of the Republic of Serbia, to the Serbian Assembly in Belgrade—live, broadcast in progress]

[Text] ...I respect your knowledge of the situation that we are in today, therefore, I will not speak in detail on all the elements of our economic and political reality. However, I must remind you that the unilateral secessions started the long and unfortunately bloody breakup of our federal state, which, along with all our Balkan complexities, was particularly ignited by a combination of international conditions in which powerful European and American states took advantage of our crisis—too frequently and too much so—for their own aims, not only foreign political, but also internal ones.

Only in this way can one understand, albeit not accept, the decisions of the international community, among which it is difficult to single out the ones that would be harsher than the rest: Is it the unjust sanctions, unprecedented so far against a country not in war, or is it the interference into our crisis according to the needs of individual world potentates, or the demonstration of power in establishing truth as they are now calling something that the peace-loving world used to naively call propaganda, media war, and the like.

However, the situation is as it is and we cannot improve anything by describing it. Therefore, for every section of these problems that we face, the government will create a plan and establish aims, a method, and a corresponding organization of work. The fact that the problems are big only means that one should mobilize more knowledge and work and rely on the people who are—now when our people are going through historic moments—ready to take on great responsibility for everything that is done or not done.

Therefore, the basic approach may be summed up in three elements—the strategy, the plan, and the people. The basic aims are peace, economic development, and an energetic and efficient state.

Our material possibilities represent powerful and known (?supports). We have survived upon them up until now.

The international situation defines limits that one should realistically evaluate and, as the international situation changes, adjust current plans to protect the republic's strategic interests. Regarding drafting the plans, we shall call on all creative forces of the people who are ready to help and can do so. We are going to publicly define some of those plans and the others are going to be kept a state secret. This is going to be followed by work—work without compromises, sympathy, or voluntarism.

The government's economic council, which has made significant results in creating an economic policy, will continue its work and recruit new members, particularly prominent personalities from the economic sphere.

A governmental legal council will also be created that will consist of a broad circle of experts to improve legislature and increase the efficacy of the state based on the rule of law.

In cooperation with the Economic Chamber of Serbia and the leading enterprises in the republic, we will organize work to strengthen entrepreneurship in all sectors of the economy and, in particular, to constantly adapt both economic policy and the government's practical measures to, above all, successful enterprises that have demonstrated vitality even in the time of crisis. The economic and legal councils and successful businessmen will represent the creative basis for the government. The

Academy of Sciences, universities, and institutes will be invited to cooperate in the work on strategic concepts for the development of the republic. The atmosphere of knowledge and entrepreneurship should help to reactivate our most important potential, our young and educated people.

Our position regarding the functions of the federal state are defined by the Constitution, but the fact is that the process of the breaking up of the former Yugoslav has left a deep mark on the realization of the federal administration's obligations, and on the situation of its members and organization.

Therefore, immediately upon the formation of the Federal Government, the Government of Serbia, in agreement with the Government of Montenegro, will make its contribution toward the fundamental and total revitalization of federal functions. I said fundamental, because in recent years the federal administration has too often and for too long been led by people whose aims were in direct collision with the interests of the Serbian people, to the extent that this left a special mark on the structure of the federal administration. I also said total, because in the future the functions of the federal state should not be realized only partly. We have already paid sufficiently for this.

The main characteristic of our foreign policy will be our efforts to achieve peace on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Through our participation in the peace process sponsored by the United Nations, within the participation of the FRY, we will always strive to ensure that the Serbian people who today live in the war torn areas be granted the right to decide on their future themselves.

We have sufficient experience, from Brioni and The Hague to New York [sites of negotiations on the former Yugoslavia], from the EC and CSCE to the United Nations, from the United States and Russia to Turkey, to maintain in a stable way the continuity of the foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia, which has often been attacked, but has always been respected whenever there were international conditions for justice and equal treatment of all people in this region. Let me mention the acceptance of Vance plan, the final talks in Geneva and so forth.

We will support the peace efforts with an even more active effort to promote the truth about Serbia and the Serbian people as a whole. We will bring to this work the necessary amount of professionalism and methodology as corresponds to the structure and (?openness) of some countries. Together with the federal government, we will introduce particular dynamics in our contacts with Serbs throughout the world. This should strengthen their bonds with Serbia in an organized way, strengthen their influence on the politics of the countries in which they live, and improve the efficiency of the help they want to and can offer their people today.

The integrity of the Republic of Serbia is inviolable. This is the main answer to the question of Kosovo-Metohija. I would like to take this opportunity and invite members of the Albanian, Hungarian, and other national minorities to come for talks regarding the realization of minority and human rights, which our republic provides in accordance with internationally recognized standards.

The government's economic policy will be characterized by three main aims. These are, above all, halting any further fall in production and increasing it, curbing hyperinflation, and public works and stimulating economic growth.

Here we first have to keep in mind that we have had a crisis since 1979, and that during that period the production and living standards have not only not risen but have been reduced. That has to a great extent reduced the elasticity of our economy, so that the threshold of social endurance for the application of radical restrictive measures has been diminished.

We should also bear in mind that for a long time now there has not been any implementation of adequate and necessary economic functions of the federal state, which has forced the Serbian government to introduce a whole series of its own measures. That can only be overcome by a consistent takeover of the constitutional powers of the federation in the sphere of the economy, for which the Federal Government will have our full and active support.

After the initial meandering at the start of the blockade, several companies in almost all spheres of production have begun to stand out during the last few months in the Serbian economy. They are still in operation and some of them are even successfully investing and developing. They should be helped so as to stimulate the others within each branch of the economy. The government and the Economic Chamber will assemble, for example, the furniture industry around those companies that are now operating successfully, not in order to deprecate the others, but to provide for the transfer of the successful business activities with the available potential to the accessible markets and under the present circumstances—without much talk and public bragging, promoting the values of the market economy, and healthy, economically successful men and companies.

I believe that this would open a new front in the struggle to increase production, not only through global means but through wide mobilization within certain branches of the economy. We have to call both the managements and the trade unions to a constructive challenge to discuss, for example, why one shoe factory is working and the other, the same as the first, is still. Times are too hard to consider this just a mere economic event. These things will always happen, but now those people and companies who are not able, who are incapable and not persistent are dragging too many people with them into social insecurity and a bleak future.

The sanctions have not abolished the inexpert and the incapable. They are still here. On the contrary, under the circumstances, the discrimination along the lines of knowledgeability and success is even more harsh, and those who can and will should be given preference everywhere. We will organize special activities in our joint operations with the economy in the struggle for new markets, the settlement of debts, and repurchase of liabilities. All that is very complicated now, but there have already been some results and there is plenty of room for improvement. I am convinced that such an effort will not be in vain, that it will bring about economic growth and promotion of the people who are now doing something to help themselves, their companies, country and nation with their work.

Among other things, this support means the government's readiness unreservedly to come to grips with the growth of the irregular commodity and money markets, something that is particularly manifested in the use of the primary issue of currency in ways other than intended and in uncontrolled money transactions, which then leads to the uncontrollable increase of the dinar exchange rate on the black market and spurs inflationary expectations toward unexpected levels, threatening the elementary interests of citizens and state.

The response to this phenomenon must match the gravity of the possible consequences: energetic and broad, ranging from the National Bank of Yugoslavia to numerous financial institutions, to the police and judiciary.

Putting enterprises to work and eliminating gray money transactions will bring back the conditions for implementing consistent economic measures.

As a priority task, the republic government must deal with the key issues of food, energy, medicines, and other vital products.

Indispensable measures will encompass the programs for carrying out agricultural works for every season separately: fuel, fertilizers, pesticides, prices, incentives [podsticaj], and the like. Spring works lie before us and the conditions for carrying them out must be provided immediately.

Supplies of vital products for the market will be in the focus of our attention all the time.

As regards macroeconomic measures, we are going to define them together with the federal government and the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and I am going to mention only some of them now: the constant adjusting of the level of restriction of credit-monetary policy in order to be able to maintain economic activity along with reducing inflation; and establishing the purpose of selective loans of the National Bank and rigorous control of their use, particularly for agriculture, exports, and the like.

We have recently been faced with enormous price increases. These are reaching alarming proportions. One must realize that under the conditions of blockade one cannot establish supply and demand by market laws alone. Therefore, as regards the sphere of wages and prices in these conditions, rational regulations are necessary. This implies, on the one hand, introducing objective criteria for establishing the minimum wage and stimulating above all the people who work and, on the other, preventing the prices of vital products and services in the infrastructure from being inflated through a monopoly. In this respect, one should particularly improve the system of the republican and federal commodity reserves and strengthen their role as market regulators.

Agricultural policy should establish conditions for the most rational production of basic agricultural products—wheat, corn, sunflower, and the like—and for the development of the cattle raising. Second, it should stimulate the management of land and irrigation in particular. Third, programs for revitalizing rural areas will particularly stimulate the development of rural households and rural areas in general.

As regards fiscal policy, one should first of all enable it to be efficiently implemented, because the methodology of collecting revenue is not developed at all, because the social accounting service and communal taxation administration offices have been abolished and new taxation bodies and financial police have still not become efficient enough.

The sphere of the so-called gray economy is particularly neglected and is even being encouraged by tax evasion. The tax collection system will also have to be urgently adapted to conditions of hyperinflation.

As regards the health service, education, science, culture, and sports, we have been facing great difficulties. However, in these spheres it is possible even now to fight for rationalization, protection of vital functions, and the reform of the right to generate income in these areas and the way it is done. Further stagnation in these significant areas will be prevented by a special program of measures. Our priority tasks are social protection, pensions, and the care of veterans and their families.

There is a large number of refugees in our republic. We have to care about them, too. Serbia will be a country of social justice under all conditions. That is why the bolstering of social and pension funds is an inevitability dictated by the situation and circumstances.

A further development of the legal system, as well as the rational organization and efficient functioning of state organs, will be a priority task of the new government. In carrying out these activities, the government will particularly bear in mind the role of the republic as a state in a market economy and multiparty parliamentary democracy. This state should primarily offer guidelines and provide control, and should have the necessary social content.

Particular attention will be paid to the development of the system of accountability of state organs and to democratic control of their work by citizens and parliament. This necessarily requires a clear division and definition of the duties of the state and other public institutions, territorial autonomy and local self-management, and the realization of mutual relations based on the principles of established rights and duties. This will make it possible to establish accountability at all times, and eliminate the possibility of being blamed for someone else's obligations or avoiding or failing to meet the obligations, and similar things, something that affects both citizens and the economy.

At the same time this activity should significantly contribute toward the development and strengthening of the democratic system, which this government understands as a system in which the rules of the game must fully be respected in realizing the broadly established rights and freedoms. These rights and freedoms must not be used or realized in a way that would turn them into their own negation or lead the entire system toward anarchy.

A particularly important task of this government is the fight against crime, which has reached enormous proportions, and against other socially dangerous phenomena. In addition to increasing efficiency in the work of the bodies of internal affairs, the government will be creating conditions for the efficient and (?legal) work of the judiciary organs as independent state organs. It is necessary to radically strengthen the inspections of the financial police and so forth.

The government will devote special attention to the general organization of the republic in the sphere of state administration. The role of the regions [okrug] and their importance will be redefined with regard to the exercise of power on the entire territory of the republic.

In deciding on the new government, I held numerous consultations. Above all, I consulted the caucuses of deputies. I encountered a constructive approach from the deputy caucus of the Serbian Radical Party, as well as readiness for cooperation. The representatives of DEPOS [Serbian Democratic Movement] said that any participation in government would tie their hands and undermine their role as the opposition. A representative of the Democratic Party even told me that if an individual member of that party were to enter the government at my request the party would reexamine his position in the party.

This, of course, is not good. I do not want to comment on it, but I stress again that the government will always be open to cooperation. However, it will not beg anyone and will not plea with anyone.

Esteemed deputies, I have presented you the essence, the core of the government's program. This government is not asking for any 100 days, or for concessions. It is only asking for realism, constructiveness, and sincere cooperation with all factors of the society.

We do not fear difficulties and we invite all those who are not afraid to join us. That is the way. [applause]

After the consultations I have had, I propose that the Serbian Government be made up of five deputy prime ministers, as has been the case so far, and ministers according to the existing laws on the Serbian Government. I have put forward four deputy prime ministers, I will propose the fifth one later, and I would like to announce right away that, perhaps even at the next session, I will propose a draft amendment to the law on the government to increase its efficiency and flexibility, allow the possibility of introducing into it ministers without a portfolio, of returning deputy ministers, and altogether increasing the efficient work of the government.

Based on all that, I propose the following for deputy prime ministers:

Dr. Zoran Randjelovic, who as a deputy prime minister in the former government contributed greatly to its activities;

Srboljub Vasovic, also a deputy prime minister in the former government, the man who has been in charge of commissions for harvests, planting, and a whole series of important current activities;

Dragoslav Jovanovic, former federal finance minister, director of the Social Accountancy Service before that, an expert in his own field;

Danilo Z. Markovic, former education minister, to whom I will also allocate the Ministry of Education in this mandate.

For ministers and members of the government I propose:

Vladislav Jovanovic for minister of foreign affairs, the man who has left his distinct mark on Serbian diplomacy;

Zoran Sokolovic for minister of internal affairs, the honorable, diligent executive in this extremely important field for our republic;

Marko Negovanovic for minister of defense, former minister who has started the complex tasks on the transformation of the role of the republic in the system of the new concept of the defense of our country in general. These tasks have to be completed;

Slavoljub Stanic for finance minister, former deputy minister, who has been the expert in the federal government for a long time. He has the necessary knowledge for the promotion of the realization and not only the concept of our finance system;

Radoslav Mitrovic for minister for trade relations with foreign countries, former general manager of the Zmaj company in Belgrade. He is a man with many economic

references, from the Gosa factory and foreign countries to completing the program of recovery of the Zmaj company;

Dr. Tomislav Ilic for minister of justice, president of the Leskovac district court. I propose him because my main objective is that the minister of justice should be a prominent member of the judiciary profession;

Dr. Jan Kirzgetij for minister of agriculture, forestry, and water, former minister who has contributed greatly to the programs on the revitalization of villages and the current important programs in this field;

Momir Pavlicevic for minister of industry, vice chairman of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, prominent businessman, general manager of the Gosa factory, and initiator of many programs for the revitalization of the metallurgy complex in Serbia;

Dr. Vladimir Zivanovic for minister of mining and energy sources, deputy general manager of the Serbian Elektroprivreda [electricity board] and prominent initiator of the energy concept in the development of our republic;

Zarko Katic for minister of transportation and communications, former minister, the man who has contributed greatly with his knowledge as former director of the Institute for Roads to the construction of the infrastructure;

Uros Banjanin for minister of city planning, housing, and communal activities and engineering, former minister who has left a convincing impression with his work in the former government;

Velimir Mihajlovic for minister of trade and tourism, former minister of industry, who is a young and ambitious man and I believe that he will be able to carry out his duties successfully;

Dr. Jovan Radovic for minister of labor, veterans' questions, and social welfare, who has only recently joined the Serbian government and whose knowledge, expertise, and efficiency are a guarantee that we will be able to deal with these issues in the most serious of ways;

Dr. Slobodan Unkovic for minister of science and technology, former rector of Belgrade University, a democratic man who, I believe, will be able to assemble scientists in the Republic of Serbia to work on the tasks that we are now facing;

Djoka Stojcic for minister of culture, formerly director of the Serbian Institute for International Scientific, Cultural, Educational, and Technical Cooperation, since I believe his references are vital not only for the promotion of our culture in Serbia, but also abroad;

Dr. Milos Banicevic for minister of health, director of the Institute for Health and Protection of Mother and Child of the Republic of Serbia, a prominent expert and a man who has been directly involved in the development and realization of the concept of increasing the population of Serbia, which is a strategic task for us.

Dr. Pavle Todorovic for minister of protection of environment, former minister who deserves to continue his work because of his systematic and diligent work in this sphere.

Vladimir Cvetkovic for minister of youth and sports, who is world-renown for his work in the field of sports. I do not think I need to introduce him.

Dragan Dragojlovic for minister of religions, also a former minister who has affirmed himself with his diligent work over a number of years.

Bogoljub Bjelica for minister for links with Serbs outside Serbia, who is currently a chairman of the Pancevo communal assembly. He deserves to be appointed minister because of his direct work and personal and voluntary involvement in extending help to Serbs outside Serbia.

Milivoje Pavlovic for minister of information, a former minister. This ministry has in the past few months made major, or one could say initial steps, toward strengthening information dissemination to the world with numerous publications and contacts with the world.

I am convinced that this government with its experts and work experience will meet the tasks that are ahead of us. I, therefore, propose to the people's assembly to accept and adopt this proposal.

Thank you.

Radio Announces Coverage of Assembly Session

AU1002090093 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0830 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] In today's Magazine 439 Program, we are going to follow the work of the Serbian Assembly. Our colleague Zoran Vaskovic is there:

The only, albeit significant, task the deputies will have today is to elect a new government for the republic. Therefore, chairman, deputy chairmen, and ministers of the government should be elected. Nikola Sainovic is the prime minister designate. At the beginning of the session, Sainovic will present the program of activities for the coming four years and propose the cabinet.

It is uncertain how many new ministers the new republic government will have. According to unofficial information, there will be only five to six new names. It is certain that the new Serbian Government will have a new minister for the judiciary, because Zoran Cetkovic has been elected deputy chairman of the republican parliament. It is widely held that the majority of ministers of the former government will continue in the same office.

It will be interesting to see whether the new republic government will include representatives of the opposition parties.

Most deputies of the opposition parties who walked out of the last parliament session are expected to take part in today's session. Let us remind you, this was done in protest at the amendments to the law on the election of the Federal Assembly Chamber of Republics. Representatives of the opposition parties, except for the the Depos deputies, have announced their return to the assembly's benches.

Half an hour before the session, there are a dozen deputies in the assembly hall and several dozen in the corridors.

Kosovo

Albanians Claim 'Forces' To 'Destroy' Serb Plans

AU1002103793 Tirana ATA in English 0940 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Tirana, February 10 (ATA)—Yesterday, the Government of the Republic of Kosovo issued a communique signed by the premier of this government Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, which says:

"Over the last years Kosovo has been living through one of the dramas of its history. The Serb occupier, resorting to violence, terror and genocide, is constantly intending long-term pacification in Kosovo, its occupation and marginalization of this problem in the international arena. Serbia intends ethnic cleansing in Kosovo of the Albanians and the creation of a new conditions favourable to other acts. What Serbia is doing in Bosnia, it is now seeking to do in Kosovo with violent pacifism, slow but efficient expulsion of the Albanians from their own homes. The Albanians, unprotected in the face of savage violence and economic austerity, of institutionalisation of life and loss of perspective and of the darkening of the vision for the future and the impossibility to defend their own dignity, are increasingly abandoning their homes. The Albanians fleeing Kosovo has assumed the proportions of an exodus which is extremely worrying.

"The Albanians' resistance has been long and unwavering. One cannot deny the deep patriotic feeling of a democratic and civilizing sense of those who fled Kosovo, but one can also not deny the fact that a great number of the Albanians preoccupied in their own personal fate and of their own families seem to forget that in these moments they are playing with the destiny of the nation and unconsciously are becoming part of a terrible scenario of national dissolution. Under these decisive dramatic environments the Government of the Republic of Kosovo firmly demands from the political subjects, institutions, associations and individuals, particularly from the youth to make everything possible to strongly resist this evil. Abandoning Kosovo leads to a painful road full of unexpected dangers. In this case the Government of the Republic of Kosovo expresses its great worry over this situation and strongly' opposes those forces, which it has identified and recorded, which in these grave moments manuipulate the people, distort the political goals of the organised subjects of Kosovo and undermine their actions, develop trade with Kosovo and its people, organise transportations and exodus directly realising the dark goals of Serbia.

"The Government of the Republic of Kosovo has strongly opposed the silent ethnic cleansing of Kosovo; it opposes any scenario and action which intends its evacuation. It also opposes all those forces which manipulate the needy persons and exploit the national drama for political and material profits.

"The Government of the Republic of Kosovo urges homogeneity of action by all, without political distinction so that an internal erosion so often repeated in our history can be avoided. We have forces to face this evil. We have forces to once more destroy and make unrealisable Serbia's plans and prove that we deserve, are worthy and able to make possible the freedom and independence of Kosovo."

FRY Army Chief Visits Troops in Province

LD0902162293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1458 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Text] Belgrade, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—Colonel General Zivota Panic, chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, visited Pristina Corps units yesterday with his aides, the information service of the Yugoslav Army General Staff reported today.

The tour of units stationed in Pristina, Pec, and Kosovska Vitina "was made in order to check their level of training and combat readiness," a statement says, adding that "the chief of the General Staff could see for himself that the units are trained to carry out tasks at a moment's notice."

He was especially "satisfied with the high degree of fire precision displayed by armored-mechanized units at a training ground."

The statement adds that Colonel General Panic visited the Pec Patriarchate, "the center of the spiritual life and the seat of Serbian archbishops and patriarch in the Serbian medieval state."

Serbs Seize Land, Property From Local Companies

AU1002133793 Tirana ATA in English 1313 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] Tirana, February 10 (ATA)—The seizing of the land and the properties of the Kosovo enterprises is going on at rapid rates. Only the name "AgroKosovo" has still remained from the biggest industrial-agricultural complex. All its enterprises and combines are now

attached to various Serbian enterprises. So, all the food industry of Kosovo is in the hands of Serbia.

The main aim of the forced integration of the Kosovo enterprises is the dismissal of Albanian workers and the seize of their properties. The chairman of the executive council of the branch of the independent trade union of this complex Haxhi Arifi stresses that after nearly 6,000 Albanian workers were dismissed, the Serbian authorities signed a number of agreements for the integration of industrial collectives of Kosovo and those of Serbia. A special interest is shown of the profitable agricultural collectives possessing great areas of land, with the aim of passing it on to the fund of the agricultural land of Serbia. The latest example of the seize of the Albanian land by the Serbs is the case of nearly 900 hectares of arable land, property of the "Ereniku" Agricultural-industrial combine of Gjakova, which was integrated to the agricultural plant of Belgrade. An area of pastures of 900 hectares has been taken from the "23 Nentori" Agricultural cooperative of Mitrovica.

These arbitrary actions do openly express the aims of the Serbian chauvinists for the recolonization of Kosovo. It is openly declared that this agricultural land will be truncated and distributed by 5 hectares each to all Serbian families who like to go and live in the Commune of Gjakova.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina Assembly Elects New Government

LD0902180693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1603 GMT 9 Feb 93

[Excerpts] Novi Sad, 9 Feb (TANJUG)—Deputies of the Vojvodina Assembly elected the new government and endorsed the government program presented by Prime Minister-Designate Bosko Perosevic at a session held today.

The decision was made by the minimum majority. Out of 120 deputies, 62 voted for Perosevic's program and the new cabinet. A total of 50 opposition deputies were against the program.

Representatives of the Reformist Democratic Party of Vojvodina, the Democratic Party, the Democratic Movement of Serbia, and the Democratic Community of Vojdodina Hungarians [DZVM] said the program is too general, schematic, copied from old-fashioned documents, unsuitable for the current situation, and resembles more "a declaration of intent" than a government program.

DZVM members criticized the appointment of Margit Savovic to the post of secretary for minority rights, administration and law, because she does not enjoy the trust of the local Hungarians. [passage omitted]

The new government will have three deputy prime ministers: Damnjan Radenkovic, Spas Komad, and Stojan Berber. Slavoljub Jovanovic is minister without portfolio. The following are new government secretaries: Bosko Barisic (economy); Olga Curovic (agriculture); Radoljub Etinski (culture and education); Ljubomir Lukic (information); Zivorad Smiljanic (health, labor, and social policy); Milan Orlovic (finance); and Margit Savovic (minority rights).

The new government has seven members from the ranks of the Serbian Socialist Party, and not a single member from the so-called democratic opposition. [passage omitted]

Hungarians Object to Appointment of New Minister

LD1002101093 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0700 GMT 10 Feb 93

[Text] The Hungarian politicians of Vojvodina consider the appointment of Margit Savovic as minister for Minority Affairs as a provocation. One of the legislators of the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina has stated that by this, it is precisely their minister who poses the biggest threat to the nationalities. The previous government had earlier wanted to appoint Margit Savovic editor in chief of the paper SZABADKAI HET, but this was successfully prevented at the time through joint efforts by journalists and readers.